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Abstract 
Calibration research is concerned with the accuracy of confidence judgments 
made by individuals when responding to various cognitive tasks. Individuals are 
scored as accurate or inaccurate based on the objective criterion of whether their 
responses are correct. Within the personality domain, judging the accuracy of trait 
self-ratings is more complicated than in the cognitive area as there are no perfect 
criteria for evaluating the accuracy of these types of judgements (Colvin & Funder, 
1991).  
Because cognitive calibration research findings formed the anchor for the 
current studies, the decision was made to initially scrutinize the cognitive domain for 
mis-calibration, and whether individual differences in gender, age, personality, and 
ability, influenced cognitive confidence and bias scores. In order to achieve the aims, 
of this dissertation, three studies were conducted with a total of 831 individuals being 
tested. To determine accuracy within the personality domain, the current studies 
constructed a situation wherein Big Five personality assessments could be scored as 
accurate or inaccurate. Results showed that when consistency measures were used, 
accuracy scores for each Big Five trait were reasonably high across Studies 1, 2, and 3. 
Prior to the studies conducted in this dissertation, no techniques using calibration 
procedures had been established to assess Big Five confidence or bias.  
Within the cognitive domain, calibration research has demonstrated the 
existence of a trait of self-confidence that appears to be independent of the type of 
activity being investigated. This result was replicated in Studies 1 and 3. However, the 
generality of this trait across other domains, such as personality assessments, remains 
largely unexplored. Two measures were designed to obtain confidence ratings in 
relation to Big Five personality judgments. Results from three studies showed that the 
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benchmark for peoples‟ confidence in Big Five judgments was around 80%. Data 
from Studies 1, 2, and 3 also demonstrated a one-factor solution when confidence 
scores for each Big Five trait were factor analysed. In studies 1 and 3 the factorial 
structure of cognitive and Big Five confidence scores was examined and both studies 
produced a two-factor solution.  
The calibration paradigm also uses bias scores as a measure of how well 
calibrated individuals are when self-monitoring their performance on various 
cognitive tasks. Whether people are well-calibrated within the Big Five domain has 
not been investigated by previous researchers. The current studies examined whether 
people were mis-calibrated when making Big Five judgments about themselves. The 
data from two studies indicate that people were well-calibrated for each of the Big 
Five traits. Factor analyses of Big Five bias scores revealed a one-factor solution. 
When study 3 examined the factorial structure of cognitive and Big Five bias scores, 
the analyses showed that bias across these domains were separate but correlated 
processes. Across all three studies, individual differences in gender and age did not 
influence Big Five confidence, Big Five accuracy or Big Five bias scores.  
One of the most significant implications of this dissertation, for calibration 
researchers, who are striving to understand the mis-calibration phenomenon, was that 
the structural analyses of cognitive and Big Five bias scores yielded a two-factor 
solution (i.e., Personality and Cognitive Bias), that was moderately correlated. Also, 
in the current studies, simple methods were used to obtain Big Five confidence ratings. 
These procedures could now be used to investigate the factorial structure of 
confidence in much more detail, and across other domains such as interests, attitudes 
and values. Practical implications of the current research within the field of clinical 
psychology were also discussed. 
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 Chapter 1 – Introduction  
1.1 Structure of the Dissertation 
This dissertation comprises six chapters. This chapter briefly sets the scene for 
the next five chapters, provides the reader with an overview of the broad aims 39of this 
PhD research, and concludes with a tabular overview of the three studies carried out in 
this dissertation. The research literature is reviewed in Chapter 2. Studies 1, 2, and 3 are 
covered in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 respectively. Chapter 6 forms the general discussion.  
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
Accurate self-insight into one‟s cognitive abilities and personality traits is 
fundamental to navigating daily life. Realistic self-views of personal strengths and 
weaknesses in both these areas, for example, allows individuals to make appropriate 
academic, career, and even relationship decisions, that capitalise on talents and at the 
same time consider areas of difficulty. Because individuals receive extensive feedback 
from each other and from their natural environments, accurate self-knowledge should be 
a relatively easy task for most people. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that 
people lack self-knowledge in some situations, and that there is considerable variation 
across individuals (e.g., Ackerman, Beier, & Bowen, 2002; Alicke, 1985; Dunning, 
2005; Ehrlinger & Dunning, 2003; Hansford & Hattie, 1982; Kleitman, 2008; Kleitman 
& Stankov, 2001; Pallier et al., 2002; Stankov, 1998, 1999a, 2000a, 2000b; Stankov & 
Crawford, 1996a, 1996b, 1997). 
Research examining the accuracy of self-insight can be split into three main 
groups. Within the first body of research, cognitive psychologists have examined 
correlations between participants‟ self-report ratings of their intelligence and objective 
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scores on tests or tasks of these intellectual abilities. Participants‟ self-perceptions of 
abilities are regarded as being accurate if they are highly correlated with performance 
measures. Earlier research showed that average correlations between these variables 
ranged between .20 and .30  suggesting that peoples‟ perceptions of their abilities are 
not closely tied to actual performance (for reviews see Hansford & Hattie, 1982; Mabe 
& West, 1982). Later research paints a slightly more flattering portrait with correlations 
between self-estimated and tested abilities ranging from .35 to .58 (e.g., Ackerman, 
1997; Ackerman et al., 2002; Ackerman, Kanfer, & Goff, 1995; Borkenau & Liebler, 
1993b; Paulhus & Morgan, 1997).  
Correlational techniques have also been used when examining the accuracy of 
trait self-reports when making personality judgments. Within the personality domain, 
judging the accuracy of trait self-ratings is more complicated than in the cognitive area 
as there are no perfect criteria for evaluating the accuracy of these types of judgements 
(Colvin & Funder, 1991). Inter-judge agreement (consensus) and self-other agreement 
are the most commonly used criteria for determining the accuracy of trait self-reports. In 
both types of studies, low to moderate levels of agreement (i.e., self-peer or peer-peer 
ratings of personality) have been obtained, with mean correlation co-efficients being in 
the order of .30 (e.g., Funder, 1999; Funder & Colvin, 1997; Funder, Kolar, & 
Blackman, 1995; John & Robins, 1993; Meyer et al., 2001). Importantly, however, 
consensus does not necessarily imply accuracy (Blackman & Funder, 1998; Swan & 
Gill, 1997). 
There has been much debate within the psychological literature on how best to 
operationalise personality accuracy given the complex methodological issues that 
confront researchers (cf. Funder, 1999). This debate and attendant methodological 
challenges are reviewed in Chapter 2. The situation can be likened to the long delay that 
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preceded the emergence of the emotional intelligence (EI) construct where researchers 
grappled for almost a century with the problem of objectively estimating people‟s 
awareness of their emotional states. In the end, progress was made when researchers 
showed a willingness to experiment with innovative measurement methods and to 
tolerate vigorous challenges to the reliability and validity of their instruments. A major 
aim of this dissertation was to develop and test various accuracy methods for use with 
personality judgments within Goldberg‟s (1997) Five-Factor taxonomic framework of 
personality structure.  
The second body of psychological enquiry encompasses those studies that have 
investigated the above-average effect, also coined comparative ability mis-calibration. 
In these studies, participants have typically compared their own abilities with those of 
their peers. For example, university students may be asked to compare their own 
academic performance relative to their classmates by endorsing a percentile rank from 0 
(I’m at the very bottom) to 50 (I’m exactly average) to 99 (I’m at the very top). Within 
the cognitive domain, the general findings indicate that individuals in the bottom 
quartile for various cognitive tasks overestimate themselves as being above average, and 
those in the top quartile underestimate their performance (e.g., Dunning, Johnson, 
Ehrlinger, & Kruger, 2003; Kruger, 1999; Kruger & Dunning, 1999). 
The third area of empirical enquiry that investigates the accuracy of self-insight 
encompasses the overconfidence studies wherein individuals provide or select answers 
to various cognitive test items and then indicate how confident they are that each answer 
is correct. In general, the research findings suggest that people are overconfident 
regarding their abilities to quite a large degree. There are instances in the literature 
where expressed confidence in cognitive performance matches objective accuracy and 
therefore confidence ratings are realistic/accurate (e.g., Baker, 2001; Keren, 1987; 
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Stankov & Crawford, 1996a, 1996b, 1997; Stankov & Lee, 2008; Tomassini, Solomon, 
Romney, & Krostad, 1982; Winman, Juslin, & Bjorkman, 1998). There are also 
instances where underconfidence has been displayed. However, the evidence for the 
tendency of people to be overconfident regarding their abilities and skills, is quite 
substantial (e.g., Allwood & Granhag, 1996; Juslin, 1994; Kleitman & Stankov, 2001; 
Stankov, 1998; Stankov & Crawford, 1996a, 1996b, 1997; Stankov & Lee, 2008). 
When individuals are either underconfident or overconfident regarding their skills and 
abilities, their insight is regarded as being inaccurate (or mis-calibrated). The main 
overall aim of this dissertation was to contribute to this body of knowledge by 
extending calibration research into the domain of personality judgments. 
1.3 Brief Rationale for Including Personality Judgments  
Although investigation of the confidence-accuracy relationship regarding 
accurate self-monitoring of cognitive performance is an important area of psychological 
inquiry, Koehler, Brenner, Liberman and Tversky (1996) assert that investigation of 
intuitive personality judgments is equally important to personality, clinical, 
organizational, and social psychologists (John & Robins, 1994). For example, within 
clinical psychology, inaccurate self-insight underlies various psychological disorders 
such as depression and personality dysfunction (e.g., Dimaggio et al., 2005; Dimaggio, 
Semerari, Carcione, Procacci, & Nicolo, 2006). On a practical level, accurate 
personality judgements are vital because they impact on daily life (e.g., do my 
personality traits suit the job I am applying for), and influence our behaviour in terms of 
how we think and feel about ourselves and others (e.g., would I choose this person as a 
partner, or would our personalities clash). To date, however, researchers have not 
investigated whether mis-calibration occurs within the personality domain. This lack of 
research is understandable given that determining personality accuracy and mis-
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calibration is a complex process that is difficult to operationalise. Nevertheless, as noted 
earlier, one of the major aims of this dissertation was to develop various accuracy 
protocols (see Chapters 3 and 4) and use them to examine personality mis-calibration 
(see Chapters 4 and 5). The calibration paradigm (see Chapter 2) was used to assess the 
confidence-accuracy relationship (i.e., self-monitoring) within both the cognitive and 
personality arenas. 
1.4  Broad Aims and Overview of Current Studies 
This dissertation has several broad aims:   
1. To investigate mis-calibration within the cognitive realm. 
2. To investigate self-confidence and mis-calibration within personality 
judgments. 
3. To investigate the impact of individual differences (e.g., age, need for 
cognition) variables on cognitive confidence and mis-calibration. 
4. To investigate the impact of individual difference variables (e.g., age, 
private self consciousness, affect) on personality confidence judgments. 
5. To investigate the factorial structure of both Big Five Confidence and 
Big rating Scales. 
6. To investigate the factorial structure of both cognitive and personality 
confidence judgments. 
7. To investigate the factorial structure of both cognitive and personality 
bias judgments. 
In order to achieve these aims, three studies were conducted with a total of 831 
individuals being tested. An overview of these studies is presented in Table 1.1. In 
Studies 1 and 3, participants responded to both cognitive and personality measures. The 
cognitive tasks selected for Studies 1 and 3 were based on Horn and Cattell‟s (1966) 
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theory of Fluid and Crystallised Intelligence. In Study 2, only personality measures 
were used. In Studies 1, 2 and 3, personality judgments were made within the Five-
Factor taxonomic framework of personality structure (Goldberg, 1997). 
Table 1.1 
Brief Overview of Studies  
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
Cognitive and Big Five confidence and 
bias judgments 
Big Five confidence and bias 
judgments only 
Cognitive and Big Five confidence and bias 
judgments 
Face-to-face testing 
(N = 127) 
Web based testing 
(N= 452) 
Web based testing 
(N= 252) 
Examine mis-calibration across  Gf, Gc, 
& Gv tasks 
 Examine mis-calibration with Gf tasks 
 
Investigate whether individual 
differences in gender, age, personality 
and ability impacts on cognitive 
confidence and mis-calibration 
 Investigate whether individual differences in 
gender, age, personality, ability, need for 
cognition (NFC), and affect impacts on 
cognitive confidence  
 
Trial method 1 for determining Big Five 
accuracy 
 
Investigate whether  individual 
differences in gender and  age impacts 
on Big Five accuracy, and confidence  
Trial various methods of assessing 
Big Five accuracy. Obtained Big Five 
confidence judgments  
Investigate whether individual 
differences in gender and age 
impacts on Big Five accuracy, 
confidence, and mis-calibration 
 
 
Investigate whether individual differences in 
gender, age, private self-consciousness, 
affect, and NFC impacts on Big Five 
confidence. 
 Investigate the factorial structure of 
item-by-item and Block Big Five 
confidence judgments 
Investigate the factorial structure of item-by-
item and block Big Five confidence judgments 
 
 
Investigate the factorial structure of 
cognitive and personality confidence 
judgments 
Investigate factorial structure of Big 
Five confidence and Big Five rating 
scales 
Investigate factorial structure of Big Five 
confidence and Big Five rating scales 
Investigate the factorial structure of cognitive, 
personality, and self-report ability confidence 
judgments  
Investigate the factorial structure of 
cognitive bias scores 
Investigate the factorial structure of 
Big Five bias scores 
Investigate the factorial structure of cognitive 
and Big Five bias scores   
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 Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter is divided into six subsections. The first section defines self-
confidence within a meta-cognitive framework. The calibration paradigm and numerical 
and graphical measures of calibration are discussed in section two. Theoretical 
explanations of cognitive mis-calibration follow. Section four reviews the calibration 
research literature. Justification for extending calibration research into the domain of 
personality is addressed in section five. Measurement issues and empirical findings in 
the personality judgment literature follow in section six. 
2.2 Confidence and Meta-cognition 
Item-by-item confidence judgments which were examined in the current studies 
are thought to represent the important meta-cognitive process of self-monitoring 
(Kleitman & Stankov, 2007; Stankov, 1999b). Meta-cognition refers to cognition about 
cognition, and is generally considered to have two elements: knowledge about one‟s 
own cognition, and the regulatory sub-processes of meta-cognitive control (Brown, 
1987; Schraw & Dennison, 1994; Schraw & Moshman, 1995). Five regulatory sub-
processes have been mentioned in the literature: planning, information management, 
monitoring, debugging, and evaluation (e.g., Artz & Armour-Thomas, 1992). Schraw 
and Dennison (1994) operationalised these sub-processes as follows: 
1. Planning: planning, goal setting, and allocating resources prior to learning. 
2. Information management: skills and strategy sequences used on-line to 
process information more efficiently (e.g., organizing, elaborating, 
summarizing, selective focusing). 
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3. Monitoring: assessment of one‟s learning or strategy use. 
4. Debugging: strategies used to correct comprehensions and performance 
errors. 
5. Evaluation: analysis of performance and strategy effectiveness after a 
learning episode (pp. 474-475). 
It is generally argued that the sub-processes of planning, monitoring, and 
evaluation are important variables in explaining effective learning (Flavell, 1977, 1987), 
and therefore are an important area of psychological enquiry. Within differential 
psychology in Australia, researchers have been studying the processes of self-
monitoring and evaluation using confidence judgments obtained from tests of human 
cognitive abilities (e.g., Kleitman & Stankov, 2001; Pallier, 2003; Pallier et al., 2002; 
Stankov, 1999a, 1999b; Stankov & Crawford, 1996a, 1996b). The current studies will 
continue this line of enquiry. This area of research is important not only because 
accurate self-assessment or self-monitoring of our cognitive performance is a 
fundamental aspect of successful learning (Flavell, 1977; Schraw, Crippen, & Hartley, 
2006; Sternberg, 1997a, 1997b), it is also vital for effectual  decision-making (Moore & 
Healy, 2008), and is critical in many work situations. For example, it is crucial that 
physicians accurately diagnose their patients‟ illnesses, are confident about their 
decisions, and are able to evaluate the accuracy of their work. The current research 
programme also takes the calibration paradigm into new territory by applying it to 
personality judgements. The importance of this extension will be addressed in a later 
section. Before introducing the work undertaken in this thesis, the calibration paradigm, 
and work based on that paradigm will be described. 
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2.3 Calibration Research 
2.3.1 The Experimental Paradigm 
Calibration studies evaluate the correctness of individuals‟ subjective probability 
ratings, or confidence in their judgements and predictions (Keren, 1991). Self-
monitoring is operationalised by self-confidence scores; that is, individuals are asked to 
express how confident they are in their judgements, answers, or predictions. The 
paradigm has been discussed at length in the literature and is therefore not repeated here 
(see Harvey, 1997; Kleitman, 2008; Stankov & Kleitman, 2008). 
2.3.2 Numerical Measures of Calibration 
2.3.2.1 Item-by-Item Confidence Scores (Self-Monitoring) 
There are various ways to evaluate the realism of obtained confidence ratings, 
with a number of studies having used Brier‟s quadratic scoring rule (cf. Keren, 1991). 
However the psychometric properties of the scores obtained from this rule have been 
shown to be inadequate (Stankov & Crawford, 1996a). Other measures such as signal 
detection theory and the confidence-judgment accuracy quotient have also been 
considered inadequate measures of the confidence-accuracy relationship (see Keren, 
1991). The simplest and most reliable calibration measure is the bias score, which is the 
average confidence rating minus the proportion correct score across all items in a task 
(Stankov & Crawford). A positive bias score suggests overconfidence, whereas a 
negative score indicates underconfidence. A bias score of greater than ± 10 indicates 
marked under-or-overconfidence (Stankov, 2000a), if it falls in the range of ± 5 then it 
represents reasonable calibration (Stankov, 1999b). Bias scores were generated for both 
the cognitive (Studies 1 & 3) and personality measures (see Studies 2 & 3) used in the 
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current research. Throughout this dissertation, the terms bias and mis-calibration reflect 
the discrepancy between confidence and accuracy and were used interchangeably.  
2.3.2.2 Self Evaluation Scores (Mis-calibration at the Global Level) 
The literature also points to the distinction between the meta-cognitive processes 
of self-monitoring (i.e., item-by-item confidence judgments) and self-evaluation 
(Schraw & Moshman, 1995). This evaluative aspect of meta-cognition has been 
measured by asking participants to estimate the proportion of items they have solved 
correctly after finishing the test (i.e., post test performance estimate or PTPE). A bias 
score that is similar to the one reported earlier can also be obtained using the PTPE 
score (Stankov & Crawford, 1996b). This bias score requires that the actual mean 
percentage of correct responses is subtracted from the estimated percentage of correctly 
solved items. A negative value PTPE bias score represents under-evaluation whereas a 
positive value indicates over-evaluation. These bias scores will be calculated for the 
cognitive tasks in Study 3. 
2.3.3 Graphical Measures of Calibration 
2.3.3.1 Calibration Curves 
Calibration curves are the most common method of representing the relationship 
between the proportion of correct responses (i.e., accuracy or objective probability 
estimates) and participants‟ confidence ratings. These curves depict the proportion of 
correct responses associated with various confidence intervals, and are useful for 
displaying general trends in data sets. When using calibration curves, it is helpful to 
display the number of observations at each point on the curve as interpretation of 
calibration curves is difficult when the curves are located in both the underconfidence 
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and overconfidence regions of the graph (Keren, 1991). Frequency-weighted curves are 
a useful aid, and were inspected for all cognitive tasks used in Studies 1 and 3. 
2.3.3.2 Item-Specific Scatterplots 
In a further methodological development, Stankov (1999a) argued that 
calibration curves fail to provide information about individual items that may have 
contributed to mis-calibration for a particular task. He advocated that item-specific 
information for each cognitive task be depicted graphically by producing plots of the 
mean confidence ratings and proportion correct scores (i.e., item difficulties) for each 
item in a given task. For items that are well calibrated, the proportion correct and mean 
confidence ratings should be the same. Wide separation of the points indicates mis-
calibration for that item. Item-specific plots were produced in addition to the frequency-
weighted calibration curves described previously for all the cognitive tasks in the 
present studies. 
2.4 Theories of Cognitive Mis-calibration 
Four different theoretical perspectives have sought to explain underconfidence 
and overconfidence effects in the cognitive domain. They are a) heuristics and biases, b) 
error, c) differing modes of uncertainty, and d) ecological accounts of mis-calibration 
respectively. 
2.4.1 Heuristics and Biases Approach 
According to this approach, confidence judgments in the accuracy of one‟s 
performance (or decisions) are said to follow Bayesian laws of probability and rational 
decisions follow the axioms of probability theory (see Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 
2002 for a review). Mis-calibration from this perspective reflects a cognitive bias that 
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represents an example of an irrational decision making process (Stankov & Kleitman, 
2008). Gigerenzer and colleagues, however, questioned the appropriateness of applying 
Bayes rule to confidence judgments and mis-calibration (Gigerenzer, 1991, 1992, 1993, 
1996a, 1996b, 2000; Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbolting, 1991; Gigerenzer & Murray, 
1994). More recently, within differential psychology, Kleitman (2003) investigated 
whether participants in her studies violated the additivity rule of probability theory. That 
is, where the sum of probability judgments made about mutually exclusive events (i.e., 
confidence ratings in her work) should equal one (or 100% on a confidence rating scale). 
Kleitman defined subadditivity as being when the sum of confidence ratings fell below 
100% and superadditivity when the sum of confidence ratings exceeded 100%. Results 
showed that 60% of her participants deviated from the additivity rule. This finding 
suggests that a significant number of participants did not use the principles of 
probability when providing confidence ratings in their answers. 
According to the heuristics and biases approach, mis-calibration is due to 
information processing biases such as heuristics (Brenner, Koehler, Liberman, & 
Tversky, 1996; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Keren, 1991; Klayman, Soll, 
González-Vallejo, & Barlas, 1999; Koehler, 1994; Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 
1980).  Heuristics are the cognitive short-cuts that individuals use when estimating 
probabilities associated with various problems (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). These 
short-cuts can lead to errors because people fail to consider all relevant information. 
Availability, representativeness, anchoring and adjustment heuristics are some examples 
mentioned in the research literature (Kahneman et al., 1982). From the information 
processing perspective, mis-calibration occurs when individuals use simplifying 
heuristics that lead to wrong answers on cognitive problems, and confidence in those 
judgments is based on natural assessments that disregard the possibility of an alternative 
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correct response. Overconfidence is predicted if people strongly believe that a response 
alternative is correct despite being based on a small amount of information. 
Underconfidence is predicted if individuals weakly believe that a response alternative is 
correct, despite being based on a large amount of information (Griffin & Tversky, 1992). 
An example problem from Kahneman and Tversky (1973) is presented below: 
A panel of psychologists have interviewed and administered personality tests to 
30 engineers and 70 lawyers, all successful in their respective fields. On the 
basis of this information, thumbnail descriptions of the 30 engineers and 70 
lawyers have been written…For each description, please indicate your 
probability that the person described is an engineer on a scale from 0 to 100 (p. 
241). 
Jack is a 45-year-old man. He is married and has four children. He is generally 
conservative, careful, and ambitious. He shows no interest in political science 
and spends most of his free time on his many hobbies which include home 
carpentry, sailing, and mathematical puzzles. 
The probability that this man is one of the 30 engineers in the sample of 100 is 
_____% (p. 241). 
Participants in this study were more likely to choose engineer even if the ratio of 
engineers to lawyers was changed to 70 versus 30. According to probability theory, 
however, if one takes into consideration the population base rates of lawyers and 
engineers, it is more likely that Jack was a lawyer. Participants did not consider this 
when they made their probability judgments. It was therefore argued by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1973) that participants used the representative heuristic, in that the personality 
description appeared to be more representative of an engineer than the lawyer. 
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2.4.2 Error Explanations of Mis-calibration 
Error explanations of mis-calibration, on the other hand, stress the importance of 
random error (e.g., attentional lapses, fatigue, memory lapses) as a contributing factor to 
biased confidence judgments. According to this position, confidence judgments 
comprise a true judgment component that is based on cue validities, as well as random 
error (e.g., Soll, 1996). Soll suggested that random error can affect judgments in 
multiple ways. Cognitive inconsistency is the first consideration in terms of error. That 
is, in the absence of practice effects, if an individual made several judgments about the 
same item over time, the judgments may differ because of idiosyncratic random errors 
(Soll, 1996). Random error can also occur if an individual has limited ecological 
experience with the problem or task presented by experimenter. For example, a doctor is 
presented with a diagnostic vignette and asked to make a diagnosis, and then provide a 
confidence rating indicating how confident he or she is that the diagnosis is correct. If 
the doctor is experienced with the particular disease and draws upon this information, 
the random error component decreases. The opposite is true if the doctor has limited 
information. Therefore, if random error is great then under-or-over confidence is the 
likely result (Budescu, Wallsten, & Au, 1997; Erev, Wallsten, & Budescu, 1994). By 
contrast, another group of researchers asserted that mis-calibration results when 
differing types of uncertainty influence the judgment process.  
2.4.3 Differing Modes of Uncertainty 
Juslin and Olsson (1997) argued that poor calibration is due to differing modes 
of uncertainty influencing the judgement process. Specifically, they suggested that mis-
calibration could be due to Thurstonian (after L. L. Thurstone) or Brunswikian (after 
Egon Brunswick) modes of uncertainty affecting the judgement process. These 
researchers presented a computational model of confidence in sensory discrimination 
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tasks that involved paired comparisons. Juslin and Olsson contended that the 
uncertainty which underlies confidence judgements is the result of two factors: noise in 
the nervous system or incomplete states of knowledge. In other words the uncertainty 
that underlies perceptual tasks differs from that of other cognitive tasks. For example, a 
participant is required to discriminate between lifted weights to determine which weight 
is heavier. Mis-calibration in this case can be attributed to Thurstonian uncertainty (i.e., 
noise in the sensory system). When an individual provides an answer to a general 
knowledge question such as, “Which city hosted the Winter Olympic Games in the year 
2006?” mis-calibration can be attributed to Brunswikian uncertainty (i.e., incomplete 
states of knowledge).  
According to this account, underconfidence is expected with all perceptual tasks 
because of sensory noise. However, this expectation is not supported in the research 
literature as Stankov (Stankov, 1999a) provided evidence where overconfidence was 
apparent for perceptual tasks within the auditory, olfactory, tactile and gustatory 
modalities. Similarly, in Pallier et al.‟s (2002) research, overconfidence was apparent 
for the visual perceptual Hidden Figures and Concealed words tasks used in their work. 
2.4.4 Ecological Approach  
The Probabilistic Mental Model (PMM) originally formulated by Gigerenzer et 
al. (1991), and later developed by Juslin (1993, 1994), explains mis-calibration in terms 
of ecological factors that are external to the individual. The fundamental premise of this 
model is that individuals learn the validities of their own environmental knowledge cues 
and use these cues when making judgments in their natural environments. That is, 
individuals have knowledge of both the relative frequencies of effective cues within 
their natural environments, as well as the numerical values of those validities, and 
memory provides an excellent store of frequency information from numerous natural 
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environments. Moreover, encoding of frequency information is both automatic and 
requires minimal attentional resources or effort. 
PMM theory (Gigerenzer et al., 1991) argues that mis-calibration results from 
researchers selecting general knowledge items that are tricky and unrepresentative of 
the real world. Gigerenzer et al. (1991) reasoned that if researchers selected a 
representative sample of items, then the overconfidence bias that is apparent with 
general knowledge tasks is likely to disappear, given that individuals are well calibrated 
to their natural environments. Thus, these theorists have argued that individuals‟ 
knowledge about their natural environments helps them generate cues, which, in turn, 
are used to answer general knowledge test items. Therefore, mis-calibration occurs 
when there is a mismatch between the cue validity on a general knowledge test item and 
its respective ecological validity. In other words, individuals are accurate self-monitors 
if the answers to general knowledge questions are already stored in their long-term 
knowledge structures (i.e., a local mental model), or if they can use inductive inferences 
to solve general knowledge problems (i.e., a probabilistic mental model). The important 
qualifier, however, is that response options must be ecologically valid (Gigerenzer et al., 
1991). 
PMM theory (Gigerenzer et al., 1991) also distinguishes between the item-by-
item confidence judgments that are given during a cognitive test and the post-test 
percentage correct estimates that are given at the end of the test. In the latter case, 
individuals estimate the percentage of items they think they answered correctly. 
According to ecological theory, these post-test judgments should not correlate with the 
item-by-item confidence ratings because their respective cue and ecological validities 
are different. For example, if an individual was asked to estimate how many general 
knowledge items about Australia he or she answered correctly, then ecological validity 
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may be influenced by base rates of correct performance on previous tests of a similar 
nature whereas response to a single item about the largest state in Australia would be 
influenced by ecological validities such as population estimates, geographical size, and 
so forth. Therefore, it was concluded that item-by-item confidence judgments and 
global post test percentage correct estimates, are not subserved by the same cognitive 
processes. Usually, mean post-test estimates are smaller than mean confidence ratings 
for a test and often display better calibration, or even under-evaluation, compared to 
confidence bias measures (Gigerenzer et al., 1991; Schneider, 1995; Stankov & 
Crawford, 1996a, 1996b). When this occurs, it is called the confidence/frequency effect 
(Gigerenzer et al., 1991). 
Empirical evidence in favour of PMM theory has been provided by Gigerenzer 
(1991), and Juslin (1993, 1994). In these studies, randomly chosen general knowledge 
questions resulted in good calibration, whereas typical general knowledge questions 
resulted in overconfidence. Partial support for PMM theory in terms of the distinction 
between mean item-by-item confidence ratings and post-test performance estimates has 
also been provided by Stankov and his colleagues where at the factorial level separate 
factors were obtained representing confidence and post-test percentage correct estimates 
respectively (Kleitman & Stankov, 2001; Stankov & Crawford, 1996a, 1996b). For 
example, Kleitman and Stankov obtained both item-by-item confidence ratings and 
post-test percentage correct judgments for three cognitive tests (i.e., Geography, 
Raven‟s Progressive Matrices, and Line Length) and, as predicted by PMM theory, 
there was a split at the factorial level between these two types of judgments, indicating 
support for the contention that differing cognitive processes are at play. Other research 
challenges this theory as overconfidence was demonstrated on tasks where items were 
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selected at random from a representative set of items (Brenner et al., 1996; Griffin & 
Tversky, 1992; Liberman, 2004; Soll, 1996). 
This approach has largely ignored other important factors such as individual 
differences (cf. Kleitman, 2003, 2008; Stankov & Kleitman, 2008). Moreover, PMM 
theory (Gigerenzer et al., 1991) predicates that confidence ratings from differing 
cognitive domains should not be consistently correlated since their respective ecological 
and test cue validities are likely to be different. However, there exists a large body of 
research where consistent correlations have been found between confidence ratings 
from differing cognitive domains (e.g., Baker, 2001; Kleitman, 2003, 2008; Kleitman & 
Stankov, 2001; Pallier et al., 2002; Stankov, 1999b, 2000a; Stankov & Kleitman, 2008). 
Given the underlying assumption of PMM theory (Gigerenzer et al., 1991) is 
that ecological validity affects mis-calibration, it is reasonable to investigate whether 
individuals are well-calibrated with judgments that are made on a daily basis. 
Personality judgments are a case in point as they are implicated in many aspects of daily 
life (see sections 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 of this chapter for details). In terms of the personality 
confidence judgments, it could be argued that Gigerenzer‟s model offers insight with 
regard to personality mis-calibration. Specifically, the foundation of PMM theory 
(Gigerenzer et al., 1991) is that individuals are well calibrated to their natural 
environments and calibration can be expected where ecological validity is high. It will 
be argued that personality judgments are of high ecological validity in today‟s society 
and will therefore exhibit the good calibration predicted by PMM theory (Gigerenzer et 
al., 1991).  
2.4.5 Summary 
In this section four theories of mis-calibration were reviewed. The empirical 
literature provides evidence both for and against each of theories. None of the theories 
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in isolation, however, can explain all calibration research findings. Moreover, 
examination of individual differences has usually been ignored by the theories discussed 
above. The individual differences approach to the study of confidence and mis-
calibration has not been neglected, however, and accounts for a large proportion of 
recent calibration research. The next section reviews what we have learned so far, 
starting with the hard-easy effect. 
2.5 Empirical Findings in Calibration Research  
2.5.1 The Hard-Easy Effect 
The hard-easy effect has been demonstrated with cognitive tasks wherein 
individuals appear to exhibit higher levels of overconfidence for difficult tasks and 
underconfidence or good calibration for easy tasks (Baranski & Petrusic, 1994; Harvey, 
1997; Juslin & Olsson, 1997; Keren, 1991). The relationship between task difficulty and 
underconfidence or overconfidence has been coined the calibration difficulty effect 
(Griffin & Tversky, 1992) or the hard-easy effect (Gigerenzer et al., 1991). This effect 
has been demonstrated with vocabulary and general knowledge tasks (e.g., Koriat et al., 
1980; Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977; Pulford & Colman, 1997; Schraw & DeBacker 
Roedel, 1994), with visual perceptual tasks such as the Line Length task (Baranski & 
Petrusic, 1994; Stankov, 1999a), and with discrimination of American and European 
handwriting (Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977). 
2.5.2 Good Calibration 
Winman, Juslin, and Bjorkman (1998) found that individuals were well-
calibrated on various tasks that required hindsight bias (i.e., biased judgments of past 
events after the outcomes of these events are known). Conversely, Granhag, Stromwall, 
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and Allwood (2000) found overconfidence on a task that required hindsight bias, where 
questions were asked about a filmed kidnapping. 
Stankov (1999a) and his collaborators (Kleitman & Stankov, 2001; Pallier et al., 
2002, Study 2; Stankov, 1998; Stankov & Crawford, 1996b, 1997) demonstrated that 
individuals were reasonably well calibrated on the Raven‟s Progressive Matrices Test. 
This test would be novel to participants and perhaps greater attentional resources were 
given to this task leading to better calibration. However, the literature contains instances 
where overconfidence was demonstrated for Ravens Progressive Matrices (Pallier et al., 
2002, Study 1; Stankov & Dolph, 2000). Random errors (e.g., motivational factors) 
could explain this inconsistency in Pallier‟s first study. That is, military participants 
may have tried to reduce cognitive dissonance (e.g., “I believe I am bright, therefore my 
answer must be correct”) by elevating their confidence ratings. This explanation makes 
sense as these participants were overconfident across a diverse range of cognitive tasks. 
Good calibration has also been demonstrated on digit span (Baker, 2001; 
Crawford & Stankov, 1996; Stankov & Crawford, 1996a, 1996b), and visual memory 
spatial tasks (Baker, 2001). Good calibration for the memory tasks could occur because 
all of the information required for task solution was within the span of immediate 
awareness facilitating better self-monitoring. 
Expertise in various domains also leads to better calibration, with good 
calibration demonstrated by experts in the domains of bridge playing (Keren, 1987), 
weather forecasting (Murphy & Winkler, 1977), and accountancy (Tomassini et al., 
1982). In the sporting domains of golf (Fogarty & Else, 2005) and tennis, however, 
expertise has not always led to better calibration (Fogarty & Ross, 2007). 
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2.5.3 Underconfidence  
Research indicates that people tend to be underconfident when answering 
questions about future events (Vreugdenhil & Koele, 1988), when responding to 
sensory discrimination tasks (Bjorkman, Juslin, & Winman, 1993; Juslin, 1994), with 
visual perceptual tasks such as discriminating between the length of various lines 
(Crawford & Stankov, 1996; Kleitman & Stankov, 2001; Pallier et al., 2002, Study 2; 
Petrusic & Baranski, 1997; Stankov & Crawford, 1996a, 1996b, 1997), and with 
unfamiliar computer-based tasks (Briggs, Burford, & Dracup, 1998). Moreover, 
Bjorkman et al. (1993) contended that underconfidence is a pervasive phenomenon in 
tasks of sensory discrimination. Two theories provide possible explanations for these 
findings. From the ecological stand point, the aforementioned tasks would not be 
representative of participants‟ natural ecology thereby leading to mis-calibration (i.e., 
underconfidence in these instances). Additionally for the sensory discrimination tasks, 
noise in the sensory system may have led to mis-calibration. 
Stankov (1999a), however, investigated whether underconfidence generalised to 
other sensory modalities (i.e., auditory, kinaesthetic, gustatory, and olfactory). Another 
aim of Stankov‟s research was to investigate whether the tendency of participants to be 
underconfident on the Line Length task also occurred with other visual perceptual tasks, 
such as the Square Gap task and the Muller-Lyer Illusion. Only a Tactile Texture and a 
Line Length task displayed underconfidence. Contrary to expectations, participants 
were well calibrated on the Square Gap task and were overconfident on the Muller-Lyer 
Illusion. Also, the weight, gustatory, and olfactory tasks displayed overconfidence, 
whereas a pitch task displayed perfect calibration. Stankov‟s overall conclusion was that 
the pervasive underconfidence effect found with the Line Length task does not 
generalise to perceptual tasks in other sensory modalities or to the other visual 
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perceptual tasks used in his study. A similar conclusion was reached by Pallier et al. 
(2002, Study 2) where participants were presented with a wide range of cognitive and 
perceptual (both visual and sensory) tasks. Two visualization tasks in Study 1 of 
Pallier‟s research, however, displayed overconfidence (i.e., the Hidden Figures Task 
and the Concealed Words Task) when administered to military participants. As noted 
earlier, this sample may be have been motivated to reduce cognitive dissonance by 
providing higher confidence ratings thereby resulting in overconfidence. Study 1 
investigates whether participants are mis-calibrated on a similar task to that used by 
Pallier (i.e., a Concealed Words task). Study 1 will contribute further information as to 
whether underconfidence generalises from the Line Length task to another visual 
perceptual task. 
2.5.4 Overconfidence 
In general, research suggests that individuals are often more confident than they 
are accurate. Overconfidence has been displayed by many different participant groups, 
including physicians (Christensen-Szalanski & Bushyhead, 1981), medical students 
(O'Keefe, Wildemuth, & Freidman, 1999), clinical psychologists (Oskamp, 1965), 
engineers (Kidd, 1970), lawyers (Wagenaar & Keren, 1985), United States Air Force 
recruits (Pallier et al., 2002), university students (Granhag et al., 2000; Kleitman & 
Stankov, 2001; Pallier et al., 2002; Pulford & Colman, 1997; Renner & Renner, 2001; 
Schaefer, Williams, Goodie, & Campbell, 2004; Stankov, 1998, 1999b; Stankov & 
Crawford, 1997), CIA analysts (Cambridge & Shreckengost, 1978, as cited in Sharp, 
Cutler, & Penrod, 1988), adolescents (Newman, 1984), children (Allwood, Granhag, & 
Jonsson, 2006; Newman & Wick, 1987), and tennis players (Fogarty & Ross, 2007). 
Overconfidence has also been demonstrated across numerous domains and tasks 
including: prediction of sports outcomes (Fogarty & Else, 2005; Fogarty, Graham, & 
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Else, 2001; Ronis & Yates, 1987), prediction of outcomes of past events (Lichtenstein, 
Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982), assessment of reading skills (Glenberg & Epstein, 1987; 
Lin & Zabrucky, 1998), marketing management predictions (Mahajan, 1992), 
categorical judgement tasks (Schneider, 1995), motor task performance (West & 
Stanovich, 1997), eye witness memory (Bornstein & Zickafoose, 1999), economic 
forecasts (Braun & Yaniv, 1992), hindsight bias (Granhag et al., 2000), psychology 
course related quizzes (Renner & Renner, 2001), tennis knowledge (Fogarty & Ross, 
2007), tennis rules (Fogarty & Ross, 2007), and with vocabulary and general knowledge 
tasks (Allwood & Granhag, 1996; Crawford & Stankov, 1996; Juslin, 1994; Kleitman & 
Stankov, 2001; Schaefer et al., 2004; Stankov, 1998, 1999b; Stankov & Crawford, 
1996a, 1996b, 1997; West & Stanovich, 1997). Essentially, the aforementioned research 
suggests that the overconfidence phenomenon is a robust finding that has demonstrated 
external validity across numerous participant groups and across a number of different 
domains. Some researchers have interpreted overconfidence as a pervasive 
psychological bias (e.g., Baron, 1994). A general knowledge task has been included in 
Study 1 and it is expected that participants will be overconfident. 
The literature reviewed thus far has focussed on examination of group 
differences (i.e., calibration curves and bias scores) as opposed to the examination of 
individual differences, which are discussed next. 
2.5.5 Self-Confidence and the Study of Individual Differences 
From the individual differences perspective, confidence judgments represent the 
important meta-cognitive process of self-monitoring, an appraisal process whereby 
individuals evaluate the accuracy of their performance whilst working through 
psychological tests items (e.g., Kleitman & Stankov, 2001; Stankov & Crawford, 1996a, 
1996b).  Furthermore, West and Stanovich (1997) highlighted the fact that there are 
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consistent inter-individual differences apparent in the confidence literature. For example, 
researchers have found that males tend to be more confident than females on cognitive 
tasks (e.g., Baker, 2001; Pallier, 2003; Pallier et al., 2002), experts are more confident 
than novices (Spence, 1996), and older children are more confident than younger 
children on counting tasks (Newman & Wick, 1987). 
The following sections review gender, age and personality differences in terms 
of accuracy, self-monitoring, and mis-calibration. These are the areas that are explored 
in this dissertation. 
2.5.5.1 Gender Differences in Accuracy, Confidence and Mis-
calibration 
2.5.5.1.1 Gender Differences and Task Accuracy 
Are females more intelligent than males? Halperin and LaMay (2000) tried to 
answer this question in their critical review of gender differences in the intelligence 
literature. They concluded that males did not differ from females in terms of general 
intelligence. However, gender differences appeared for visualisation tasks and for verbal 
tasks that required retrieval from long-term memory. Males displayed an advantage for 
the former, and females for the latter. Gender differences in accuracy are not elaborated 
on in any further detail as it is not the focus of this dissertation.  
Rather, the current doctoral research sought to extend the examination of gender 
differences from the cognitive accuracy domain, an area that has been well reported, 
into the domain of personality accuracy. Studies 1 and 2 addressed this issue as various 
accuracy methods were developed and tested. 
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2.5.5.1.2 Gender Differences and Confidence 
To date, empirical research indicates that males are more confident than females 
on: General Knowledge (Pallier, 2003; Pulford & Colman, 1997), Vocabulary (Stankov, 
1998), Line Length (Pallier, 2003; Stankov, 1998), Letter Series (Baker, 2001; Pallier, 
2003), Ravens Progressive Matrices (Stankov, 1998), Working Memory (Baker, 2001), 
Cattell‟s Matrices (Pallier, 2003), golf tasks (Graham, 2006), and with tests of tennis 
knowledge (Ross & Fogarty, 2006). Gender-stereotypic socialization patterns provide 
one explanation for the elevated confidence in males. Within the self-concept literature, 
it has been reported that males hold more favourable maths and science self-concepts 
than do females in accordance with the gender stereotype that males will be more 
proficient at maths and science type questions (for a review see Marsh & Yeung, 1998). 
It could also be the case that parental socialisation patterns engender higher levels of 
confidence in males across a range of cognitive abilities thereby explaining why males 
were more confident than females on the tasks used by the calibration researchers 
mentioned above. Similarly, if tasks are perceived by participants as being masculine 
gender-typed (e.g., a quiz on sports figures) or gender-neutral then males also tend to be 
more confident than females (Beyer, 1990). For example, Ross and Fogarty (2006) 
found gender differences with females being less confident than males on a test of 
tennis knowledge, a task that would be considered gender-neutral to tennis trainees. 
Similarly, in Beyer‟s (1990) study, males were more confident on some of the gender-
neutral (e.g., anagrams) tasks than were their females counterparts. If, however, tasks 
were perceived as being feminine gender-typed then gender differences disappeared. 
More recently, however, Stankov and Lee (2008) did not find gender differences in 
confidence on the Reading and Listening sections of the test of English as a Foreign 
 Cognitive and Personality Confidence 26 
 
Language Internet-Based Test (TOEFLiBT).  Studies 1 and 3 explored gender 
differences for the cognitive tasks used in those studies. 
However, the current research programme differs from other calibration research 
in a further significant aspect: by examining gender differences in Big Five confidence 
judgments. A discussion of this investigation, carried out in Studies 1, 2, and 3, is 
deferred to later chapters. 
2.5.5.1.3 Gender Differences and Mis-Calibration 
Previous research findings of gender differences in mis-calibration in the 
cognitive arena have been somewhat mixed (Baker, 2001; Beyer & Bowden, 1997; 
Crawford & Stankov, 1996; Jonsson & Allwood, 2003; Pallier, 2003; Pulford & 
Colman, 1997; Stankov, 1998; Stankov & Crawford, 1997; Stankov & Lee, 2008). In 
Baker‟s study, males were significantly more mis-calibrated than females on only three 
of the five working memory tasks used in her test battery (i.e., Digits Backward, Visual 
Memory, and Letter-Number-Sequencing tasks). Pallier, on the other hand, conducted 
two studies, with Study 1 comprising young adults (mean age = 19.81, N = 185) and 
Study 2 consisting of older adults (mean age = 22, range 17 to 80, N = 303). Results for 
Study 1 indicated that males were both significantly more confident and mis-calibrated 
than their female counterparts on General Knowledge and Line Length tasks. Similarly, 
Pulford and Colman found that males were more mis-calibrated than females for 
General Knowledge questions. Beyer and Bowden, however, did not find similar results 
with sport‟s trivia questions and females were more mis-calibrated than males. This 
finding makes sense if females perceived sport‟s questions as being masculine gender-
typed, then lowered their efforts accordingly legitimising that poorer performance 
results from decreased effort, not lower ability. 
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In the second study by Pallier (2003), older participants responded to two 
crystallised intelligence tasks (i.e., General Knowledge and a Synonyms Vocabulary 
test) and two fluid intelligence tasks (i.e., Letter Series and Cattell‟s Matrices). Again, 
results indicated significant differences between the genders, with males endorsing 
higher levels of confidence in the accuracy of their performance across all four of the 
cognitive tasks. For the Vocabulary and Letter Series tasks, males were also 
significantly more mis-calibrated than females. Gender differences in terms of mis-
calibration for the General Knowledge task, however, were not significant. Similarly, 
Jonsson and Allwood (2003) did not find stable gender differences in mis-calibration 
for either a Word Knowledge task or a Logical Spatial task. More recently, Stankov and 
Lee (2008) found that males were significantly more mis-calibrated than females on the 
TOEFLiBT.   
To summarise, the literature suggests that on tasks of cognitive abilities, males 
have been more confident, but not necessarily more calibrated, than females. Gender 
differences in mis-calibration within the cognitive domain are examined in Studies 1 
and 3 of this dissertation. At this point it should be noted that calibration researchers 
have not previously examined Big Five mis-calibration or gender differences in Big 
Five mis-calibration, despite these being important topics of empirical investigation. 
Studies 2 and 3 (Chapters 4 and 5) have examined these gender differences. 
2.5.5.2 Age Differences in Accuracy, Confidence and Mis-Calibration 
2.5.5.2.1 Age Differences in Accuracy 
From the vantage point of Gf/Gc theory (Horn, 1988), accuracy on tasks of fluid 
intelligence (Gf) decreases with age as fluid intelligence peaks in early adulthood and 
then declines, whereas accuracy on tasks of crystallised intelligence (Gc) either 
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increases, or stays stable, from age 20 to 65 years (Kaufman & Horn, 1996). As age 
differences in cognitive accuracy are well established in the literature, it will not be 
investigated in the current studies. Rather, Studies 1, 2 and 3 examined the hitherto 
unexplored role of age differences in personality accuracy. See Chapter 3 for further 
discussion. 
2.5.5.2.2 Age differences in Confidence and Mis-calibration 
Self-efficacy theory (Bandura, 1977), and cognitive dissonance theory 
(Festinger, 1957), may provide some insight into what to expect in terms of age 
differences in cognitive confidence and mis-calibration. Self-efficacy describes people‟s 
beliefs and confidence about their own ability to perform in a particular domain 
(Bandura, 1997). Domain specific self-efficacy beliefs and confidence increase with 
personal accomplishments within a domain, with the reverse happening when negative 
experiences occur. For instance, an elderly woman is invited to join a trivia club. If she 
wins a number of games her self-confidence in her ability to play the game increases, 
thereby increasing her motivation to try harder. If she often loses, however, both 
confidence and motivation decline. Blanton, Pelham, DeHart, and Carvallo (2001) 
related this decrease in motivation to cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957). 
This theory posits that individuals prefer that their cognitions, including those about 
their own actions, be consistent. Dissonance occurs when these cognitions are 
inconsistent, and the individual is motivated to make them more consistent in order to 
decrease uneasiness or distress. Blanton et al. (2001) argued that mis-calibration can 
result from the need to view oneself as a capable and knowledgeable individual who 
makes competent self-judgments. Accordingly, unwarranted confidence occurs with 
judgments that challenge a positive view of the self. For example, Mary believes she is 
a bright woman and then participates in an experiment examining mis-calibration on 
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tasks of cognitive abilities. In the test battery she finds one of the tasks quite difficult, 
and in order to reduce cognitive dissonance (i.e., I should know the answer to this as I 
am bright) she provides a higher confidence rating than is warranted resulting in 
overconfidence. 
Few studies have examined age differences in cognitive confidence and mis-
calibration (Crawford & Stankov, 1996; Pallier, 2003). Crawford and Stankov (1996) 
found small but significant correlations (from .22 to .23) between age and 
overconfidence scores on tests of both Fluid intelligence (i.e., Raven‟s Progressive 
Matrices, Letter Number Sequencing, and Animals) and Crystallised intelligence (i.e., 
Vocabulary, Esoteric Analogies, Proverbs) as well as significant positive correlations 
between age and scores on the visual perceptual Line Length task. Similarly, Pallier 
(2003) also reported similar correlation coefficients between age and overconfidence 
scores for the fluid (r = .23) and crystallised (r = .16) tasks used in his study. However, 
within the sporting domain age did not co-vary with calibration on golf tasks (Fogarty 
& Else, 2005).  
Given the paucity of studies that have examined the impact of age, a further aim 
of the current dissertation was to investigate whether age was associated with 
confidence and mis-calibration for the tasks in Study 1 that spanned various cognitive 
domains. The current research programme also contributes to the literature by its 
investigation into age differences in Big Five confidence and mis-calibration. 
2.5.5.3 Ability and Confidence 
A potential source of individual differences in cognitive confidence and mis-
calibration could be ability levels, as research in the area of relative comparisons 
suggests that individuals of lower ability may have difficulty accurately appraising their 
cognitive abilities compared with their more competent peers (see also Dunning et al., 
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2003; Kruger & Dunning, 1999). In these types of studies, participants provide 
estimates in the form of percentile ranks of how their abilities compare to their peers 
(i.e., other undergraduate students). University students scoring in the bottom quartile 
on various cognitive tasks have significantly overestimated their own scores and 
percentile ranks on tests of Psychology (Dunning et al., 2003), humour (Kruger & 
Dunning, 1999, Study 1), logical reasoning (Kruger & Dunning, 1999, Study 2), and 
grammar (Kruger & Dunning, 1999, Study 3) compared with top quartile participants 
(see also Maki, Jonas, & Kallod, 1994; Moreland, Miller, & Laucka, 1981; 
Shaughnessy, 1979). In these studies, researchers employ calibration type procedures in 
terms of relative comparisons although confidence ratings and bias scores were not 
calculated. For example, in the Kruger and Dunning studies (1999) participants 
responded to various cognitive tasks and were then asked to provide percentile 
estimates about their own performance relative to peers. The sample was then divided 
into quartiles according to their actual performance and, for the first and fourth quartile 
individuals, percentile estimates were evaluated against their respective actual percentile 
ranks. Results suggested that people of lower ability overestimate their performance 
whilst the opposite is true for those of higher ability. Kruger and Dunning (1999) 
attributed these differences to a lack of metacognitive insight of lower ability 
participants.  
More recent studies, however, have presented data demonstrating that judgments 
of relative comparisons contain noise such as regression to the mean, and floor and 
ceiling effects (Ackerman et al., 2002; Burson, Larrick, & Klayman, 2006; Krueger & 
Mueller, 2002). The more recent studies raise the possibility that Kruger and Dunning‟s 
results need to be interpreted with caution as their findings may have been the result of 
statistical artefacts. For instance, Ackerman (2002) in a simulation of Kruger and 
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Dunning‟s study found that the perceived average percentile rank in their data fell at the 
66
th
 percentile thus the division of participants into quartiles guarantees that bottom 
quartile participants are more mis-calibrated than individuals at top. That is, top quartile 
participants are closer to the 66
th
 percentile than are individuals in the bottom quartile. 
Other literature (e.g., Burson et al., 2006; Krueger & Mueller, 2002) indicates that both 
top and bottom quartile participants can also be wrong about their judgments of relative 
comparisons. For instance, Burson et al. across three studies demonstrated that top 
quartile individuals underestimated their relative standing in terms of percentile ranks 
across 12 cognitive tasks whereas the opposite was true for bottom quartile participants. 
However, when tasks were moderately difficult, then both top and bottom quartile 
participants were just as accurate in their judgments of relative comparisons. Moreover 
for difficult tasks, top quartile participants were less accurate in their judgments than 
were their low ability counterparts. 
The focus of this dissertation is not whether individuals believe that they are 
better than their average peer. Of interest to the current studies is that confidence 
judgments are obtained from individuals with regard to the accuracy of their own self-
assessment within the cognitive domain, and if those of lower ability believe that they 
performed better than they actually did (Dunning, 2005), then these individuals should 
be more overconfident in their own performance than their high ability counterparts. 
This issue was investigated in Studies 1 and 3, where participants responded to various 
cognitive tasks. 
2.5.5.4 Personality Correlates of Confidence and Mis-Calibration  
Previous research has yielded interesting findings regarding the personality 
correlates of confidence and mis-calibration. For example, proactiveness and activity 
were positively correlated with confidence (Pallier et al., 2002). Highly anxious 
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individuals were less confident than non-anxious individuals on a Line-up Identification 
task (Nolan & Markham, 1998). Cognitive impulsivity co-varied with confidence and 
mis-calibration on a Comprehension Monitoring task (Walczyk & Hall, 1989). 
Clinically depressed people were more overconfident than their non-depressed peers 
when making judgments about real life events (Dunning & Story, 1991), but individuals 
with mild depression were better calibrated than their non-depressed counterparts on 
General Knowledge questions (Stone, Dodrill, & Johnson, 2001). Narcissism was 
positively correlated with overconfidence on a General Knowledge task (Campbell, 
Adam, & Joshua, 2004), and self confidence ratings obtained from an Esoteric 
Analogies task correlated negatively with imposterism (Want & Kleitman, 2006). 
The focus of the current studies was to examine the relationships between the 
Big Five personality dimensions and cognitive confidence and mis-calibration. In terms 
of previous research using Big Five personality measures, moderately small but 
significant positive correlations (r = .30) have been found between the 
Openness/Intellect dimension and Working Memory confidence (Baker, 2001) and 
between Openness and confidence ratings on a Verbal Reasoning test (Kleitman, 2003). 
However, because Openness correlates with both the accuracy and confidence rating 
scores from tasks of cognitive abilities, it is important to partial out the variance that is 
attributable to accuracy when examining the relationship between this trait and 
cognitive confidence measures (Schaefer et al., 2004). This practice was adopted in the 
current research programme. 
The relationship between Extraversion and both confidence and mis-calibration 
remains unclear. Extraversion, as measured by Goldberg‟s International Personality 
Item Pool (IPIP) inventory, did not correlate with confidence or overconfidence scores 
from the five Working Memory tasks in Baker‟s (2001) study. Similarly, Extraversion, 
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as measured by NEO PI-R, did not correlate with the overconfidence factor that resulted 
from principal components analysis of a large battery of intellectual tasks in the Pallier 
et al. (2002) study. Conversely, Schaefer et al. (2004) found that the Extraversion 
subscale of the IPIP significantly predicted overconfidence for General Knowledge 
questions. 
It is important to consider interpretative issues when examining whether Big 
Five personality variables co-vary with confidence and mis-calibration on cognitive 
tasks. Schaefer and his colleagues (2004) argued that interpretation of only simple zero-
order correlations between overconfidence and each of the Big Five personality 
dimensions may be misleading because of the shared variance that exists between the 
five personality factors (i.e., correlations .30 or greater). They advocated the use of 
partial correlations when examining the relationships between the Big Five dimensions 
and accuracy and confidence scores (i.e., mean confidence ratings and bias scores) 
derived from cognitive tasks. After reporting zero-order correlation coefficients between 
Big Five subscale scores and bias scores, they also calculated partial correlations 
between each Big Five trait and accuracy, confidence and overconfidence scores, and 
partialled out the variance attributable to the other four personality dimensions. This 
change of analyses provided the clearest conclusions according to these researchers, and 
some of the significant simple correlations reported in their study failed to reach 
significance when partial correlations were used. 
Schaefer et al. (2004) found that Intellect/Openness significantly predicted 
accuracy and confidence scores, but not overconfidence on the General Knowledge task 
used in their study, indicating that those with higher scores on this dimension were also 
more confident and accurate in their performance. Extraversion predicted 
overconfidence but not accuracy suggesting that extraverts were significantly mis-
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calibrated. Agreeableness and Neuroticism did not predict accuracy, confidence, or 
overconfidence. Finally, Conscientiousness significantly predicted confidence, but not 
accuracy or overconfidence, suggesting that, whilst conscientious individuals were more 
confident, this did not influence accuracy or mis-calibration. Other research has also 
demonstrated that Agreeableness and Conscientiousness do not correlate with bias 
scores derived from tasks of cognitive abilities, although it should be noted that these 
researchers did not use partial correlations in their work (Baker, 2001) However 
research by Kleitman (2003) found small but significant correlations (rs = .15) between 
Conscientiousness and bias scores derived from a Verbal Reasoning test, a Nonsense 
Syllogisms test, and the Esoteric Analogies test. 
In summary, because previous research has not used partial correlations in the 
way advocated by Schaefer and his colleagues (2004), the role of personality in 
cognitive confidence and mis-calibration remains unclear, and further research is 
warranted. The use of partial correlations will be adopted in Studies 1 and 3 of this 
dissertation to investigate Schaefer et al.‟s assertions. 
2.5.5.5 A Trait of Self-Confidence within the Cognitive Domain 
Another interesting question raised by differential psychologists is whether the 
item-by-item confidence judgments obtained from cognitive tasks represents a 
confidence trait. Correlational analyses of confidence ratings and accuracy scores 
obtained from batteries of tasks across different cognitive domains shows that mean 
confidence rating scores tend to be highly correlated. Indeed, they are more highly 
correlated than the accuracy scores obtained from the tasks, an observation that led 
Stankov and colleagues (see Stankov & Dolph, 2000 for a review) to claim that there is 
a general self-confidence (or self-monitoring) trait that is independent of accuracy. This 
confidence factor has been replicated many times using larger test batteries and different 
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populations (Crawford & Stankov, 1996; Kleitman, 2003; Kleitman & Stankov, 2001; 
Pallier et al., 2002; Stankov, 1998, 1999a, 2000a; Stankov & Crawford, 1996a, 1996b, 
1997; Stankov & Dolph, 2000; Stankov & Lee, 2008). Other investigators also provide 
data in support of a confidence factor that is domain independent (e.g., Schraw, 1994, 
1997; Schraw & DeBacker Roedel, 1994; Schraw & Dennison, 1994; Schraw, Dunkle, 
& Bendixen, 1995; Schraw & Moshman, 1995). 
Whilst Stankov and colleagues speculated that the confidence trait was related to 
metacognitive processes, few studies have examined the relationships between this trait 
and self-report measures of meta-cognition. Examination of these relations was 
addressed by Kleitman and Stankov (2007) who investigated the relationship between a 
self-confidence factor (from a diverse battery of cognitive tasks) and a meta-cognitive 
processes factor (from three meta-cognitive measures) via confirmatory factor analysis. 
The correlation between these two factors was r = .44. Stankov and Lee (2007) reported 
similar results when a battery of acculturated knowledge accuracy, confidence, and 
meta-cognition scores were factor analysed using exploratory factor analysis. The 
correlation between the meta-cognition and confidence factors was .32. Both studies 
indicate that confidence and meta-cognition represent separate factors that share some 
cognitive processes. 
2.5.5.5.1 Gf-Gc Theory and the Calibration Paradigm 
In each of the studies by Stankov and various colleagues noted above, task 
selection was guided by Gf-Gc theory (Horn, 1985) which postulates first, second, and 
third order factors. The two first-order factors being Gf (i.e., Fluid ability) and Gc (i.e., 
Crystallised ability) and the second and third-order factors being (i.e., Gv (visualisation 
abilities), Speed, Ga (auditory abilities), SAR (short-term acquisition retrieval), TRS 
(long-term storage retrieval), Visual Sensory Detectors, and Auditory sensory detectors. 
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This hierarchical structure of human cognitive abilities is posited on the basis of large 
factor analytic studies employing both exploratory and confirmatory techniques (Carroll, 
1993). The first-order and second-order factors were derived from factor analysing 
accuracy scores from a diverse battery of cognitive tasks. 
Stankov and his collaborators (Stankov, 1998, 1999a) attempted to replicate 
some of the factors in Gf-Gc theory by factor analysing accuracy and mean confidence 
rating scores from test batteries that included markers for Gf, Gc, and Gv. For example, 
Stankov (1998) used a test battery that included one marker test for Gf (i.e., Raven‟s 
Progressive Matrices), one marker test for Gc (i.e., a multiple choice synonyms 
vocabulary test), and one marker test for Gv (i.e., Line Length test). Correlational 
analyses revealed two findings. Firstly, the accuracy scores from the three tests were 
correlated but the magnitude of these correlations was low (i.e., .15 to .20). Stankov 
concluded that the magnitude of these correlations suggested that the accuracy scores do 
not share much common variance, and that each test measures a different construct in 
line with the Gf-Gc theory. That is, Gf, Gc, and Gv respectively. Secondly, the 
correlations between the confidence ratings were much higher (.32 to .52) and did not 
point to the distinction between Gf, Gc, and Gv that was apparent with the accuracy 
scores as the confidence ratings across a diverse range of tasks defined a single 
confidence factor. Stankov therefore concluded that the correlations between confidence 
ratings suggested the presence of a self-confidence trait that was distinct from accuracy 
measures. More recently, Stankov and his collaborators have provided further data in 
support of the factorial separation of confidence, and accuracy factors, obtained from 
the same tests, across various cognitive domains (Kleitman & Stankov, 2001, 2007; 
Pallier et al., 2002; Stankov & Lee, 2008). This separation occurs, despite the average 
correlation between confidence and accuracy scores obtained from the same test, 
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ranging between 0.40 and 0.60 (Stankov & Kleitman, 2008). Data in these studies 
indicate that the high correlations among the confidence ratings obtained from a diverse 
range of cognitive tests, leads to the emergence of a confidence factor that is separate 
from, but correlated with, ability factors (Stankov & Kleitman, 2008). 
Collectively, the findings from the aforementioned factor analytic studies 
indicate the presence of self-confidence factor (trait) that is factorially separate from the 
cognitive domain being investigated. Study 1 extended this line of investigation by 
measuring and factor analysing confidence ratings from both ability and non-ability 
domains (i.e., measures of how confident people are when making judgments about 
their personality within the Big Five taxonomic framework of personality structure). 
Study 1 includes two markers for Gc, two markers for Gf, one marker for Gv, and one 
confidence rating for each of the Big Five personality dimensions. A major aim of this 
dissertation was to examine the factorial structure of these ratings to determine whether 
confidence in ability and personality judgments are subserved by the same cognitive 
processes. A rationale for extending confidence judgments into the domain of 
personality judgments is presented in sections 2.6 and 2.7. 
Returning to the bias scores obtained from ability tasks, Stankov and his 
colleagues have also factor analysed the bias scores obtained from the various cognitive 
tasks and found that they also loaded onto one factor. Accuracy scores (i.e., proportion 
correct scores), however, were not factor analysed with the bias scores in these studies, 
because these scores are mathematically dependent. As discussed earlier, the bias score 
is the simple difference between the mean confidence rating score and the proportion 
correct score both obtained from a cognitive task. The factorial structure of cognitive 
bias scores will be examined in Study 1. More importantly, however, is that the current 
research programme extended previous empirical work by examining mis-calibration 
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within the domain of personality (see Studies 1, 2 and 3). Furthermore, the current 
studies contributed to the extant literature by investigating the factorial structure of 
cognitive and Big Five bias judgments (see Chapter 5). 
Calibration research reviewed in this section has shown a well-established 
confidence trait that has emerged from tasks spanning differing cognitive domains (e.g., 
Gf, Gc, Gv). This trait has been argued to lie on the boundaries between abilities and 
personality (Stankov, 1999b). However, differential psychologists have not yet 
investigated the generality of this trait in other domains such as personality judgments. 
Therefore the question of whether there is a general confidence trait that influences 
judgments across both the personality and abilities domains remains unanswered. That 
is, are the processes involved in making confidence judgments about aspects of my 
personality the same as those used when I am asked to provide a confidence rating 
about whether I answered a test item correctly? Is there a difference between knowing 
your abilities and knowing your personality? These are important questions that have 
hitherto not been addressed. 
2.6 Justifying Inclusion of Personality Confidence Judgments  
There are good reasons for extending calibration research into the domain of 
personality. Opponents of research in the judgment and decision-making area have 
argued that calibration research has portrayed both an uncomplimentary and unmerited 
image of human inferential capabilities because researchers have chosen judgmental 
tasks that are not familiar to, or maybe even misunderstood by, some participants, 
therefore leading to mis-calibration (Dunning, Griffin, Milojkovic, & Ross, 1990). 
Moreover, these judgements are fundamentally different from the important day-to-day 
decisions that govern people‟s lives. Dunning and his colleagues argued that it was 
important to extend calibration research into more familiar domains. 
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Dunning et al. (1990) conducted a series of studies in which participants 
predicted the actions of peers in response to a variety of stimulus situations (e.g., 
responses to hypothetical predicaments), and were then asked to express their 
confidence in the accuracy of each prediction on a numerical scale ranging from 50 to 
100 percent. Findings indicated that participants were consistently over-confident when 
predicting the social behaviours of peers with bias scores ranging from 8.7 to 14.9. 
These studies provide evidence that overconfidence is also present in the area of social 
prediction. Overconfidence effects were also found in the context of self-predictions of 
future behaviours (e.g., leisure and social activities) in a study by Vallone, Griffin, Lin 
and Ross (1990). Dunning et al. and Vallone et al. stated that it is important that 
researchers continue to investigate whether mis-calibration occurs in other domains that 
are both familiar and relevant to the decisions people make in daily life. It is argued that 
accurate personality judgments are very pertinent to the many decisions that individuals 
make each day.  
For example, as argued by previous researchers, accurate personality judgements 
are an important aspect of daily life (Letzring, Wells, & Funder, 2006) that influences 
how one behaves, and how one thinks and feels about himself or herself (Kolar, Funder, 
& Colvin, 1996). These judgments also impact how one chooses relationship partners or 
friends (Funder, 1999), and has implications for organizational effectiveness in terms of 
employing the right person for the job (Christiansen, Wolcott-Burnam, Janovics, Burns, 
& Quirk, 2005; Funder, 1999). Accurate judgments of clients‟ personalities are critical 
in clinical psychology so that appropriate interventions can be selected and 
implemented (Funder, 1999; Funder & Sneed, 1993). Indeed my own clinical 
experience from working as a psychologist in a psychiatric hospital over several years 
has been that when patients‟ lack self-insight into their own personality disorders then 
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psychological interventions are ineffectual as patients are not motivated to work on their 
issues as they do not believe that there is anything wrong. Also, studying the accuracy 
of personality judgments is also of theoretical interest to personality and social 
psychologists (Koehler et al., 1996), as well as to attribution theorists (Funder, 1980). 
Another reason for examining calibration in personality judgments is the widespread 
use of self-report measures of personality. A major problem with this form of 
assessment is faking, whereby respondents deliberately misrepresent their scores on 
certain personality traits to maximise the chances of a favourable assessment. The 
research on mis-calibration described in this chapter raises the possibility that these 
effects may not be due entirely to faking. Consequently it is important to investigate 
whether individuals are mis-calibrated (i.e., inaccurate) when making personality 
judgments about themselves. Personality accuracy is operationalised in Chapters 3 and 
4.   
2.7 Empirical Relations Between Personality and 
Ability/Intelligence Measures 
Over the last ten years research interest in investigating the relationships 
between abilities (intelligence) and personality has been increasing (see meta-analyses 
by Ackerman, 1997; Reeve, Meyer, & Bonaccio, 2006). Prior to this, these domains 
were studied independently despite more than 100 years of scientific interest in these 
relations (see Reeve et al., 2006, for a discussion). One reason cited in the meta-
analyses for this separation has been that intelligence researchers are interested in 
maximal performance (what I can do) whereas in the personality domain typical 
performance (what I am generally like) has been the focus of attention (Ackerman, 
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1997; Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997). Maximal performance is measured by objective 
tests whereas typical performance is measured by self-report inventories. 
Investigators who have studied the relationship between personality and 
intelligence measures have used measures guided by the Five Factor Model of 
personality structure as this taxonomy of personality traits is regarded by many 
researchers as a framework that includes most phenotypic personality attributes (e.g., 
Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997; Austin, Dreary, & Eber, 2002; Goldberg, 1999; Pallier 
et al., 2002; Saucier & Goldberg, 1996; Wiggins, 1996).  
Results from Ackerman and Heggestad‟s meta-analytic review of 155 studies 
showed that psychometric g was significantly related to Neuroticism (r = -.15), 
Extraversion (r = .08) and Openness (r = .33). Similar correlations were found between 
Gc and these three personality variables. Correlations between Gv and these variables 
were r = -.04 for Neuroticism, r = .06 for Extraversion, and r = .24 for Openness. 
Nevertheless, despite the magnitude of these correlations being generally low, 
Ackerman and colleagues (Ackerman, 1997; Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997) and 
Demetriou and Kazi (2001) assert that intelligence and personality are actively entwined 
in determining the chance of success in a particular task domain. For example, within 
the domain of academic performance, Chamorro-Premuzic and Furnham (2008) used 
hierarchical regression to examine how much personality (i.e., Big Five personality 
traits) predicts academic performance over and above the variance explained by 
intelligence (i.e., the Wonderlic IQ test, and Baddeley‟s Reasoning test, a measure of 
Gf). Results indicated that Gf accounted for only 6% of the variance in academic 
performance; Conscientiousness contributed a further 27% and Openness an additional 
3%. Chamorro-Premuzic and Furnham‟s research was inspired by other empirical 
evidence which showed that IQ tests infrequently explain more than 50% of the 
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variance in academic performance (e.g., Chamorro-Premuzic & Furhnam, 2004; 
O'Connor & Paunonen, 2007). 
Because of the long standing interest in the relations between personality and 
intelligence/ability measures, and also because personality works in tandem with ability 
in determining the success in various domains, the current research investigated the 
existence of links between confidence judgments obtained from both the abilities and 
Big Five personality domains. 
2.8 Confidence Judgments Across Cognitive and Personality 
Measures: One Trait or Two?  
Do confidence judgments obtained from both the abilities and personality 
domains load onto a general confidence factor? Because this question has not yet been 
investigated in the calibration literature, it has been investigated in the current studies. 
Self-concept theory may shed some light on what to expect in regard to the factorial 
structure of these confidence ratings.   
Shavelson, Hubner, and Stanton‟s (1976) model (see Figure 2.1) posits that 
global self-concept can be divided into academic, social, emotional, and physical self-
concepts, and that each of these second-order constructs being further sub-divided into 
narrower sub-domains. More recent research however, has not demonstrated evidence in 
favour of this hierarchy and has consistently shown that both academic and non-
academic (social, emotional, and physical) self-concept are highly differentiated (see 
Marsh, 2008, for a review). Moreover, Marsh‟s (2008, p. 450) review of his empirical 
work that demonstrates that “if specific components of self-concept are highly 
differentiated, then there is much variation in specific components that cannot be 
explained in terms of a single global component such as self-esteem”. These findings 
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are relevant to the current studies as Stankov and Crawford (1997) suggested that both 
confidence and self-concept judgments are cognitive appraisals of the self. If self-
concept is highly differentiated between the academic and non-academic domains then 
perhaps the self-confidence trait is also highly differentiated across the abilities and 
personality domains. It follows then that confidence judgments across cognitive and 
personality judgments should define different factors at the factorial level. Investigating 
whether personality confidence splits at the factorial level from cognitive confidence 
has important implications for calibration theorists who are trying to understand self-
monitoring. This question has not been examined by previous researchers. 
The current studies have attempted to answer this important question by 
obtaining confidence measures from both the cognitive and personality domains. As 
noted earlier the personality variables were selected within the framework of the Big 
Five Model of personality (Goldberg, 1997). Horn‟s (1985) theory of Fluid and 
Crystallized Intelligence provided the framework from which the psychometric tasks 
were chosen. The cognitive domains that were assessed include acculturated knowledge 
(Gc), abstract reasoning (Gf), and visual perception (Gv). 
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Figure 2.1: Diagrammatic representation of the multidimensional, hierarchical model of 
self-concept. 
2.8.1 Summary 
Thus far, this chapter has reviewed calibration research findings mainly from 
within the cognitive domain, and has provided both theoretical and empirical reasons 
for conducting calibration type analyses within the personality arena. The next section 
deals with the measurement issues associated with personality judgments. 
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2.9 Measurement Issues and Empirical Findings of Personality 
Judgements 
Research examining the accuracy of personality judgments falls into two main 
groups, that is, interpersonal and intrapersonal perception. It is acknowledged from the 
outset that studying accuracy within the personality domain is weighed down by 
methodological complexities, because there is no criterion by which a personality 
judgment can be appraised as being either true or false. Nevertheless, Funder (1999) 
argued that these difficulties should not stop accuracy research and advocated that 
researchers should continue to tackle the topic and frankly acknowledge any 
methodological problems, because studying accuracy is far too important to be 
abandoned. He contended that studying the accuracy of personality judgments should be 
centred on three reasonable premises that must be accepted as a given before conducting 
this type of investigation: 
1) individual differences in personality (personality traits) exist and are 
important; 
2) people sometimes make judgments about these traits; 
3) these judgments are sometimes accurate (p. 11). 
These premises were accepted for the purposes of the current studies. The 
accuracy debate concerning personality judgments will be elaborated upon in Chapters 
3 and 4. 
The major focus of personality research with regard to phenomenological 
accuracy has dealt with interpersonal perception and this literature is reviewed in the 
next section. 
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2.9.1 Interpersonal Perception 
Studies have shown moderate correlations between self-ratings and others‟ 
ratings of personality (e.g., Funder, 1980, 1999; Meyer et al., 2001; Watson, Hubbard, 
& Wiese, 2000). It has been argued that these moderate correlations imply both 
accuracy and convergent validity for intrapersonal self-reported ratings of personality. 
Inter-judge agreement or consensus between a number of observers has been the 
most commonly used criterion for assessing the accuracy of personality judgments (e.g., 
Albright et al., 1997; Borkenau & Liebler, 1993a, 1993b; Funder & Colvin, 1988; Vogt 
& Colvin, 2003). However, consensus/agreement does not necessarily imply accuracy, 
because shared errors or biases can lead to consensus, but not necessarily to accuracy 
(Blackman & Funder, 1998; Funder, 2001; Swan & Gill, 1997). That is, two or more 
judges can reach agreement but one or all of them can be inaccurate for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, observers may not have had enough information about target persons, 
therefore reducing accuracy. Secondly, observers may have discussed their conclusions 
about a target and inadvertently influenced each other, so that although they reached 
consensus in their judgements, they were in fact inaccurate. Judges may also have used 
their own implicit personality theories to make judgements about the target rather than 
relying on the information solely provided. Alternatively, observers may make 
judgements about a target based on population base rates. Because dissertation is 
concerned with self-judgments, the discussion now addresses the research literature that 
has examined intrapersonal perception. 
2.9.2 Intrapersonal Perception 
How do we come to know ourselves? Am I agreeable, conscientious, extraverted, 
neurotic, or even intellectual, for example? The psychological literature highlights that 
individuals draw upon at least two self-appraisal processes to respond to these types of 
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questions. These appraisal processes can be grouped as being either reflected or direct 
(Ochsner et al., 2005). 
2.9.2.1.1 Reflected Appraisals 
Two theories that exemplify reflected appraisals are the looking glass self theory, 
and Bem‟s (1972) self-perception theory. According to the looking glass self theory, 
self-knowledge is based on what individuals believe others think of them (e.g., Shrauger 
& Schoeneman, 1979). For example, Joe loves going to parties and being the centre of 
attention. Joe‟s family and friends think he is extraverted; therefore, Joe believes he is 
extraverted. Bem expresses it somewhat differently in his self-perception theory: 
Individuals come to know their own attitudes, emotions and internal  
states by inferring them from observations of their own behaviour and  
circumstances in which they occur. When internal cues are weak,  
ambiguous, or uninterpretable, the individual is in the same position as the  
outside observer (p. 2). 
Therefore, according to Bem (1972), self-knowledge is attained in the same way that 
one perceives others. That is, individuals make personality judgments about themselves 
by observing their own behaviour, just as they make judgments about others by 
observing others‟ behaviours. In contrast to both the looking glass self theory and 
Bem‟s self-perception theory, direct appraisals examine self-knowledge from the 
vantage point of two types of knowledge structures in memory. 
2.9.2.1.2 Direct Appraisals 
Cognitive psychologists assert that trait self-knowledge, and recall of specific 
occasions that involve those traits, stem from two different knowledge structures (e.g., 
Kihlstrom, Beer, & Klein, 2003; Klein, Loftus, & Burton, 1989; Klein, Loftus, & 
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Kihlstrom, 1996). These are semantic self-knowledge and episodic personal knowledge. 
Episodic knowledge represents memory for specific events from one‟s past in which the 
self was present, whereas semantic self-knowledge is more generalized, is context-free, 
and includes general knowledge of the world (Kihlstrom et al.). According to this view, 
individuals‟ self-knowledge is based on their general view of themselves, as well as on 
recalling specific events that provide evidence for trait self-knowledge. For example, 
Fred believes he is generally conscientious, and then remembers when he worked long 
hours to finish a marketing project on time. From a cognitive perspective, however, 
self-knowledge is not limited to semantic and episodic memory structures. 
Other cognitive work on self-knowledge has focussed on a number of areas: 
associative network models of the self, the self-reference effect, priming and self-
referent processing, self-relevance and recognition, interactions between episodic and 
semantic self-knowledge, and neuropsychological approaches to the self as memory 
(see Kihlstrom et al., 2003 for a review). 
2.9.2.1.3 Biases That Can Affect the Accuracy of Self-Perception 
Within the psychological literature, researchers argue that many motives 
influence the process of self-evaluation (for reviews see, Leary, 2007; Sedikides & 
Strube, 1997; Taylor, Neter, & Wayment, 1995; Tesser, 2003). These motives include, 
self-enhancement, self-verification, self-serving attributions, self-improvement, need for 
closure, cognitive consistency, social desirability, the bias blind spot, and uncertainty 
orientation.  However, the emphasis has been on two motives: self-enhancement and 
social desirability. 
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2.9.2.1.4 Self-Enhancement 
It has been argued that individuals self-enhance to bolster their self-esteem (e.g., 
Dunning, 2005; Taylor & Brown, 1988; Tesser, 2003), and that self-perceptions are 
essentially distorted and self-enhancing, and are often more positive compared with the 
perceptions of others (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Within the personality domain, this self-
enhancement bias has been demonstrated by studies in which individuals were found to 
be less likely to endorse negative personality traits as being characteristic of themselves 
(e.g., Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989; Halperin, Snyder, Shenkel, & Houston, 
1976). John and Robins (1994), however, demonstrated that the self-enhancement bias 
was not a universal law of human behaviour, and that there were marked individual 
differences ranging from self-enhancement to self-diminishment biases. In their study, 
53% of participants were reasonably accurate when asked to estimate their performance 
on a managerial group-discussion task, with 15% underestimating and 32% 
overestimating their performance. Gosling, John, Craik, and Robins (1998) conducted a 
study in which a similar conclusion was reached. Furthermore, in their review of the 
characteristics of self-enhancers, Robins, Paulhaus, Roberts, and Hogan (2001) 
concluded that self-enhancement is not universal, and that the conclusion drawn from 
the few studies in which the percentage of participants who self-enhanced was reported, 
as well as those who did not, is that self-enhancers are in the minority. These authors 
critiqued previous research methodologies for not including the percentages of 
participants who self-enhanced, self-effaced, or who were accurate, so that appropriate 
conclusions could be made. 
2.9.2.1.5 Above-Average Effect 
In the area of social cognition, researchers have argued that the above-average 
effect is also an example of self-enhancement bias. The literature on personality 
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judgments describes studies in which, participants were required to indicate the degree 
to which various personality traits described themselves, compared with unfamiliar 
average peers of the same gender (e.g., Alicke, 1985; Alicke & Govorum, 2006; Alicke, 
Klotz, Breitenbecher, & Yurak, 1995; Silvera & Seger, 2004). Findings indicated that 
people tended to rate themselves more positively than they rated their average peers. For 
example, in Alicke et al.‟s study in 1995 university students were informed that the 
purpose of the study was to investigate how they would rate themselves on various 
personality traits relative to unknown average university students on 20 positive (e.g., 
responsible, perceptive, creative, and polite) and 20 negative (e.g., meddlesome, 
complaining, unforgiving, and vain) traits. Results indicated that participants rated 
themselves as better than average on 38 out of 40 traits. These authors concluded that 
this effect was a pervasive phenomenon. However, Colvin, Block, and Funder (1995) 
argued that when individuals are asked to rate their own personality traits relative to 
unknown peers, there are inevitably times when participants‟ ratings are accurate, and 
times when they are inaccurate or self-enhancing. They suggest that there is no way of 
telling what percentage of participants might fall into each category. Self-enhancement 
also occurs when individuals respond to psychological test items in a socially desirable 
manner, a phenomenon discussed in the following section. 
2.9.2.1.6 Social Desirability 
Psychologists hope clients will respond to self-report inventories in a frank and 
truthful manner so that valid results can be interpreted. Unfortunately, as previously 
noted, this does not always happen, and some individuals may respond to items in a 
socially desirable manner. Social desirability is defined as positive endorsement of 
socially-acceptable items and negative endorsement of items that are considered socially 
unacceptable (Edwards, 1953). With regard to personality self-report, some authors 
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have argued that social desirability is not a response bias that causes problems for 
personality measurement and that psychologists should stop “…kicking the 
methodological dead horse”, and that “…the sacred cow status” of this construct should 
be re-evaluated (Nevid, 1983, p. 139). McCrae and Costa (1983) concurred with Nevid, 
and provided empirical data to support this conclusion. Similarly, conclusions are found 
within the organisational literature. In their meta-analytic review, Ones, Viswesvaran, 
and Reiss (1996) concluded that social desirability in personality testing for personnel 
selection was, overall, nothing more than a “…red herring”, and that the use of 
personality inventories should continue. 
2.9.2.1.7 Are Personality Judgements Error-Prone or Error-Free? 
Another focus of research into intrapersonal perception of personality traits 
focussed on the instances when individuals make errors in self-judgements about their 
personality. This research has consistently demonstrated that individuals readily accept 
general personality statements, supposedly derived from personality tests, as being 
accurate descriptions of their personality (e.g., Ditto & Boardman, 1995; Greene, 
Bausom, & Macon, 1980; Jackson & Murray, 1985; Mosher, 1965; Snyder & Larson, 
1972; Snyder & Shenkel, 1976; Snyder, Shenkel, & Lowery, 1977). The acceptance of 
bogus personality feedback has been coined the Barnum effect, so as to stigmatise those 
personality descriptions that are highly accepted simply because their base rate in the 
general population is high (Meehl, 1956). An example of a Barnum feedback statement 
from Marks and Seeman (1962) is: 
You have a tendency to worry at times but not to excess. You do get depressed 
at times but you couldn‟t be called moody because you are generally cheerful 
and rather optimistic. You have a good disposition although earlier in life you 
have had to struggle with yourself to control your impulses and temper (p. 205). 
 Cognitive and Personality Confidence 52 
 
Accepting of this type of feedback does not necessarily constitute an error in 
judgment for the following reasons. Firstly, this scenario has a high base rate in the 
general population; therefore endorsement of this description is not an error per se, but 
rather a methodological flaw in the studies that have used these kinds of feedback 
statements. Secondly, researchers who have used Barnum scenarios in their studies have 
also employed deception as part of the experimental design, with participants being told 
that this feedback was derived from the psychological inventories they had completed 
earlier. Hence, it is possible that acceptance of this type of feedback is due to 
participants not wanting to challenge the psychological interpretation provided by the 
so-called personality expert. Previous research has demonstrated that the credibility of 
the interpreter of psychological tests influences participants‟ acceptance of personality 
feedback, even if the feedback is negative (Binderman, Fretz, Scott, & Abrams, 1972; 
Halperin et al., 1976). 
Harris and Greene (1984) improved previous research by examining 
participants‟ perceptions of actual feedback (their true score), trivial feedback (true for 
people in general), and inaccurate feedback (the opposite of their actual score) based on 
their responses to the California Psychological Inventory. Results showed that 
participants were able to differentiate between the three types of feedback thereby 
showing that their perceptions of themselves were valid. Similar results were reported 
by Davies (1997 see experiment 3) where participants were administered the 16PF 
questionnaire and were asked to rate the accuracy of true and false feedback from the 16 
PF manual. True feedback was judged as more accurate than was false feedback. Most 
recently, Andersen and Nordvik (2002) examined whether a Barnum type effect (that is, 
participants‟ endorsement of a false trait profile as being accurate) occurred within the 
Five Factor Model of personality judgments. Participants responded to the NEO 
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Personality Inventory-Revised (NEO PI-R) so that their actual personality profiles were 
calculated for each of the Big Five dimensions. One month later participants were asked 
to rate the accuracy of a unique NEO PI-R false profile that was generated for each 
participant. These profiles included T scores and subjects were given information about 
the Five Factor Model and were able to read descriptions of each trait from the test 
manual before giving their accuracy rating. Participants correctly recognized and 
rejected T score profiles that were distant from their actual T scores suggesting that the 
Barnum type effect is not present in Big Five judgments.     
In summary, acceptance of Barnum type feedback does not necessarily imply 
that people are inaccurate when making judgments about themselves. What is important 
is that general personality descriptions are not useful for judging the accuracy of self-
judgments of personality. Therefore, Big Five trait specific personality descriptions 
were generated for the current research studies (see Study 1 for details). 
2.10 Chapter Summary  
Accurate self-monitoring is an important area of psychological enquiry. 
Overconfidence appears to be the most common judgmental error. Underconfidence 
appears to be less prevalent although there is still some doubt as to whether 
underconfidence is a pervasive phenomenon in all tasks of sensory discrimination. 
Study 1 has included a measure of Gv to examine whether participants are mis-
calibrated. 
Gender differences in confidence and mis-calibration in the cognitive arena has 
demonstrated that whilst males are more confident, they are not necessarily more mis-
calibrated than females. However, previous research findings are mixed therefore the 
role of gender is re-examined in the current research programme. Few studies have 
investigated whether age is correlated with cognitive confidence and mis-calibration. 
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This was examined in Studies 1 and 3. Additionally, obtaining confidence ratings from 
personality judgments allows examination of age and gender differences in personality 
confidence which have hitherto not been previously examined. These differences are 
investigated in Studies 1, 2, and 3. 
A robust confidence factor (trait) has been demonstrated within the cognitive 
domain and Stankov and his collaborators have argued that this trait initiates self-
monitoring. The present studies have continued and extended this line of investigation 
by measuring and factor analysing, the confidence ratings obtained from both the ability 
and personality domains to examine, whether confidence in ability and personality 
judgments are subserved by the same cognitive processes. This is important for 
calibration researchers because it remains unclear whether there is a general monitoring 
trait that spans differing domains. A robust overconfidence factor is also present in the 
cognitive domain, and a single overconfidence factor was expected to emerge from the 
diverse range of cognitive tasks in Studies 1 and 3. The question that remains 
unexplored, however, is whether overconfidence in personality judgments shares 
variance with overconfidence in cognitive judgments. Before this could be addressed, 
accuracy methods for personality judgments were developed in Studies 1 and 2. Study 3 
then examines whether there is a general overconfidence factor that spans both the 
cognitive and personality domains. As this concludes the review of the relevant 
literature, the focus now shifts to Study 1, which is presented in Chapter 3.  
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 Chapter 3 - Study 1 
3.1 Introduction 
The domains assessed in Study 1 include Gc, Gf, Gv and confidence ratings 
from each of the Big Five personality dimensions. Study 1 was designed to:  
1. Investigate whether individuals are mis-calibrated across a diverse battery of 
cognitive tasks. 
2. Examine if gender, age, and personality, are each correlated with cognitive 
accuracy, with confidence, and with mis-calibration. 
3. Explore if those of lower ability are more mis-calibrated than those of higher 
ability. 
4. Examine the factorial structure of cognitive confidence judgments. 
5. Construct self-rated personality descriptions based on the Big Five trait 
adjectives by Goldberg (1997). 
6. Obtain confidence and accuracy measures for each of the Big Five personality 
dimensions. 
7. Investigate the factorial structure of cognitive and personality confidence 
judgments. 
8. Examine the factorial structure of cognitive bias scores. 
9. Examine the relationship between cognitive and personality bias. 
In the following sections, relevant research is reviewed briefly and predictions 
are presented. 
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3.2 Mis-calibration for Gf, Gc, & Gv Tasks 
This section presents the overall trends from the calibration literature for Gf, Gv, 
and Gc tasks. Individual differences in cognitive confidence mis-calibration are 
addressed in section 3.3. 
Reliable findings have shown that individuals tend to be either overconfident or 
underconfident when evaluating the accuracy of their cognitive performance and being 
well calibrated is much less common. Reasonably good calibration has been 
demonstrated on reasoning (Gf) tasks (e.g., Raven‟s Progressive Matrices and/or Letter 
Series) (e.g., Baker, 2001; Crawford & Stankov, 1996; Kleitman & Stankov, 2001; 
Pallier et al., 2002, Study 2; Stankov, 1998; Stankov & Crawford, 1996a, 1996b). 
Pallier et al. asserted that good calibration was expected for Gf tasks as these tests do 
not include misleading items or else the construct validity of these tests would be 
questionable. It is not possible to select a representative sample of reasoning items from 
participants‟ natural ecology, and therefore cue and ecological validities are equal. 
Some instances in the literature, however, have demonstrated overconfidence for 
Ravens Progressive Matrices task (Pallier et al., 2002, Study 1; Stankov & Dolph, 2000). 
Pallier et al. explained this overconfidence in their study by suggesting that military 
participants were less accurate than were the samples of undergraduate students used in 
the other studies cited above. In general however, the aforementioned literature 
concluded that good calibration was evident for Gf tasks. Therefore, for the Gf tasks 
used in the current study, good calibration was expected, along with bias scores that 
were close to zero and calibration curves that closely paralleled the perfect calibration 
line. 
Research findings have also been mixed for visual perceptual (Gv) tasks, with 
some studies demonstrating underconfidence (Crawford & Stankov, 1996; Kleitman & 
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Stankov, 2001; Pallier et al., 2002, Study 2; Petrusic & Baranski, 1997; Stankov & 
Crawford, 1996a, 1996b, 1997), and others demonstrating overconfidence (Pallier et al., 
2002 Study 1; Stankov, 1999a). Reasons for these discrepancies remain unclear and 
further research is required. A Gv measure was included in Study 1 to further examine 
mis-calibration. 
For tasks of acculturated knowledge (Gc), on the other hand, overconfidence has 
consistently been demonstrated in the research literature (Allwood & Granhag, 1996; 
Crawford & Stankov, 1996; Juslin, 1994; Kleitman & Stankov, 2001; Pallier et al., 
2002; Schaefer et al., 2004; Stankov, 1998; Stankov & Crawford, 1996a, 1996b, 1997; 
West & Stanovich, 1997). One possible explanation for these findings is derived from 
PMM theory which Gigerenzer (1991) used to argue that items from acculturated 
knowledge tasks were unrepresentative of participants‟ natural ecology, thereby leading 
to overconfidence. Gigerenzer and colleagues asserted that if researchers randomly 
selected ecologically valid items, overconfidence would disappear. In line with this 
argument for acculturated knowledge tasks, participants in Study 1 were expected to be 
overconfident, bias scores were expected to be positive, and calibration curves were 
expected to display overconfidence. 
The next section covers whether individual differences in gender, age, ability, 
and personality, impact on cognitive confidence and on mis-calibration. 
3.3 Individual Differences in Cognitive Confidence and Mis-
calibration 
3.3.1 Gender  
Previous research showed that males were more confident than females (Pallier, 
2003; Pulford & Colman, 1997; Ross & Fogarty, 2006; Stankov, 1998; see Stankov & 
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Lee, 2008, for an exception). However, gender differences in mis-calibration in the 
cognitive arena have been somewhat mixed (Baker, 2001; Beyer & Bowden, 1997; 
Crawford & Stankov, 1996; Jonsson & Allwood, 2003; Pallier, 2003; Pulford & 
Colman, 1997; Stankov, 1998; Stankov & Crawford, 1997; Stankov & Lee, 2008).  It 
was suggested in the last chapter that higher confidence in males may have been due to 
either gender-stereotypic socialization patterns, or to task characteristics, or to both of 
these variables (Beyer, 1990; Marsh & Yeung, 1998; Ross & Fogarty, 2006). Males 
were therefore expected be more confident than females for all five tasks used in Study 
1. Gender differences in cognitive mis-calibration were also explored although no 
specific hypotheses were generated due to conflicting research findings. 
3.3.2 Age 
Little research has examined whether age differences are linked to individual 
differences in confidence and mis-calibration within the cognitive domain (Crawford & 
Stankov, 1996; Pallier, 2003). In terms of confidence and mis-calibration, both self 
efficacy theory (Bandura, 1977), and cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) may 
shed some light on what to expect. If task completion activates either negative self-
efficacy beliefs or cognitive dissonance, confidence levels in older participants may be 
affected. Specifically, activated negative self-efficacy may produce lower confidence 
than is warranted by accuracy scores, whereas cognitive dissonance may affect 
confidence in the opposite direction (see Chapter 2 for the rationale). 
Calibration literature has demonstrated evidence of greater mis-calibration for 
older participants with small but significant positive correlations between age and bias 
scores that have been obtained from fluid, crystallised, and visual perceptual tasks 
(Crawford & Stankov, 1996; Pallier, 2003). This same pattern of results was expected 
for the Gc, Gf, and Gv tasks used in the current study. 
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3.3.3 Ability 
Work by Dunning and his colleagues (Dunning et al., 2003; Kruger & Dunning, 
1999) and others (see also Maki et al., 1994; Moreland et al., 1981; Shaughnessy, 1979), 
suggests that, compared with those of higher ability those of lower ability may have 
some difficulty in accurately appraising their cognitive abilities. Consequently for the 
cognitive tasks in Study 1, low scorers (i.e., in the bottom quartile) were expected to be 
more mis-calibrated than high scorers (i.e., top quartile). See Chapter 2 for a detailed 
rationale. 
3.3.4 Personality 
The current study also examined the relationships that exist between each of the 
Big Five personality dimensions, and both cognitive confidence and mis-calibration. 
Previous empirical studies using zero order correlations have demonstrated that 
Openness was significantly positively correlated with cognitive confidence (Baker, 
2001; Kleitman, 2003; Pallier et al., 2002) and, Conscientiousness was significantly 
associated with cognitive bias scores (Kleitman, 2003). The role of personality, 
however, is somewhat unclear due to the concerns raised by Schaefer and his colleagues 
(2004) (see Chapter 2). They convincingly argued that researchers need to use partial 
correlations instead of simple zero-order correlations because of the shared variance that 
exists between the five personality dimensions. Consideration of the results by Schaefer 
et al. (2004) led to the expectation that, after controlling for the influence of the other 
four personality dimensions:  
1. Openness/Intellect scores would be significantly related to cognitive confidence 
scores. 
2. Extraversion would be associated with both confidence and bias scores. 
3. Conscientiousness would be significantly related to confidence scores. 
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4. Emotional Stability and Agreeableness scores would not be associated with 
either cognitive confidence or bias. 
3.4 Individual Differences in Big Five Accuracy, Confidence, 
and Mis-calibration 
Despite the methodological difficulties mentioned in Chapter 2, the emphasis 
placed on personality assessment justifies the extension of the calibration paradigm to 
the domain of personality judgements. Following Gigerenzer‟s (1991) assertions that 
individuals are well calibrated to their natural environments, and coupling this assertion 
with the proposition that personality assessments are a perfectly natural everyday 
occurrence, it was expected that individuals would be well calibrated in this domain. 
3.4.1 Gender Differences in Big Five Personality Confidence, 
Accuracy and Bias 
The gender similarities hypothesis (Hyde, 2005) provides some insight into what 
to expect in terms of gender differences in Big Five confidence judgments. This 
hypothesis posits that males and females are more similar across a wide range of 
psychological variables, than they are different. Hyde argued that this hypothesis holds 
true for adults, adolescents and children. It is important to note, however, that Hyde was 
not arguing that men and women are similar across all psychological dimensions. With 
regard to effect sizes, Hyde postulated that the majority of psychological gender 
differences are likely to be in the close-to-zero (d ≤ 0.10) or small (0.11 < d < 0.35) 
range, that very few would be in the moderate range (0.36 < d < 0.65), and that only a 
small number would be large (d = 0.66-1.00) or very large (d > 1.00). Hyde reviewed 
the results of 46 meta-analyses of studies that investigated gender differences across 
numerous psychological variables (i.e., cognitive, communication, social, personality, 
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psychological well-being, motor behaviours, moral reasoning, delay of gratification, 
cheating, computer use and efficacy, and job attribute preferences). Results obtained 
from her review supported the gender similarities hypothesis with 78% of the 124 effect 
sizes being close to zero or small. There were, however, some exceptions. For example, 
motor behaviours, and in particular throwing distance (d = 1.98) and throwing velocity 
(d = 2.18) produced very large effect sizes in terms of gender differences. However, in 
her review Hyde did not comment about findings within the Big Five personality 
domain, which are relevant to the current studies. Nevertheless, inspection of the data 
Hyde presented in Table 1 of her work, which summarises the effect sizes obtained in 
Feingold‟s (1994) meta-analysis of gender differences in personality, upheld the gender 
similarities hypothesis. That is, most of the effect sizes were zero to small, with only the 
assertiveness facet of the Extraversion dimension demonstrating a moderate effect size 
(d = + 0.51). Moreover, as expected by the gender-similarities hypothesis, only one 
large effect size (-0.91) emerged for the tendermindedness facet of the agreeableness 
dimension. These findings suggested that males were more assertive and less 
tenderminded than females. 
Gender-stereotypic socialisation patterns may provide one explanation for 
Hyde‟s findings within the Big Five personality domain. Assertiveness is often regarded 
as being a more masculine attribute and is therefore more likely to be reinforced in 
males. Tendermindedness, on the other hand, is often perceived as more feminine and 
consequently, encouraged in females. These suggestions are reasonable if one refers to 
social role theory, proposed by Eagly (1987). This theory contends that, each gender is 
expected to behave in certain ways that are considered appropriate for their gender and 
culture (Eagly & Wood, 1991), and that these expected behaviours influence personality 
(Feingold, 1994). For example, females are expected to have elevated levels of 
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communal qualities such as friendliness, selflessness, concern for others and emotional 
expressivity (Eagly & Wood, 1991), whereas, males are expected to have elevated 
levels of agentic attributes such as independence, masterfulness, assertiveness and 
instrumental competence (Eagly & Wood, 1991). Nonetheless, although the literature 
has highlighted gender differences in Big Five personality ratings, there was no a priori 
reason to suspect that males and females would differ when making personality 
confidence judgments about themselves as it was argued in Chapter 2 that these 
judgments have high ecological validity. Therefore, it was expected that males and 
females would not differ in terms of personality confidence and that Hyde‟s hypothesis 
would be upheld in Study 1. For the reasons just stated, the same predictions were made 
for both personality accuracy and mis-calibration.  
3.4.2 Age Differences in Big Five Confidence, Accuracy and Bias 
According to the five-factor theory of personality (McCrae & Costa, 1999) 
personality traits develop during childhood and adolescence and then remain stable in 
adulthood. However, the fact that the traits themselves remain stable in adulthood 
reveals little about the stability of peoples‟ perceptions of those traits. Nevertheless, this 
stability (e.g., I am conscientious), combined with the assumption that personality 
judgments are made on a daily basis, and therefore have high ecological validity, 
plausibly leads to the conclusion that confidence, accuracy, and bias judgments about 
one‟s personality would also remain stable in adulthood. It is difficult to draw parallels 
with the cognitive confidence literature wherein individuals make confidence judgments 
on tests of maximal performance whereas the confidence judgments obtained for the 
Big Five dimensions were taken from measures of typical performance. Thus it was 
expected that age would not be associated with Big Five confidence, bias, or accuracy 
scores. 
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3.5 The Factorial Structure of Cognitive and Personality 
Confidence Judgments 
Differential psychologists have demonstrated the existence of a trait (factor) of 
self-confidence that appears independent of the type of cognitive activity being 
investigated (cf. Stankov & Dolph, 2000). This confidence factor has been replicated 
using larger test batteries and different populations (Crawford & Stankov, 1996; 
Kleitman & Stankov, 2001, 2007; Pallier et al., 2002; Stankov, 1998, 1999a, 2000a; 
Stankov & Crawford, 1996a, 1996b, 1997; Stankov & Dolph, 2000; Stankov & Lee, 
2008). Other investigators have also provided data in support of a confidence factor that 
is domain independent (e.g., Schraw, 1994, 1997; Schraw & DeBacker Roedel, 1994; 
Schraw & Dennison, 1994; Schraw et al., 1995; Schraw & Moshman, 1995). Moreover, 
it has been argued that this general self-monitoring/self-confidence trait represents one 
aspect of meta-cognition that is related to the accuracy of self-assessment in the 
cognitive domain (Kleitman & Stankov, 2001; Stankov & Dolph, 2000). Stankov and 
associates (Kleitman & Stankov, 2007; Stankov & Lee, 2008) have since demonstrated 
that this trait (factor) was moderately associated with a metacognitive factor in each of 
these studies. These moderate correlations imply that confidence and meta-cognition 
share common cognitive processes. 
Empirical evidence has demonstrated that confidence ratings have consistently 
displayed very high internal consistency co-efficients (Baker, 2001; Jonsson & Allwood, 
2003; Kleitman, 2008; Kleitman & Stankov, 2001, 2007; Liberman & Tversky, 1993; 
Pallier et al., 2002; Stankov, 1999a, 1999b, 2000a; Stankov & Lee, 2008). However, 
differential psychologists have not investigated the generality of this trait in other 
domains such as Big Five confidence judgments. For the purposes of Study 1 the 
assumption was made that the rating for each Big Five dimension would not be highly 
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correlated with confidence in that rating as Stankov (1999b) has placed the cognitive 
confidence trait somewhere between the boundaries of intelligence and personality. The 
question that remains unanswered, however, is whether there is one general factor for 
both personality and cognitive confidence judgments or whether there are two. The 
current study examined the factorial structure of cognitive and Big Five confidence 
ratings.  
Self-concept theory (Shavelson et al., 1976) could provide insight into what to 
expect with regard to the factorial structure of these ratings. Marsh (2008) asserted that 
academic and non-academic self-concept are highly differentiated, therefore variance in 
specific areas cannot be elucidated in terms of one general trait. It was therefore argued 
that the self-confidence trait is also likely to be highly differentiated across the Big Five 
(non-academic) and cognitive (i.e., abilities) domains, because both self-confidence and 
self-concept judgments are cognitive appraisals of the self. Investigating whether Big 
Five personality and cognitive confidence judgments splits at the factorial level has 
important implications for calibration theorists who are trying to understand self-
monitoring. The domains assessed in Study 1 included Gc, Gf, Gv and confidence 
ratings from each of the Big Five personality domains. Two confidence factors were 
expected to emerge from the structural analyses of confidence scores obtained from 
both the cognitive and the personality measures used in Study 1. This expectation was 
based on the assumption that the self-confidence trait would be similarly differentiated 
across the cognitive and Big Five domains as the self-concept construct, as both 
represent cognitive appraisals of the self.  
To date, the prediction about the factorial structure of cognitive and Big Five 
confidence scores has been made with reference to Self-Concept theory (Marsh, 2008; 
Shavelson et al., 1976) but not to Gigerenzer et al.‟s (1991) ecological theory. Even 
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though this theory was developed in relation to general knowledge questions, it is 
reasonable to assume that the same principles apply to personality judgments; thus 
separate confidence factors for personality and cognition would emerge, because the cue 
validities used to endorse personality test items are vastly different from those cues used 
to answer cognitive test items. 
3.6 Factorial Structure of Cognitive Bias Scores 
Stankov and his collaborators (Pallier et al., 2002; Stankov, 1998, 1999a) factor 
analysed bias scores obtained from various combinations of Gc, Gf, and Gv tasks, and 
found that the bias scores loaded onto one factor. These results indicated that mis-
calibration across a diverse range of abilities and perceptual tasks were driven by the 
same cognitive processes. In view of these findings factor analysis of the bias scores 
obtained from the Gc, Gf, and Gv tasks used in Study 1 was expected to produce a 
single bias factor. 
3.6.1 Correlations between the Personality Bias Score and Cognitive 
Bias Scores 
As discussed in the previous chapter, an important question that remains 
unexplored is whether bias scores from the cognitive domain are associated with 
personality bias. In Study 1, an overall personality bias score was developed across all 
of the Big Five personality dimensions and cognitive bias scores were obtained from 
each of the cognitive tasks. The assumption from Gigerenzer‟s theory (1991) that cues 
used to answer cognitive items differ from those used to answer personality items, led to 
the expectation that personality bias would not be associated with cognitive bias scores. 
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3.7 Restatement of Hypotheses 
The hypotheses for the current study are summarised as follows: 
1. It was hypothesised that good calibration would be demonstrated for the Gf tasks 
used in Study 1, with bias scores being close to zero and with calibration curves that 
align closely to the perfect calibration line. Previous research which demonstrated 
that good calibration occurs for Gf tasks formed the basis of this hypothesis (e.g., 
Baker, 2001; Crawford & Stankov, 1996; Kleitman & Stankov, 2001; Pallier et al., 
2002, Study 2; Stankov, 1998; Stankov & Crawford, 1996a, 1996b). 
2. It was hypothesised that participants would be overconfident on the Gc tasks in 
Study 1 with positive bias scores, and calibration curves that display overconfidence. 
This hypothesis was developed from the calibration literature wherein 
overconfidence has consistently been demonstrated on Gc tasks (Allwood & 
Granhag, 1996; Crawford & Stankov, 1996; Juslin, 1994; Kleitman & Stankov, 
2001; Pallier et al., 2002; Schaefer et al., 2004; Stankov, 1998; Stankov & Crawford, 
1996a, 1996b, 1997; West & Stanovich, 1997). 
3. It was hypothesised that males would be more confident than females for all five 
cognitive tasks. Previous research which found that males have demonstrated 
significantly higher levels of confidence than females on cognitive tasks formed the 
foundation of this hypothesis (Pallier, 2003; Pulford & Colman, 1997; Ross & 
Fogarty, 2006; Stankov, 1998). 
4. It was hypothesised that age would be positively related to Gf, Gc, and Gv bias 
scores. Calibration studies that demonstrated evidence of greater mis-calibration for 
older participants, and small but significant positive correlations between age and 
bias scores obtained from Gf, Gc, and Gv tasks (Crawford & Stankov, 1996; Pallier, 
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2003), underpinned this hypothesis. This same pattern of results was expected for 
the Gc, Gf, and Gv tasks in the current study. 
5. It was hypothesised that low scorers (i.e., in the bottom quartile) would be more 
mis-calibrated than high scorers (i.e., top quartile) for each of the cognitive tasks 
used in Study 1. Previous research that demonstrated that those of lower ability have 
some difficulty in accurately appraising their cognitive abilities compared with 
those of higher ability (Dunning et al., 2003; Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Maki et al., 
1994; Moreland et al., 1981; Shaughnessy, 1979), formed the rationale for this 
hypothesis. 
6. Based on the results by Schaefer et al. (2004) it was hypothesised that, after 
controlling for the influence of the other four personality dimensions, that:  
6.1. Openness/Intellect scores would be significantly related to confidence scores. 
6.2. Extraversion would be associated with confidence and bias scores. 
6.3. Conscientiousness would be significantly related to confidence scores. 
6.4. Emotional Stability and Agreeableness scores would not be associated with 
cognitive confidence or bias. 
7. It was hypothesised that good calibration was also expected for the Big Five 
judgments, based on Gigerenzer‟s (1991) theory in which it was argued that 
individuals are well calibrated to their natural environments. 
8. Based on the gender similarities hypothesis (Hyde, 2005) it was hypothesised that 
males and females would not differ in terms of Big Five confidence, Big Five 
accuracy, or Big Five bias. 
9. Based on the five-factor theory of personality (McCrae & Costa, 1999) combined 
with the assumption that Big Five judgments are made on a daily basis, and 
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therefore have high ecological validity it was hypothesised that age would not be 
associated with Big Five confidence, Big Five accuracy, or Big Five bias. 
10. It was hypothesised that two confidence factors would emerge from the structural 
analyses of confidence scores obtained from the cognitive (Gc, Gf, and Gv) and Big 
Five Measures. This hypothesis was developed with reference to Self-Concept 
theory (Marsh, 2008; Shavelson et al., 1976) and PMM theory (Gigerenzer et al., 
1991). 
11. It was hypothesised that one bias factor would emerge from factor analysing the bias 
scores obtained from the Gc, Gf, and Gv tasks used in the current study. Work by 
Stankov and his collaborators (Pallier et al., 2002; Stankov, 1998, 1999a) who factor 
analysed bias scores obtained from various combinations of Gc, Gf, Gv tasks and 
found that the bias scores loaded onto one factor, formed the groundwork for this 
hypothesis. 
12. It was hypothesised that cognitive bias would not be associated with the personality 
bias score. PMM theory (Gigerenzer et al., 1991) provided the basis for this 
hypothesis. 
3.8 Method 
3.8.1 Participants 
A total of 127 individuals participated in this study. The sample comprised 40 
males and 87 females, ranging in age from 17 to 74 years (M = 34.42, SD = 12.76). The 
mean age of the males was 33.98 years (SD = 12.32 years). The mean age for females 
was 34.63 (SD = 10.02 years). The highest educational level of the sample varied from 
completion of grade 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, or 12 (n = 77), to completion of tertiary studies (n = 
50). Sixty participants were enrolled in undergraduate Psychology courses at the 
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University of Southern Queensland and received 1% course credit toward their final 
grade in return for their participation. 
Participants were recruited in two ways. Firstly, a sign-up sheet was placed on 
the Psychology department notice board at the University of Southern Queensland (see 
Appendix A). Snow ball sampling techniques were used to obtain a community sample 
of 67 participants. When community organizations were randomly approached they 
agreed to provide individuals with the rationale for the study; then respondents 
recommended it to others they thought may be interested in participating. The 
community sample came from both metropolitan and regional areas in Queensland, and 
these participants received the opportunity to enter a draw for cash prizes. 
3.8.2 Materials 
Demographic questions consisted of items regarding, gender, age, and highest 
level of education. All participants completed a battery of five cognitive tasks, one self-
report personality inventory, and five short descriptions of personality.  
3.8.2.1 Cognitive Tests 
For each of the cognitive tests, participants provided an answer to every trial, as 
well as a confidence rating indicating how confident they were that the answer provided 
was correct. For the open-ended tests (i.e., General Knowledge, Letter Series, and 
Concealed Words), confidence ranged from 0% (Just guessing) to 100% (Absolutely 
certain). For the other multiple choice tests (Esoteric Analogies and Cattell‟s Matrices), 
the starting point on the confidence scale was 100/k, where k = the number of response 
alternatives (see Appendix B). There were two markers each for Gc (General 
Knowledge and Esoteric Analogies) and Gf (Letter Series and Cattell‟s Matrices). The 
marker for Gv was the Concealed Words task. 
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General Knowledge Test (GKT) - (Stankov, 1997). This test (see Appendix C) 
covered knowledge of diverse areas such as history and geography, and contained 20 
open-ended items. For example, “What are BASIC, FORTRAN, and ALGOL?”  
Letter Series Test (LST) - (Stankov, 1997). After being presented with a series 
of letters (e.g., A, D, G, J, ?) participants provided the next letter of the series. They 
responded to 12 trials within a time limit of four minutes (see Appendix D). 
Esoteric Analogies Test (EST) - (Stankov, 1997). Participants chose words 
that completed verbal analogies for which four response options were provided. For 
example, LIGHT is to DARK as HAPPY is to GLAD, SAD, GAY, EAGER. A time 
limit of four minutes was imposed within which respondents were presented with 24 
trials (see Appendix E). 
Concealed Words Test (CWT) - (Stankov, 1997). Participants identified 
words in which parts of each letter were degraded. Participants responded to 26 trials 
within a time limit of two minutes (see Appendix F). 
Cattell’s Matrices (CM)- (Stankov, 1997). From among six options, 
participants chose the design that completed a matrix (see Appendix G). They 
responded to 11 trials within a four minutes time limit. 
3.8.2.2 Self-report Measures 
The International Personality Item Pool Five-Factor Personality Scale  
(IPIP, Goldberg, 1999). The scale consists of 50 statements describing people‟s 
behaviours and comprises five subscales (each consisting of 10 statements). The IPIP 
assesses personality across the following dimensions: Extraversion (e.g., “Am the life of 
the party”), Agreeableness (e.g., “Am interested in people”), Conscientiousness (e.g., 
“Am exacting in my work”), Emotional Stability (e.g., “Seldom feel blue”), and 
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Intellect (e.g., “Am quick to understand things”). Intellect is the equivalent of Openness 
in Big Five terminology. 
Respondents indicated, on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (Very inaccurate) to 5 
(Very accurate), the extent to which each statement described them. After the negatively 
worded items were recoded, a total score for each subscale was calculated by summing 
the 10 scores. Scores for each of the five subscales can range from 10 to 50, with higher 
scores indicating higher levels of the particular personality dimension. 
Goldberg (1999) reported that the IPIP was internally consistent, with a mean 
alpha coefficient of .84. Goldberg also reported adequate alpha coefficients for the 
Extraversion (.87), Agreeableness (.82), Conscientiousness (.79), Emotional Stability 
(.86), and Intellect (.84) sub-scales. 
Reasons for choosing the IPIP for Study 1 included its prior use in other studies 
of interpersonal and intrapersonal perception, as well as its psychometric properties (e.g., 
Christiansen et al., 2005; Funder, 1999; Gosling et al., 1998; John & Robins, 1993; John 
& Robins, 1994; Levesque, 1997; Mount, Barrick, & Strauss, 1994; Watson et al., 
2000). 
Goldberg‟s (1999) work provided evidence for the convergent validity of the 
IPIP scales by showing significant positive correlations (ranging between .64 and .80) 
between these subscales and other personality measures including Cattell‟s 16 
Personality Factors Questionnaire (Cattell, Eber, & Tatsuoka, 1992), Gough‟s 
California Psychological Inventory (Gough, 1996), Costa and McCrae‟s (1991) NEO-
PIR, and Cloninger‟s Temperament and Character Inventory (Cloninger, Przybeck, 
Svrakic, & Wetzel, 1994). A copy of the IPIP is presented in Appendix H. 
Big Five Block Descriptions of Personality (BFBD) Based on the Trait 
Adjectives - (Goldberg, 1999). The IPIP item-based personality descriptors described 
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above are often referred to as “objective” measures of personality. It is well-known that 
they do not provide completely accurate assessments of personality but they do provide 
the most objective means of assessing this aspect of individual differences and, were 
therefore used as dependent variables in Study 1. 
To continue the parallel with cognitive testing, a situation was constructed 
wherein these five item-based personality assessments could be scored as accurate or 
inaccurate. As mentioned in Chapter 2, strict parallels are not possible because, outside 
the limits imposed by reliability and validity estimates, there is no way to determine 
whether personality assessments are accurate. However, it is possible to approach this 
goal by using the notion of consistency/reliability. Consistency does not ensure 
accuracy, but a lack of consistency implies inaccuracy. Thus, a person who estimates a 
personality trait at one level using a reliable and valid form of a personality test but 
obtains a completely different estimate using a different but equally reliable and valid 
personality test, would be considered to be inaccurate. In this scenario, an assumption is 
made that the wildly different trait estimates are due to the person making the 
assessment, not to features of the instrument itself. Parallel forms of the IPIP Big Five 
measures were therefore developed. Rather than use another set of item-based measures 
(respondents had just completed one set), participants instead viewed text blocks 
presenting textual descriptions of the main personality traits, and then rated the extent to 
which each of these blocks described their own personalities. 
The present study utilized five block personality descriptions, which were 
constructed using the trait adjectives from the 100 item IPIP scale (Goldberg, 1999). 
The block descriptions entailed grouping together eight to ten adjectives for each 
personality dimension. However, participants completed the 50 item IPIP in the same 
testing session as these block descriptions, which meant that practice effects may have 
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been a concern. Therefore, the other 50 items that make up the 100 item scale supplied 
the trait adjectives for the block descriptions. In addition, these descriptions utilized 
only positively worded trait descriptions, because the group of items were presented in a 
block. Finally, in a further attempt to minimise overlap, the instructions and the rating 
scales were also changed (see below) to suit the purposes of the current research. A 
confidence measure (see below) was also added to each description. This resulted in 8 
trait adjectives being used for the Extraversion dimension, 10 for the Agreeableness 
dimension, 10 for the Intellect dimension, 9 for the Emotional Stability dimension, and 
9 for the Conscientiousness dimension. 
For each Big Five personality dimension, participants viewed a block 
description and rated the extent to which the overall block description generally 
reflected their personality. They marked their choices on an 11-point scale with end 
points of -5 (Not like me) to + 5 (Like me). The Extraversion personality block 
description, in which eight trait adjectives were grouped, appears below: 
I don‟t mind being the centre of attention; I make friends easily; I take charge; I 
know how to captivate people; I feel at ease with people; I am skilled in 
handling social situations; I am the life of the party; I start conversations. 
In order to continue the analogy with calibration assessment in the cognitive 
domain, a situation needed to be devised wherein respondents rated the extent to which 
they were confident about their personality ratings. This is not the first time this has 
been done. As early as 1920, Lewis Terman began his famous study of gifted children, 
in which he assessed not only their intelligence but also their personality and social 
skills. His methodology involved asking parents and teachers to rate children on various 
traits using a single seven-point scale for each trait, and then asking parents/teachers to 
immediately indicate how certain they were about the judgment they had just made 
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(very certain, fairly certain, rather uncertain, very uncertain) (Terman, as cited in 
Friedman & Schustack, 2009). A comparable confidence scale was used for the current 
study. Another reason for using this form of personality assessment as the parallel form 
(rather than another set of individual items), is that the block descriptors method lends 
itself to confidence ratings, because respondents are perfectly clear that they are rating 
themselves on these personality dimensions. Following each description, participants 
therefore provided their confidence rating after reading the following: 
Imagine that there was some device that could accurately tell us about your 
personality. How confident are you that the rating you gave above would 
correspond with the device‟s rating? Please rate your confidence on the scale 
that appears below by circling your level of confidence. 
The confidence scale for the personality judgements used 10% intervals and 
ranged from 0% (Just guessing) to 100% (Absolute certainty). All five personality block 
descriptions are presented in Appendix I.  
It is noted that within the neurosciences domain, researchers have not entirely 
neglected the area of individual differences in personality, and that modern textbooks on 
personality now routinely include descriptions of physiological approaches to 
measuring personality (Friedman & Schustack, 2009). Because physiological 
methods/measurements were beyond the scope of this dissertation, the current study 
developed an alternative method (described above) to obtain confidence ratings. 
Although the imagined device is not a physiological measure, it still constitutes a useful 
method of probing confidence in one‟s self-assessment of personality judgments. 
Despite the fact that respondents were not expected to experience difficulty bringing to 
mind such an imagined device, the current study was preceded by a pilot investigation 
that explored individuals‟ reactions to the instructions regarding this means of providing 
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their confidence ratings. Individuals consistently reported that the instructions were easy 
to comprehend and apply. 
Finally, to complete what is admittedly a forced analogy, accuracy and bias 
scores were obtained for the personality assessments by following the steps outlined 
below: 
1. Convert each subscale score from the IPIP item-based personality assessments 
to a percentage. 
2. Convert each of the Big Five block descriptors self-ratings to percentages. That 
is, -5 = 0%, -4 = 10%, -3 = 20%, -2 = 30%, -1 = 40%, 0 = 50%, 1 = 60%, 2 = 
70%, 8 = 80%, 9 = 90%, 10 = 100%. 
3. Subtract (2) from (1). 
4. Code each score as either accurate or inaccurate. An arbitrary figure of 20% was 
chosen for the purposes of determining accuracy. That is, if the absolute value of 
the difference between the parallel forms was ≤ 20, then the score was coded 
accurate. 
5. Calculate a mean accuracy score across the five dimensions. 
6. Calculate a mean confidence rating score across the five dimensions. 
7.  Subtract (5) from (6). 
3.8.3 Procedure 
Participants were tested individually on a face-to-face basis after providing a 
rationale, and explaining that all data would remain confidential. An informed consent 
sheet was signed (see Appendix J) and participants were told that they could withdraw 
from the study at any time. 
The test battery started with the GKT test. The order of the BFBD descriptors 
and the IPIP were randomised for each participant, with the only constraint being that 
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each descriptor was followed by a cognitive task. Participants were not informed of 
their accuracy during testing but were given feedback at the end of the experiment. The 
battery took approximately one hour to complete. 
Scoring: For the cognitive tasks described above, the correctness of every item 
was recorded (i.e., 1 = correct, 0 = incorrect) as well as the confidence rating for each 
item. The dependent variables for each cognitive task included:  
1.  A proportion correct score (mean accuracy score). That is, summing each 
individual‟s number correct and dividing this number by the number of items in 
the task. 
2.  A mean confidence rating score was calculated for each participant for each 
objective task (i.e., summing his or her confidence ratings for each task and 
dividing this number by the number of items in the task). 
3. A bias score; that is, the mean confidence rating for each task minus the 
proportion correct for that task. 
Subscale scores were calculated for the IPIP. For the gender variable, 0 = males 
and 1 = females. 
3.9 Results 
3.9.1 Data Screening 
Prior to statistical analyses, all variables were examined using Version 16 of the 
Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS, 2009) for accuracy of data input, 
missing data, and evaluation of the multivariate analysis assumptions of normality, 
linearity, multicollinearity, singularity, and univariate and multivariate outliers. No 
missing values were present in the data set. No problems were detected with the 
assumptions of linearity, multicollinearity, and singularity. 
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For several variables one or more univariate outliers were detected. Visual 
inspection of all data provided by these cases, however, suggested that they were 
plausible responses. These cases were retained as a legitimate variation (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 1996). All subscales of the IPIP were normally distributed. Several other self-
report and objective measures displayed problems with normality and/or kurtosis. 
Various transformations were applied which successfully reduced skewness and 
kurtosis for all variables. Statistical analyses were performed with both the transformed 
and untransformed data. As the transformed data did not alter the outcome of the 
multivariate statistical analyses, the untransformed data were retained in line with 
recommendations made by Tabachnick and Fidell (1996).  
3.9.1.1 Reliability Analysis 
Prior to statistical analyses, internal consistency reliability estimates (i.e., 
Cronbach‟s coefficient alphas) were calculated for all self-report and objective task 
variables. Descriptive statistics and alpha coefficients for all dependent variables are 
presented in Table 3.1 showing alpha coefficients ranged from .56 (Cattell‟s Matrices 
task) to .90 (Esoteric Analogies confidence score). Cattell‟s task displayed poor internal 
consistency but was still considered acceptable for use in experimental research 
(Gregory, 1996). Reliability coefficients for the IPIP subscales were similar to those 
reported by Goldberg (1999). Internal consistency estimates for the cognitive 
confidence variables were similar to those reported by other calibration researchers (e.g., 
Kleitman, 2003; Stankov & Lee, 2008). 
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Table 3.1 
Descriptive Statistics for all Dependent Variables (N = 127) 
Dependent Variables M SD # items  
Cognitive Accuracy     
GKTAC 40.08 19.65 20 .79 
LSTAC 60.84 17.82 15 .74 
CWTAC 26.47 11.13 26 .65 
ESTAC 60.24 16.34 24 .73 
CMAC 76.16 15.32 11 .56 
Cognitive Confidence     
GKTC 44.72 19.84 20 .86 
LSTC 60.57 15.12 15 .78 
CWTC 26.42 12.52 26 .78 
ESTC 65.55 16.61 24 .90 
CMC 85.70 13.29 11 .86 
Cognitive Bias Scores     
GKT bias 4.64 11.34   
LST bias -.27 15.24   
CWT bias -.05 6.66   
EST bias 5.31 13.07   
CM bias 9.54 16.01   
Big Five Block Accuracy Scores (BFBD Accuracy 20%)     
CONSCAC20% 71.65 45.25   
EXTRAAC20% 77.95 41.62   
AGREEAC20% 82.68 37.99   
EMOTAC20% 72.44 44.86   
INTAC20% 87.40 33.31   
Big Five Confidence     
CONC 80.08 14.17 1 - 
EMOTC 78.11 15.30 1 - 
INTELLC 78.11 14.73 1 - 
EXTRAC 80.16 11.95 1 - 
AGREEC 81.89 13.84 1 - 
IPIP Subscales     
ICON 35.78 5.59 10 .73 
IEMOT 32.44 7.83 10 .89 
IINTELL 36.68 5.93 10 .82 
IEXTRA 32.95 6.68 10 .83 
IAGREE 41.00 4.64 10 .66 
Note.  GKT= General Knowledge; LST = Letter Series; EST = Esoteric Analogies; CWT = Concealed Words; CM = Cattell’s 
Matrices; CONC= Conscientiousness; EMOT= Emotional stability; INTELL = Intellect; EXTRA = Extraversion; AGREE= 
Agreeableness; ICON = IPIP Conscientiousness; IEMOT = IPIP Emotional stability; INTELL = IPIP Intellect; IEXTRA = IPIP 
Extraversion; IAGREE = IPIP Agreeableness; CONSCAC20% = Conscientiousness Accuracy ≤ 20 %; EXTRAAC20% = 
Extraversion accuracy ≤ 20 %; AGREEAC20% = Agreeableness Accuracy ≤ 20 %; EMOTAC20% = Emotional Stability Accuracy 
≤ 20 %; INTAC20% = Intellect Accuracy ≤ 20 %;. 
3.9.1.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Means and standard deviations of all the dependent variables are presented in 
Table 3.1. The table shows, bias scores for the cognitive tasks ranged from –.05 for the 
CW task to 9.54 for the CM task. Proportion correct scores for all objective measures 
represented traditional measures of difficulty. Participants found the Concealed Words 
task the most difficult with approximately 26% of items correctly solved. Respondents 
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found Cattell‟s task relatively easy, correctly solving 76% of the items. Big Five block 
accuracy scores ranged from 71.65 for Conscientiousness, to 87.40 for Intellect. 
3.9.2 Calibration Results for the Cognitive Tasks 
3.9.2.1 Reasoning Tasks (Gf) 
The first hypothesis stated that good calibration was expected for the reasoning 
tasks with bias scores being close to zero. The bias scores for the Letter Series and 
Cattell‟s Matrices Tasks were -.27 and 9.54 respectively. The calibration curve for the 
Letter Series task is presented in Figure 3.1. Inspection of this graph revealed that most 
of the curve is either close to the perfect calibration line in the overconfidence region or 
slightly above it. The impact of individual item means is presented in Figure 3.2. As can 
be seen, most of the items displayed reasonable calibration. 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Mean  Confidence Rating
M
e
a
n
 A
c
c
u
ra
c
y
260
(13.66% )
587
(30.83% ) Observed
Ideal
885
(46.48% )
172
(9.03% )
 
Figure 3.1. Calibration curve for the Letter Series Task. 
Figure 3.3 displays the calibration curve for the Cattell‟s matrices task. Again, 
visual inspection of this graph without taking into account the relative frequencies may 
have led to an incorrect interpretation as 90.06% of the observations lie in the 
overconfidence region of the graph. The scatterplot of individual item means are 
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presented in Figure 3.4 showing that two items at the lower levels of accuracy 
contributed to the overconfidence for this task. 
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Figure 3.2. Scatterplot of mean confidence rating and mean accuracy scores for the 
Letter Series Task. 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Mean  Confidence Rating
M
e
a
n
 A
c
c
u
ra
c
y
360
(26.12% )
88
(6.39% ) Observed
Ideal
881
(63.93% )
49
(3.56% )
 
Figure 3.3. Calibration curve for the Cattell‟s Matrices Task. 
3.9.2.2 Acculturated Knowledge Tasks (Gc) 
The second hypothesis stated that individuals would be overconfident on tasks 
of acculturated knowledge. Both the General Knowledge and the Esoteric Analogies 
task demonstrated overconfidence, with bias scores of 4.64 and 5.31, respectively. 
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Figure 3.4. Scatterplot of mean confidence rating and mean accuracy scores for the 
Cattell‟s Matrices Task. 
Figure 3.5 presents the calibration curve for the General Knowledge task. Visual 
inspection of this figure highlighted overconfidence because 55.61% of the observations 
are situated below the perfect calibration line, which results in a positive bias score.  
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Figure 3.5. Calibration curve for the General Knowledge Task. 
Figure 3.6 presents the impact of individual item means for this task, and shows 
that most of the items come close to the perfect calibration line. Only a few items at the 
lower levels of accuracy displayed overconfidence. 
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Figure 3.6. Scatterplot of mean confidence rating and mean accuracy scores for the 
General Knowledge Task. 
Figure 3.7 presents the calibration curve for the Esoteric Analogies task. Visual 
inspection of this graph took the relative frequencies into account, to avoid being misled 
by the fact that the majority of the curve lies in the underconfidence region of the graph. 
The occurrence of 61.10% of observations in the overconfidence region, explained the 
positive bias score. 
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Figure 3.7. Calibration curve for the Esoteric Analogies Task. 
Figure 3.8 displays the scatterplot of the item means. Observation of this 
scatterplot showed that, several items in the overconfidence region of the graph 
appeared to influence the bias score for this task. 
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Figure 3.8. Scatterplot of mean confidence rating and mean accuracy scores for the 
Esoteric Analogies Task. 
3.9.2.3 Visual Perceptual Task (Gv) 
No hypothesis was made for the Concealed Words task; nevertheless the bias 
was examined and was found to be -.05, which indicated good calibration. Figure 3.9 
presents the calibration curve for this task. Visual inspection of the relative frequencies 
clearly showed that the majority of observations were situated close to the perfect 
calibration line, or just above it in the underconfidence region of the graph. The item-
specific scatter plot presented in Figure 3.10, shows that, most of the items were close 
to the perfect calibration line. 
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Figure 3.9. Calibration Curve of mean confidence rating and mean accuracy scores for 
the general Concealed Words Task. 
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Figure 3.10. Scatterplot of mean confidence rating and mean accuracy scores for the 
general Concealed Words Task. 
3.10 Individual Differences in Cognitive Confidence and Mis-
calibration 
3.10.1 Gender Differences in Cognitive Confidence 
The third hypothesis stated that males would be significantly more confident 
than females, on tasks of cognitive abilities. No hypothesis was made in terms of gender 
differences in mis-calibration; nevertheless differences in bias scores were examined. 
The gender data were subjected to an independent samples t test with the results 
presented in Table 3.2 
1
. A bonferroni adjustment was made to control for family-wise 
error with the alpha level being set at 0.01. As expected, in terms of General Knowledge 
                                                 
 
1
 The male to female ratio in this study is not ideal, however, it closely resembles other 
calibration research wherein similar gender ratios were reported (e.g., Pallier, 2003). Also, based on the 
recommendations made by Howell (2002), each effect size calculation used the mean and the standard 
deviation for each gender as the denominator.  This practice guarantees that d is approximated 
independently of N, thereby removing potential concerns regarding unequal sample sizes. 
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confidence significant differences arose between males and females (see Table 3.2). 
Contrary to predictions, however, no significant differences arose between the genders 
in terms of confidence for the other cognitive tasks. There were no significant 
differences between the genders with regard to cognitive mis-calibration. These results 
indicated that apart from males being more confident than females on the General 
Knowledge task, males and females did not differ in terms of cognitive confidence or 
mis-calibration. 
Table 3.2 
Means of Confidence and Bias Scores for Males (N = 40) and Females (N = 87) on 
Cognitive Tasks in Study 1. 
 GKTC GKT 
BIAS 
LSTC LST 
BIAS 
CWTC CWT 
BIAS 
ESTC EST 
BIAS 
CMC CM 
BIAS 
Male 52.18 6.55 61.72 1.38 29.42 .481 69.41 6.59 88.14 11.32 
Female 41.30 3.77 60.04 -1.03 25.04 -.30 63.77 4.72 84.58 8.71 
t tests  2.96** 1.29 .58 .83 1.85 .61 1.79 .75 1.40 .85 
Note. gktc= General Knowledge confidence; gktbias= General Knowledge bias; letter series confidence = Letter Series 
confidence; lstbias = Letter Series bias; cwtc = Concealed Words confidence; cwtbias = Concealed Words bias; estc = Esoteric 
Analogies confidence; estbias = Esoteric Analogies bias; CMC = Cattell’s Matrices confidence; CMBIAS = Cattell’s Matrices bias 
p = .00. 
3.10.2 Age differences in Cognitive Mis-calibration 
Pearson Product Moment correlations were calculated in order to test the fourth 
hypothesis, which stated that there would be significant positive associations between 
age and bias scores. To help comparison with previous research, composite bias scores 
for Gc (average bias score on General Knowledge and Esoteric Analogies) and Gf 
(average bias score for Cattell‟s Matrices and Letter Series) were calculated, and were 
found to be correlated with age (see Table 3.3). For Gv, only one marker was available, 
therefore a composite variable could not be calculated. The hypothesis was partially 
supported, as age was significantly positively correlated with Gf and Gc bias scores, 
suggesting that older people were more mis-calibrated than younger people on Gc and 
Gf tasks. 
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Table 3.3 
Correlations between Age and Bias Scores  
 age GKTBIAS LSTBIAS CWTBIAS ESTBIAS CMBIAS 
age 1.00      
GCBIAS 0.23* 1.00     
GFBIAS 0.28** 0.16 1.00    
CWBIAS 0.15 0.36 0.32 1.00   
Note. GKTBIAS= General Knowledge bias; LSTBIAS = Letter Series bias; CWTBIAS = Concealed Words bias; ESTBIAS = 
Esoteric Analogies bias; CMBIAS = Cattell’s Matrices bias 
 * p < .05.   ** p < .01. 
3.10.3 Mis-calibration and Ability 
The fifth hypothesis stated that for the five cognitive tasks used in Study 1, low 
scorers (i.e., in the bottom quartile) are likely to be more mis-calibrated than high 
scorers (i.e., top quartile). Based on their accuracy scores, participants were divided into 
quartiles for each cognitive task. Independent samples t-tests were conducted to 
compare bias scores scored obtained by top and bottom quartile participants (see Table 
3.4). A bonferroni adjustment was made to control for family-wise error with the alpha 
level being set at 0.01. 
Table 3.4 
Mean Bias Scores for First and Fourth Quartiles on Cognitive Tasks 
 GKTBIAS LSTBIAS CWTBIAS ESTBIAS CMBIAS 
Quartile 1 6.84 10.76 1.04 12.20 27.05 
Quartile 4 -1.62 -9.00 0.73 -.87 -.51 
t tests  3.65** 3.24** .17 4.40** 7.68** 
Note. gktbias= general knowledge bias; lstbias = letter series bias; cwtbias = concealed words bias; estbias = esoteric analogies 
bias; cmbias = Cattell’s matrices bias   
** p = .00. 
Results indicated that low scorers were significantly more miscalibrated than 
high scorers, for all cognitive tasks except for the Concealed Words task. The 
hypothesis was therefore supported for four out of the five cognitive tasks, suggesting 
that in this sample, those who know more know more about what they know. 
3.10.4 Personality Correlates of Cognitive Confidence Judgments 
Hypothesis 6.1 proposed that there would be a significant positive association 
between Intellect and cognitive confidence, and hypothesis 6.2 postulated that positive 
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associations would occur between Extraversion and both cognitive confidence and bias 
scores. Hypothesis 6.3 suggested a significant positive relationship between 
Conscientiousness and cognitive confidence. Hypothesis 6.4 proposed that Emotional 
Stability and Agreeableness would not be associated with cognitive confidence or bias 
scores.  
Both zero order and partial correlations were used to test all these hypotheses 
(see Table 3.5). To simplify results, composite scores were created for the cognitive 
confidence (average confidence score across all five cognitive tasks), accuracy (average 
accuracy score across all five cognitive tasks), and bias variables (average bias score 
across all five cognitive tasks). Zero order correlations are presented in the top portion 
of this table and partial correlations are presented below these. Two salient features 
emerged: Intellect was significantly positively correlated with cognitive confidence and 
accuracy, and Conscientiousness was significantly positively correlated with cognitive 
bias. The overall conclusions did not differ, whether zero-order correlations or partial 
correlations were used to test the hypotheses. 
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Table 3.5 
Correlations Among IPIP Subscale Scores and Accuracy, Confidence and Bias and 
Partial Correlations Between Big Five Scores and Accuracy, Confidence and Bias (N = 
127) 
 IEXTRA IAGREE ICON IEMOT IINTELL a COGCON1 COGAC1 COGBIAS1 
IEXTRA 1.00        
IAGREE 0.18 1.00       
ICON 0.10 0.20 1.00      
IEMOT 0.12 -0.01 0.14 1.00     
IINTELL 0.35 0.11 0.03 -0.12 1.00    
COGCON1 0.11 0.01 0.14 0.06 0.21** 1.00   
COGAC1 0.04 -0.02 -0.07 -0.03 0.47** 0.70 1.00  
COBIAS1 0.09 0.04 0.27** 0.13 0.01 0.39 -0.39 1.00 
Partial  
Correl- 
ations IEXTRA1 IAGREE1 ICON1 IEMOT1 IINTELL2    
COGCON1 -0.08 -0.07 0.15 0.13 0.23**    
COGAC1 -0.12 -0.05 -0.08 -0.03 0.49**    
COGBIAS1 0.05 -0.02 0.26** 0.13 -0.08    
Note.  cogcon1= Cognitive confidence; cogac1 = Cognitive accuracy; cogbias1 = Cognitive bias; a = controlling for accuracy; 1 = 
controlling for the other four personality dimensions; 2 = controlling for the other four personality variables and accuracy. 
 * p < .05.  ** p < .01. 
3.11 Individual Differences in Big Five Accuracy, Confidence 
and Mis-calibration 
Because this study presented the BFBD measures in a novel format, it was 
important to first check the psychometric properties of the scales. Beginning with the 
IPIP item-based measures, the internal consistency reliability estimates have already 
been reported as being similar to those reported in the literature. The pattern of 
correlations among the IPIP scales was also similar to that recorded in the literature (see 
Saucier & Goldberg, 1996), which is not surprising given that the item-based IPIP 
measures were administered and scored in the usual way. The block descriptors of 
personality (BFBD), however, were an original feature of this study, and there was a 
possibility that measures derived from these descriptors might not have behaved in the 
expected way. Such an outcome would have rendered invalid any attempt to calculate 
accuracy measures based on differences between what were meant to be parallel tests of 
personality. To check this possibility, correlations were calculated and no significant 
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differences emerged (p < .05) between the correlations obtained using the block 
descriptors and those obtained from the traditional IPIP item-based method. Factor 
analysis of a correlation matrix, formed by combining all 10 measures yielded a clear 
five-factor solution with both measures from each of the two forms pairing to define the 
Big Five factors (see Appendix K). These outcomes were taken as convincing evidence 
that the attempt to construct a parallel measure of the Big Five was successful. 
The point of constructing this parallel form measure was to allow participants to 
rate their own personality traits and to express confidence in those ratings. Although 
interesting in themselves, these confidence ratings also served as one of the components 
needed to calculate bias scores. The other part of the bias score was the accuracy score, 
formed by first converting both sets of scores to percentages, and then subtracting the 
block descriptor scores from the IPIP item-based descriptor scores. Differences greater 
than 20% were given an accuracy score of zero; smaller differences were scored as 
correct. To recapitulate the rationale; if individuals gave themselves a rating on a 
particular trait that was more than 20% above or below the rating obtained via the usual 
objective method of assessing that trait, they were regarded as being incorrect in that 
assessment. The large interval (20%) acknowledged the fact that the objective measure 
itself is not perfectly reliable. 
Descriptive statistics for these accuracy scores appear in Table 3.6. The means 
of these difference scores suggest that, when converted to percentages, the scores across 
the parallel forms were similar. However, the standard deviation of the difference scores 
revealed many inaccurate ratings for some traits.  
 Cognitive and Personality Confidence 90 
 
Table 3.6 
Descriptive Statistics for Big Five Accuracy Scores (N= 127) 
Big Five Accuracy M SD 
CONSCAC20% 71.65 45.25 
EXTRAAC20% 77.95 41.62 
AGREEAC20% 82.68 37.99 
EMOTAC20% 72.44 44.86 
INTAC20% 87.40 33.31 
Note. CONSCAC20% = Conscientiousness Accuracy ≤ 20 %; EXTRAAC20% = Extraversion accuracy ≤ 20 %; AGREEAC20% = 
Agreeableness Accuracy ≤ 20 %; EMOTAC20% = Emotional Stability Accuracy ≤ 20 %; INTAC20% = Intellect Accuracy ≤ 20 %; 
The original intention was to combine the five accuracy scores (percentage 
correct across the five traits) and use this figure in the bias calculation, in exactly the 
same way that accuracy estimates are obtained for cognitive tasks by averaging 
performance on individual items. However, when these accuracy scores were formed 
for the five traits, it was apparent that, for the most part, they were uncorrelated. In other 
words, using this experimental measure of accuracy, people who were consistent 
(accurate) in their scores on one trait were not necessarily consistent in their scores on 
other traits. The lack of intercorrelations among the accuracy measures meant that an 
overall bias score obtained from the personality measures was questionable. For this 
reason, in this study, examination of individual differences in gender and age were 
restricted to the confidence and accuracy scores for each Big Five dimension. 
Consequently, hypotheses 7, 8, 9, and 12, related to the personality bias score, were not 
examined. 
Nevertheless, prior to investigating gender and age differences in Big Five 
confidence and accuracy, correlations between Big Five accuracy scores and scores of 
cognitive accuracy, confidence, and bias were examined. These correlations appear in 
Table 3.7. For the sake of brevity, composite scores for Gc (average 
accuracy/bias/confidence scores on General Knowledge and Esoteric Analogies tasks) 
and Gf (average accuracy/bias/confidence scores for Cattell‟s Matrices and Letter Series 
tasks) were calculated, and these composite scores were correlated with Big Five 
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accuracy scores. A salient feature was that Emotional Stability accuracy was negatively 
correlated with Gf bias, suggesting that as Emotional Stability accuracy increased, Gf 
bias decreased. There were also positive correlations between Intellect accuracy and 
both Gf and Gc accuracy scores, indicating that as Gf and Gc accuracy increased, so did 
Intellect accuracy. Similarly, significant positive correlations occurred between Intellect 
accuracy and both Gf and Gc confidence. Overall, these correlations suggested that 
individuals who scored higher for accuracy on the Intellect dimension were also more 
confident and more accurate for both Gf and Gc tasks. Partial correlations between 
Intellect accuracy and both Gf and Gc confidence were also examined, controlling for 
Gf and Gc accuracy respectively. These partial correlations showed that Intellect 
accuracy did not correlate with either Gf or Gc confidence, suggesting that the positive 
correlations between Intellect accuracy and both Gf and Gc confidence were mediated 
by Gf and Gc accuracy scores, respectively. 
3.11.1 Gender Differences in Big Five Confidence and Accuracy 
The next hypothesis proposed that males and females would not differ in terms 
of Big Five confidence or accuracy and independent samples t-tests were used to test 
this hypothesis. Bonferroni adjustment was used to keep family-wise error at alpha 
= .05. Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 present the statistical analyses
2
. Both tables show that 
none of the t-tests indicated significant gender differences and the effect sizes were in 
                                                 
 
2
 The male to female ratio in this study is not ideal, however, it closely resembles other 
calibration research wherein similar gender ratios were reported (e.g., Pallier, 2003).  Also, based on the 
recommendations made by Howell (2002), each effect size calculation used the mean and the standard 
deviation for each gender as the denominator.  This practice guarantees that d is approximated 
independently of N, thereby removing potential concerns regarding unequal sample sizes. 
 Cognitive and Personality Confidence 92 
 
the close-to-zero, or small range, as expected. These results indicate that males did not 
differ from females in terms of either Big Five confidence or accuracy scores. 
Table 3.7 
Correlations among Big Five Accuracy Scores and Cognitive Confidence, Accuracy and 
Bias Scores ( N = 127). 
Variable  CONSCAC20% EXTRAAC20% AGREEAC20% EMOTAC20%  INTAC20% 
CONSCAC20% 1.00         
EXTRAAC20% 0.26** 1.00       
AGREEAC20% -0.01 0.21* 1.00     
EMOTAC20%  -0.04 0.10 -0.05 1.00   
INTAC20% -0.08 0.14 0.33** 0.08 1.00 
GCACC 0.07 -0.01 0.08 -0.01 0.20* 
GFACC -0.07 -0.01 -0.06 0.07 0.21* 
GFBIAS 0.12 0.04 0.14 -0.25** -0.06 
GCBIAS 0.15 0.03 0.01 -0.06 -0.08 
GFCONF 0.05 0.03 0.08 -.17 0.18* 
GCCONF 0.10 0.01 0.16 0.02 0.20* 
Note. CONSCAC20% = Conscientiousness Accuracy ≤ 20 %; EXTRAAC20% = Extraversion accuracy ≤ 20 %; AGREEAC20% = 
Agreeableness Accuracy ≤ 20 %; EMOTAC20% = Emotional Stability Accuracy ≤ 20 %; INTAC20% = Intellect Accuracy ≤ 20 %; 
GCACC = Gc accuracy; GFACC = Gf accuracy; GFBIAS = Gf bias; GCBIAS = Gc bias; GFCONF = Gf confidence; GCCONF = 
Gc confidence. 
* p < .05.  ** p < .01. 
Table 3.8 
Mean Big Five Confidence Scores for Males (n = 40) and Females (n = 87)  
Variable CONC INTELLC AGREEC EXTRAAC EMOTAC 
Male 79.25 79.25 79.50 79.75 76.00 
Female 80.46 77.58 82.99 80.34 79.19 
t tests  -.45 .59 -1.32 -.26 -1.10 
Effect size -0.09 0.12 -0.26 -0.05 -0.20 
Note. CONC= conscientiousness confidence; INTELLC = intellect confidence; AGREEC= agreeableness confidence; EXTRAC = 
extraversion confidence; EMOTC= emotional stability confidence. 
Table 3.9 
Mean Big Five Accuracy Scores for Males (n = 40) and Females (n = 87) 
Variable CONSC 
AC20% 
INT 
AC20% 
AGREE 
AC20% 
EXTRAC20
% 
EMOTC20
% 
Male 67.50 82.50 75.00 82.50 82.50 
Female 73.56 89.66 86.21 75.86 67.82 
t tests  -.70 -1.04 -1.42 .83 1.86 
Effect size -0.13 -0.18 -0.25 0.15 0.33 
Note. CONSCAC20% = Conscientiousness Accuracy ≤ 20 %; EXTRAAC20% = Extraversion accuracy ≤ 20 %; AGREEAC20% = 
Agreeableness Accuracy ≤ 20 %; EMOTAC20% = Emotional Stability Accuracy ≤ 20 %; INTAC20% = Intellect Accuracy ≤ 20 %. 
3.11.2 Age Differences in Big Five Confidence and Accuracy 
Hypothesis 9 proposed that age would not be associated with either Big Five 
confidence or Big Five accuracy. Pearson‟s Product Moment correlations were 
calculated in order to test both aspects of this hypothesis, and the only significant 
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correlations were between Intellect confidence and age (r(125) = .19, p < .05), and 
Intellect accuracy and age (r(125) = -.21, p < .05). These correlations suggest that older 
participants were more confident than younger participants were when rating their 
confidence for the Intellect dimension; and were less accurate than were younger 
participants‟ when rating themselves on the Intellect dimension. However, the effect 
sizes were small. 
3.12 The Factorial Structure of Cognitive and Big Five 
Confidence 
According to hypothesis 10, two confidence factors were expected to emerge 
from the structural analysis of the confidence ratings obtained from both the cognitive 
domain and the Big Five personality domain. Exploratory factor analysis was used to 
test this hypothesis. Principal Axis factoring with oblique rotation was undertaken with 
the five Big Five personality confidence scores, as well as with the five cognitive 
confidence rating scores from the objective tasks. The correlation matrix of these 
psychometric variables is presented in Table 3.10. 
Table 3.10 
Correlation Matrix of Cognitive and Personality Confidence Variables (N= 127) 
Variable CONC INTELLC AGREEC EXTRAC EMOTC GKTC LSTC CWTC ESTC CMC 
CONC 1.00                   
INTELLC 0.38** 1.00                 
AGREEC 0.49** 0.54** 1.00               
EXTRAC 0.46** 0.32** 0.36** 1.00             
EMOTC 0.49** 0.42** 0.55** 0.41** 1.00           
GKTC -0.19* 0.07 -0.09 -0.11 -0.03 1.00         
LSTC -0.07 0.01 0.04 -0.06 0.02 0.33** 1.00       
CWTC -0.12 0.11 0.00 -0.04 0.11 0.12 0.15 1.00     
ESTC 0.06 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.53** 0.33** 0.19* 1.00   
CMTC 0.01 0.22* 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.37** 0.54** 0.23* 0.52** 1.00 
Note. CONC= Conscientiousness confidence; INTELLC = Intellect confidence; AGREEC= Agreeableness confidence; EXTRAC = 
Extraversion confidence; EMOTC= Emotional Stability confidence; GKTC= General Knowledge confidence; LSTC= Letter Series 
confidence; ESTC = Esoteric Analogies confidence; CWTC = Concealed Words confidence; CMTC = Cattell’s Matrices 
confidence  
* p < .05   ** p < .01 
The data from Table 3.10 were considered factorable as all assumptions as 
advocated by Coakes and Steed (1996) were met. A solution employing root one 
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criterion produced two factors, which accounted for 52.80% of the total variance. 
Inspection of Cattell‟s Scree Plot supported a two factor solution. The pattern matrix, 
percent of variance accounted for, eigenvalues, communalities, and factor correlation 
matrix for the two-factor solution are presented in Table 3.11. 
The first factor was labelled Cognitive Confidence because all five confidence 
scores from the objective tasks loaded on it. The second factor comprised high loadings 
from all Big Five confidence ratings and was labelled Big Five confidence. The factor 
correlation matrix presented in Table 3.11 indicated that factors 1 and 2 were not 
significantly related suggesting that Cognitive Confidence and Personality Confidence 
are not driven by the same cognitive processes. 
Table 3.11 
Summary of Exploratory Structural Analysis Results for Cognitive Confidence and Big 
Five Personality Confidence Scores, Using Principal Axis Factoring with Oblique 
Rotation (N = 127)  
Variable h2(b) F1a F2 
CONC .51 -.14 .71 
INTELLC .40 .14 .61 
AGREEC .56 .01 .74 
EXTRAC .33 -.04 .57 
EMOTC .50 .04 .70 
CWTC .08 .28 .00 
GKTC .40 .62 -.14 
ESTC .50 .69 .11 
CMC .59 .75 .11 
LSTC .34 .58 -.04 
    
Eigenvalues  2.89 2.40 
% of variance  28.84 23.96 
Factor 
Correlation 
Matrix 
   
 F1 F2  
F1 1.00   
F2 .05 1.00  
Note. h2(b) = Communalities 
 a  F1 = Cognitive Confidence; F2 = Personality Confidence 
Big Five ratings were not included in the factor analysis because it was assumed 
that the rating for each Big Five block dimension would not be highly correlated with 
confidence in that rating. There were only two significant correlations for the 
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Agreeableness (r = .62, p < .01) and Emotional Stability (r = .28, p < .01) dimensions 
between the block rating and its respective confidence rating.  
3.13 Factor Structure of Cognitive Bias Scores 
Principal axis factoring tested the hypothesis that a single bias factor would 
emerge from the bias scores obtained from the five cognitive tasks. The correlations 
among the cognitive bias scores are presented in Table 3.12 
A solution employing root one criterion produced one factor, which accounted 
for 45.57% of the total variance. Table 3.13 presents the percent of variance accounted 
for, the eigenvalues, and the communalities. The factor extracted from the data set was 
called Cognitive Bias because all five bias scores loaded highly on it. This finding was 
in line with expectations and further supported the premise that mis-calibration is not a 
domain specific phenomenon within the cognitive domain. That is, individuals who are 
mis-calibrated in one domain are also mis-calibrated across other cognitive domains. 
Table 3.12 
Correlations between Cognitive Bias Scores (N = 127) 
Variable GKTBIAS LSTBIAS CWTBIAS ESTBIAS CMBIAS 
GKTBIAS 1.00     
LSTBIAS 0.17* 1.00    
CWTBIAS 0.35** 0.32** 1.00   
ESTBIAS 0.28** 0.27** 0.39** 1.00  
CMBIAS 0.21* 0.37** 0.36** 0.43** 1.00 
Note. GKTBIAS= General Knowledge bias; LST BIAS= Letter Series bias; ESTBIAS = Esoteric Analogies bias; CWTBIAS = 
Concealed Words bias; CMBIAS = Cattell’s Matrices bias 
* p < .05   ** p < .01 
Table 3.13 
Principal Axis Factoring of Cognitive Bias Scores (N = 127) 
Variable Communalities F1-Cognitive Bias 
GKTBIAS .19 .56 
LSTBIAS .24 .62 
CWTBIAS .41 .73 
ESTBIAS .39 .72 
CMBIAS .40 .72 
   
Eigenvalues - 2.29 
% of variance - 45.57 
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3.13.1 Correlations between the Personality Bias Score and 
Cognitive Bias Scores 
The last hypothesis which proposed that cognitive bias scores would not be 
associated with an overall Big Five bias score was not investigated because of the lack 
of correlations among the Big Five accuracy measures. 
3.14 Discussion 
The present study was designed to: (a) investigate whether individuals are mis-
calibrated across a diverse battery of cognitive tasks; (b) examine if gender, age, and 
personality, are correlated with cognitive accuracy, confidence, and mis-calibration; (c) 
explore if those of lower ability, are more mis-calibrated than those of higher ability; (d) 
examine the factorial structure of cognitive confidence judgments; (e) construct self-
rated personality descriptions based on the Big Five trait adjectives by Goldberg 
(Goldberg, 1997); (f) obtain confidence and accuracy measures for each of the Big Five 
personality dimensions; (g) investigate the factorial structure of cognitive and 
personality confidence judgments; (h) examine the factorial structure of cognitive bias 
scores; and (i) examine the relationship between cognitive and personality bias. 
Results supported the hypothesis that participants would be overconfident on the 
General Knowledge and Esoteric Analogies tasks. The bias scores were positive and 
close enough to five to indicate some overconfidence. These findings were largely 
consistent with previous calibration research (Allwood & Granhag, 1996; Crawford & 
Stankov, 1996; Juslin, 1994; Kleitman, 2003; Kleitman & Stankov, 2001; Schaefer et al., 
2004; Stankov, 1998; Stankov & Crawford, 1996a, 1996b, 1997; West & Stanovich, 
1997). Overconfidence for these tasks appeared to be due to the effect of three or four 
items that displayed overconfidence at the lower levels of accuracy. The hard-easy 
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effect may provide one reason for the overconfidence on these tasks. These results 
support Gigerenzer et al.‟s (1991) theory which asserts that overconfidence is the 
product of ecological factors. That is, because the items for both of these tasks were not 
selected at random, the items are unrepresentative of the participants‟ ecology, thereby 
leading to overconfidence. 
The next hypothesis expected good calibration for the reasoning tasks. Bias 
scores provide partial support for this hypothesis. The bias score for the Letter Series 
task was very close to zero, and was consistent with previous research (e.g., Baker, 
2001; Crawford & Stankov, 1996; Kleitman & Stankov, 2001; Stankov, 1998; Stankov 
& Crawford, 1996a, 1996b). Conversely, the positive bias score for the Cattell‟s 
Progressive Matrices test was more moderate in magnitude. The scatterplot of item 
means for this task indicated that the hard-easy effect may provide one explanation for 
these findings, as participants were overconfident on two items thereby influencing the 
bias score. The finding for the matrices task was consistent with studies that also found 
moderate levels of overconfidence (Pallier, 2003; Stankov & Dolph, 2000). 
Although no predictions were made for the concealed words task, the bias score 
indicated that people were well calibrated in this study. This finding was inconsistent 
with that of Pallier et al. (2002, Study 1) who found that participants were overconfident. 
The differing samples may explain this inconsistency. That is, participants in Pallier et 
al‟s study were military personnel who may have tried to reduce cognitive dissonance 
(e.g., I believe I am bright therefore my answer must be correct) by elevating their 
confidence ratings. This explanation is possible because military participants were 
overconfident across all of the Gv, Gc, and Gf tasks used in their study. 
Males were expected to be more confident than females on tasks of cognitive 
abilities. The data provided partial support for this hypothesis, as males were 
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significantly more confident than females on General Knowledge questions. This result 
is consistent with previous research (Pallier, 2003). Contrary to expectations, however, 
males and females did not differ in terms of cognitive confidence for the other four 
tasks used in the current study. These findings differ from previous research wherein 
males were significantly more confident than females (Pallier, 2003; Pulford & Colman, 
1997; Ross & Fogarty, 2006; Stankov, 1998). The accuracy scores for males in the 
current study, however, are lower across all four tasks than those reported by previous 
calibration researchers, and it is possible that males may have decreased their 
confidence levels accordingly, thereby eliminating gender differences in confidence 
ratings. The lack of gender differences in the current study were, however, consistent 
with more recent work by Stankov and Lee (2008) 
Older participants were expected to be more mis-calibrated than younger 
participants, a hypothesis which was partially supported by the findings that age was 
positively correlated with Gf and Gc bias scores. For the Gv task, however, age 
differences did not appear. The findings for the Gf and Gc bias scores are consistent 
with previous research (Crawford & Stankov, 1996; Pallier, 2003). Mean Gf and Gc 
bias scores for older participants in the current study demonstrated overconfidence, 
which indicates that older people were more confident than they were accurate. These 
findings fit well with cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), which posits that 
individuals prefer their cognitions, including those about their actions, to be consistent 
with one another. Dissonance occurs when these cognitions are inconsistent, and the 
individual is motivated to make them more consistent in order to decrease uneasiness or 
distress. Accordingly, Blanton et al. (2001) argued that unwarranted confidence occurs 
with judgments that challenge a positive view of the self. It is plausible to speculate that 
older participants provided higher confidence ratings on Gf and Gc tasks to reduce 
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cognitive dissonance and maintain a positive view of the self. Perhaps older people 
place higher value on judgments that contain knowledge and reasoning components, 
because these judgments are more similar to those made in daily life than judgments 
about perceptual tasks, which are far removed from real-world decision making. This 
may explain why age did not correlate significantly with the bias score from the 
Concealed Words task, an outcome that is inconsistent with previous work, in which a 
significant positive correlation was obtained between age and bias on a Line Length 
task (Crawford & Stankov, 1996). This inconsistency may also be explained by sample 
differences. Crawford and Stankov (Crawford & Stankov, 1996) recruited older 
participants from The University of the Third Age, where individuals attend social 
gatherings and lectures given by retired professionals. Their convenience sample may 
not have been representative of the population of older adults thereby limiting the 
generalisability of their results. To investigate how these types of tasks influence 
confidence ratings, future researchers could examine age differences on a larger battery 
of Gv tasks, as well as ask participants to provide think aloud protocols when supplying 
their confidence ratings. 
The hypothesis that low scorers on tasks of cognitive abilities are more mis-
calibrated than high scorers is partially supported. Significant differences were found 
for all tasks except the Concealed Words task. Participants found this exercise very 
difficult, with both top and bottom quartile participants performing poorly. Data 
indicate that both groups must have known they had answered questions incorrectly, 
and decreased their confidence ratings accordingly. As both groups were well calibrated, 
group differences were eliminated. Alternatively, low reliability for this task may 
explain the inconsistency. The significant differences between top and bottom quartile 
participants in terms of mis-calibration for the other four tasks, parallel the work of 
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Kruger and Dunning (1999) who showed that low scorers overrated their test 
performance relative to their peers. Ability differences were re-examined in Study 3. 
In accordance with expectations and previous research, Intellect was positively 
associated with cognitive confidence and accuracy (Baker, 2001; Kleitman, 2003; 
Pallier et al., 2002). However, contrary to expectations, Conscientiousness was 
positively associated with cognitive bias. Although this result is inconsistent with the 
findings of Schaefer and colleagues (2004), there are other data that demonstrate small 
but significant positive correlations between Conscientiousness and cognitive bias 
scores (Kleitman, 2003). To date, Conscientiousness has not been shown to follow a 
consistent pattern of associations with bias scores from the cognitive domain. Because 
its contribution to cognitive bias remains unclear, the role of Conscientiousness was re-
examined in Study 3. More importantly the current study utilized both zero order and 
partial correlations to investigate the claim by Schaefer and his colleagues, that partial 
correlations provide the clearest conclusions when examining associations between Big 
Five personality dimensions and both cognitive confidence and bias scores. As shown in 
Table 3.5, the overall conclusions do not differ whether zero order or partial correlations 
were examined. To test the legitimacy of these overall conclusions, Study 3 re-
examined the personality correlates of cognitive confidence and bias, using both zero-
order and partial correlations. 
The lack of intercorrelations among the Big Five accuracy measures meant that 
the bias score obtained from the personality measures was questionable. Hence 
personality calibration was not investigated. The hypotheses that were related to the 
personality bias score were also not investigated. The lack of intercorrelations between 
the Big Five accuracy scores suggested that accuracy for each dimension was driven by 
differing cognitive processes. Thus, people who were consistent (accurate) in their 
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scores on one trait were not necessarily consistent (accurate) in their scores on other 
traits. The lack of intercorrelations between the Big Five accuracy scores does, however, 
make sense. For example, Joe knows he is really conscientious because he works long 
hours and receives positive feedback from his supervisor and colleagues. Joe is more 
likely to provide consistent responses across both the Conscientiousness subscale of the 
IPIP and the Conscientiousness block measure, than an individual who has not thought 
about him or herself in this way. Thus, for Joe, consistency of responding across two 
measures of the same personality dimension is influenced by the ecological validity of 
the Conscientiousness dimension. Moreover, Joe knows he is conscientious and 
agreeable; however, he is not sure if the intellect, extraversion or emotional stability 
dimensions describe him, so his ratings for those dimensions may not be consistent. In 
Joe‟s case, to assume that all his accuracy scores are going to be significantly 
intercorrelated, assumes that all Big Five traits have equal amounts of ecological 
validity. It also assumes that random error (e.g., fatigue, boredom etc) does not affect 
consistency of responding but this assumption may not be realistic. Accuracy scores 
were re-examined in Studies 2 and 3, to determine the replicability of the non-
significant low correlations between the Big Five accuracy scores. 
An interesting pattern of correlations did, however, emerge when Big Five 
accuracy scores were correlated with accuracy, confidence and bias scores for both the 
acculturated knowledge (Gc) and reasoning (Gf) domains. Intellect accuracy scores 
were significantly related to confidence and accuracy for both Gf and Gc. However, 
partial correlations indicated that when accuracy was partialled out, the only significant 
correlations occurred between both Gf and Gc accuracy, and Intellect accuracy. These 
correlations suggested that individuals who were coded as being accurate for the 
Intellect dimension were also more likely to be more intelligent. The positive 
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correlations between Intellect accuracy and Gf and Gc accuracy scores are largely 
consistent with previous research within the cognitive domain where positive 
correlations have been demonstrated between Intellect and Gf and Gc accuracy scores 
(Pallier et al., 2002). Although findings regarding personality accuracy scores need to 
be replicated, that there are strong indications in these data that the experimental 
personality accuracy measures have yielded data that are of psychological interest. The 
correlations between personality accuracy scores and Gf accuracy scores were re-
examined in Study 3. 
When the block description method was used, it was not possible to develop a 
bias score for each of the Big Five personality dimensions because of the lack of 
correlation among the accuracy scores. This lack of correlation is problematic because a 
major aim of the current studies was to examine the factorial structure of bias scores 
obtained from both the Big Five and cognitive domains.  Consequently, Study 2 
focussed on trying to address this issue, and on developing various accuracy methods. 
This enabled bias scores for each Big Five personality dimension to calculated, which 
assisted the investigation of the factorial structure of cognitive and Big Five bias scores 
in Study 3. 
For the reasons stated above, in this study, examination of individual differences 
in both gender and age were also restricted to the confidence and accuracy scores for 
each Big Five dimension. The hypothesis that males do not differ from females in terms 
of Big Five confidence or accuracy, was upheld in the current study. In accordance with 
the gender similarities hypothesis, it appears that males and females are more similar 
than different. Furthermore these findings fit well with PMM theory (Gigerenzer et al., 
1991) because individuals are likely to be familiar with Big Five judgments, given that 
similar judgments are made on a daily basis. However, because of the exploratory 
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nature of the current study, it is too early to draw conclusions about gender differences 
in either Big Five confidence or Big Five accuracy. Studies 2 and 3 returned to the 
examination of gender differences. 
As expected, age was not associated with Big Five confidence scores, with the 
exception being that age was weakly positively correlated with Intellect confidence with 
only 4% of the variance explained. This finding may represent a Type I error, and 
requires replication before speculating why older participants were more confident for 
this dimension. Also as predicted, age was not associated with Big Five accuracy scores 
again with one qualification. That is, age was negatively correlated with Intellect 
accuracy, although the magnitude of this correlation was also small with only 4% of the 
variance explained by the correlation between age and Intellect accuracy. A Type I error 
may also be responsible for this finding, which needs to be replicated before any 
suppositions are made about why younger adults were more accurate for this dimension. 
Studies 2 and 3 re-examined age differences in Big Five confidence and accuracy. The 
remainder of the results are in concert with Five-Factor theory of personality (McCrae 
& Costa, 1999), which posits that personality traits develop during childhood and 
adolescence, and then remain stable in adulthood. It seems that Big Five accuracy and 
Big Five confidence remain constant too. These other findings also fit well with PMM 
theory (Gigerenzer et al., 1991) which argues that people are well calibrated to their 
natural ecology, therefore age differences should not be expected. 
Two confidence factors did indeed emerge, as predicted, from the structural 
analysis of the confidence ratings obtained from both the cognitive and Big Five 
personality domains. These findings suggest that self-confidence is similar in factorial 
structure to the self-concept construct (see Marsh, 2008 for a review) which is highly 
differentiated across both the academic and non-academic domains. Therefore, variance 
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in specific components cannot be explained in terms of one general trait. Self-
confidence and self-concept resemble one another in that they both require cognitive 
appraisals of the self. It was therefore assumed that the factorial structure of both 
constructs is similar. The split between cognitive confidence and Big Five confidence at 
the factorial level, raises doubt about whether confidence judgments are driven by a 
general confidence trait. However, further conjecture requires replication, which is why 
the factorial structure of Big Five confidence and cognitive, were scrutinized again in 
Study 3. The existence of two separate confidence factors also supports PMM theory 
(Gigerenzer et al., 1991) which was interpreted for the purposes of the current study to 
mean that cue validities used to endorse personality test items were vastly different from 
those cues used to answer cognitive test items. Using this logic, it seems that 
participants do use differing cues to generate confidence judgments across these two 
domains, as the Big Five confidence factor was not significantly associated with the 
cognitive confidence factor. 
Another potential reason for the lack of correlation between personality 
confidence and cognitive confidence is that the cognitive confidence judgments were 
made on tests of maximal performance, whereas personality confidence judgments were 
elicited from measures of typical performance. It may be that, if participants were given 
a self-report measure of abilities that also elicited confidence ratings for those abilities, 
then cognitive self-report confidence may share variance with personality confidence. 
This possibility was investigated in Study 3. 
Calibration researchers may also argue that the Big Five confidence judgments 
in the current study were of a global nature, and were therefore more similar to post-test 
evaluative judgments in the cognitive domain. To make these post-test judgments, after 
completing a test, individuals indicate the percentage of items they believe they 
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answered correctly. In a similar way, participants in the current study provided a global 
rating as to whether the block of trait adjectives described themselves, and then 
provided a confidence measure about the accuracy of that global rating. In the cognitive 
domain, factor analyses of post-test evaluative judgments and item-by-item confidence 
estimates have resulted in two separate factors. This separation has been explained in 
terms of PMM theory (Gigerenzer et al., 1991) which argues that these types of 
judgments are not subserved by the same cognitive processes. Perhaps item-by-item 
personality confidence ratings share more variance with item-by-item cognitive 
confidence ratings? This question was further examined in Study 3, wherein participants 
were asked to make both item-by-item and global confidence judgments within both the 
cognitive and personality domains. 
One cognitive bias factor emerged from the structural analyses of the cognitive 
bias scores, as expected. This result is consistent with previous research (Pallier et al., 
2002; Stankov, 1998, 1999a), which provided further evidence that if individuals were 
miscalibrated in one domain, then they are also miscalibrated across other domains. 
To conclude, this study was exploratory in terms of adding (a) confidence 
ratings to Big Five personality judgments and (b) developing simple measures of 
accuracy. Results showed that Big Five confidence ratings were uni-dimensional across 
traits, with accuracy scores that were themselves uncorrelated, and that these Big Five 
confidence ratings were unrelated to cognitive confidence scores. The attempt to derive 
accuracy scores remains a challenge and was investigated further in Study 2. 
Nevertheless, results for the personality confidence and accuracy measures were 
meaningful, because all hypotheses except for two were supported. Of particular interest 
were the findings that both Gf and Gc accuracy were correlated with Intellect accuracy, 
suggesting that if individuals are accurate in estimating their Intellect scores, they are 
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likely to be more intelligent. Study 3 re-examined the correlations between Big Five 
accuracy scores and Gf accuracy. 
Study 2 focused solely upon Big Five confidence and bias and extended upon 
the personality confidence data obtained in Study 1 by taking item level-confidence 
ratings for each Big Five dimension. It also developed other measures of accuracy 
allowing Big Five bias scores to be examined. A question investigated in Studies 2 and 
3 – whether Big Five confidence subscale scores define a separate factor from Big Five 
subscale ratings – is important, because the answers would provide further evidence that 
confidence  is related to, but distinct from personality.  
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 Chapter 4 - Study 2 
4.1 Introduction 
This study was designed to (a) obtain both item-by-item and block confidence 
judgments based on the Big Five taxonomy of personality structure, (b) examine the 
factorial structure of item-by-item and block personality confidence judgments, (c) 
develop different accuracy protocols so that a bias score for each Big Five dimension 
can be calculated, (d) investigate the factorial structure of item-level Big Five accuracy 
scores, (e) investigate whether individual differences in both gender and in age 
influence Big Five confidence, accuracy, and bias scores, (f) investigate the factorial 
structure of item-level Big Five bias scores, and (g) investigate the factorial structure of 
Big Five confidence subscale scores and Big Five subscale ratings. 
4.2 Item-by-Item and Block Personality Confidence Judgments 
Findings from Study 1 suggested that confidence judgments obtained from the 
Big Five block descriptors did not share much variance with item-by-item cognitive 
confidence judgments. If personality confidence had been measured at the item level, 
results may have been different, assuming that block and item-by-item personality 
confidence judgments have the same factorial structure as cognitive confidence 
judgments. That is, in the cognitive arena, item-by-item confidence judgments and post- 
test performance estimates (PTPE) scores do not correlate at the factorial level because, 
according to theorists like Gigerenzer and his colleagues (1991), cue validities people 
use to rate their confidence on item-by-item questions are different from those they use 
to make global post-test performance estimates (see section 2.3.2.2). Research has not 
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investigated whether, at the factorial level, the structure of Big Five confidence follows 
the same pattern.  
It is doubtful that the factorial structure of Big Five confidence splits unless, at 
the item level, individuals were making their confidence judgments with reference to 
episodic memory, but their block judgments encouraged retrieval from semantic 
memory. If this were the case then cue validities could possibly be different. For 
example, Jim is extraverted and went to a party on the weekend. At this party, he did 
not like some of the people and was rather reserved. On the following Monday he 
participated in an experiment that examined his level of extraversion at both the item 
level and the block level. He also provided confidence ratings for these judgments. If 
this party came to mind only when he answered item-by-item questions but not when he 
made block confidence judgments, then he used episodic knowledge at the item level 
and semantic knowledge for the block judgment. However, Jim‟s example does not fit 
well with the Five Factor theory of personality, which postulates that personality 
remains stable over adulthood (McCrae & Costa, 1999). If this is true for confidence 
judgments as well, it follows that Jim is more likely to make all his confidence 
judgments from semantic memory. This is logical with regard to the Big Five traits 
because these traits come from the lexicon of everyday language and therefore, will 
have high ecological validity for him. However, this statement assumes that semantic 
knowledge also incorporates self-knowledge of one‟s personality traits. It is interesting 
that the social-cognitive literature reveals theoretical and evidential information that 
demonstrates that semantic memory contains a specialized database that facilitates both 
the storage and retrieval of personality trait information and a brief overview of the 
relevant literature follows. 
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According to Klein‟s (2004) review, most of the psychological investigation 
regarding the relation between trait knowledge and memory has focused on episodic 
memory. This makes sense in view of its operational definition where episodic memory 
involves a psychological depiction of the self as the “agent or recipient of some action, 
or as the stimulus or experiencer of some state” (Kihlstrom, 1997, as cited in Klein, 
2004, p. 1078). For example, I remember going to the movies last night, and I recall 
watching Andre Rieu on television on Christmas Eve, and feeling very moved by the 
music. Episodic memories about oneself obviously record both the instances when one 
exemplified a particular personality trait (e.g., being extraverted at a work party), and 
the times when one did not (e.g., having lunch with the mother-in-law) (Klein, 
Cosmides, Tooby, & Chance, 2001). The same can be said for our episodic memories of 
others (e.g., my daughter was extraverted at the party on Saturday night). Therefore, 
episodic memory provides one store of information that individuals can use to make 
personality judgments about themselves or others (Klein). Perhaps every time 
individuals make trait judgments they perform a serial search of each instance in which 
a particular trait was displayed or was not displayed. Such a laborious serial search, 
however, is impractical, because many decisions in daily life require quick and accurate 
judgments. Furthermore, it is more beneficial for individuals to have access to a store of 
precomputed trait summaries or generalizations across many episodes, which can be 
readily retrieved. For example, I am usually conscientious, or my friend Joe is generally 
agreeable. Such a store of precomputed trait summaries is more likely to reside in 
semantic memory. A review of the relevant cognitive literature follows. 
Cognitive psychologists provide research data that supports the theory that trait 
self-knowledge and recall of specific occasions that involves those traits, stem from two 
different knowledge structures (e.g., Kihlstrom et al., 2003; Klein et al., 1989; Klein et 
 Cognitive and Personality Confidence 110 
 
al., 1996). These structures are semantic and episodic knowledge respectively. So far, 
however, the literature reviewed in this dissertation has not addressed how people make 
use of both types of knowledge structures when making trait judgments. Memory 
theorists propose two explanations (cf. Klein, 2004), known as the computational and 
the abstraction viewpoints, which are discussed below. 
From the computational standpoint, individuals make trait judgments by 
retrieving trait-consistent behavioural exemplars from episodic memory, and then 
compare their similarity to the trait being judged (cf. Klein, 2004). For example, Kerry 
decides whether she is conscientious. First, she retrieves trait-relevant behaviours from 
memory, and then she computes online whether the retrieved exemplars match the trait 
of conscientiousness.  
In contrast, the abstraction viewpoint posits that trait-relevant episodes are not 
retrieved when making trait judgments (Klein, 2004). Klein, Cosmides, Murray and 
Tooby (2004) posit that people have a cognitive database of trait 
generalizations/summaries (e.g., I am usually introverted, my father is generally 
conscientious, and my son is often stubborn) from which they make personality 
judgments about themselves and others. Abstraction theorists argue that trait 
information is abstracted from a delimited number of episodes, which leads to the 
development of trait summaries/generalizations (e.g., Buss & Craik, 1983; Klein, 2004; 
Klein & Loftus, 1993b; Klein, Loftus, Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992). Individuals decide 
whether they exemplify a particular trait by retrieving trait summary knowledge from 
memory, as well as trait-inconsistent episodes (e.g., Klein, 2004; Klein, Loftus, Trafton 
et al., 1992). This makes sense because retrieval of trait-consistent episodes is redundant 
unless a trait summary does not exist (Klein, 2004). In the absence of a trait summary, 
episodic memory is the only store of information. For example, John is asked whether 
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he is gregarious. If he does not have a summary store relevant to the trait of 
gregariousness, then he needs to perform a serial search of episodic memory before he 
answers the question. Predictions from both the computational and the abstraction 
viewpoints have been extensively examined within the memory literature (see Klein, 
2004 for a review). A very brief summary follows. 
As reviewed by Klein (2004), data from priming, encoding specificity, and 
encoding variability paradigms all support the abstraction viewpoint (e.g., Klein et al., 
2001; Klein & Loftus, 1993a, 1993b; Klein et al., 1989; Klein, Loftus, & Plog, 1992; 
Klein, Loftus, Trafton et al., 1992). For example, in the priming experiments (e.g., 
Klein et al., 2001; Klein & Loftus, 1990, 1993a, 1993b; Klein et al., 1989; Klein, Loftus, 
Trafton et al., 1992), participants undertook numerous pairs of tasks, each of which 
included a certain trait adjective such as conscientious (Klein, 2004). Each adjective 
was preceded by a prime stimulus. That is, a descriptive judgment (e.g., does 
conscientious describe you?), a control judgment (e.g., think of the definition of 
conscientious) or a filler task. The dependent variable was the response latency for the 
recall task for each trait in question (e.g., try to recall a particular event during which 
you demonstrated conscientiousness). If the computational view is correct then 
participants presented with the describe prime should have answered the recall task 
more quickly than participants in the other two conditions, because trait-consistent 
episodes have already been activated. This was not the case and, in fact, individuals in 
all three conditions performed equally quickly when responding to the recall task. The 
overall conclusion was that individuals make trait self-judgments from a semantic store 
without activating episodic memory of those traits, which is consistent with the 
abstraction viewpoint (Klein, 2004). 
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Similarly, neuropsychological data from cognitively impaired individuals also 
provides evidence of the functional independence of semantic and episodic memory 
when individuals make trait self-judgments. Studies of amnesic patients allow 
psychologists to investigate the contributions of semantic and episodic memory to trait 
self-knowledge, because these patients often have impaired episodic memory, but intact 
semantic memory (cf. Klein, 2004 for a review). Five case studies provide compelling 
evidence for the existence of trait summaries within semantic knowledge structures. The 
cases of KC, who suffered a motorcycle accident (Tulving, 1993); WJ, who received a 
blow to her head (Klein et al., 1996); DB, who suffered anoxic encephalopathy 
following cardiac arrest (Klein, Rozendale, & Cosmides, 2002); RJ, who was autistic 
(Klein, Chan, & Loftus, 1999); and KR, who had Alzheimer‟s dementia (Klein, 
Cosmides, & Costabile, 2003), are particularly relevant. KC, WJ, and DB all suffered 
brain injuries and were unable to retrieve information from their respective episodic 
memory stores. Nevertheless, they were still able to provide reliable judgments about 
their own personalities when significant others were used as the criterion for accuracy. 
For example, DB‟s personality ratings correlated moderately (r = .64) with ratings of his 
personality obtained from his daughter. In the case of KR, who had advanced 
Alzheimer‟s dementia combined with severe retrieval deficits in many semantic 
domains (e.g., cannot name simple objects such as batteries or pencils and so forth), it 
was demonstrated that, despite her pronounced cognitive deficits, she demonstrated 
preserved knowledge of her own premorbid personality traits. KR‟s trait self-ratings 
correlated moderately with ratings of her premorbid personality obtained from both her 
daughter (r = .59) and her son-in-law (r = .79). To summarise, the evidence from both 
the cognitive and neuropsychological domains reviewed, suggests the presence of a sub-
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store within semantic memory, which specializes in the storage and retrieval of trait 
self-knowledge (Klein, 2004). 
Perhaps confidence in personality judgments also resides within the same store 
of semantic memory. This is plausible if it is assumed that the traits under investigation 
have semantic summaries in place. The Big Five personality traits are expected to fit 
this criterion, because they come from the lexicon of daily life. If this is true, then all 
(i.e., item-by-item and block) Big Five personality confidence judgments can be 
expected to follow abstraction processes rather than computational processes. For 
example, it is onerous to have to recall specific episodes in which one is conscientious 
before being able to endorse one‟s confidence level for items that measure that construct. 
It is more logical for people to have summary representations within semantic memory 
that allow them to make confidence judgments about well-known traits. For this reason, 
item-by-item and block Big Five personality confidence ratings are expected to load 
onto one factor because, both types of judgments reside within the same store of 
semantic memory. Previous research has not examined the factorial structure of Big 
Five confidence. 
4.3 Accuracy Scores for the Big Five Block Judgments 
In Study 1, accuracy scores obtained from the block method were largely 
uncorrelated. Therefore, people who were consistent (accurate) in their scores on one 
trait were not necessarily accurate in their scores on other traits. In consequence, an 
accuracy score could not be formed across the Big Five dimensions, and an overall 
personality bias score was not calculated. The intercorrelations between the accuracy 
scores were re-examined in Study 2. However, for the reasons discussed at the end of 
Study 1, it is problematic to assume that personality accuracy can be summed across all 
the Big Five measures. Any decision to simply add the Big Five accuracy scores 
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requires making the assumption that each Big Five trait has the same ecological validity 
for every individual in the sample. Therefore, each person should be able to provide 
consistent responses across the IPIP and its respective block measure. Another 
assumption that random error does not affect consistency of responding may also not be 
realistic. It was assumed that properties of the accuracy measures themselves did not 
lead to the low intercorrelations among the Big Five accuracy scores, but, that the 
inconsistencies were, for the reasons stated, within the individuals themselves. The 
associations among the Big Five block accuracy scores, were, therefore, expected to be 
low. Consequently, bias scores cannot be calculated using the block method. Thus, it 
was important for accuracy to be calculated in a different way, in order to compute a 
bias score for each Big Five dimension. Study 2 aimed to develop accuracy methods so 
that mean accuracy scores were calculated for each Big Five dimension. A detailed 
discussion of these accuracy scores can be found in the method section of this chapter. 
4.4 Bias and Accuracy Scores for the Item-By-Item Big Five 
Judgments 
The calibration paradigm uses bias scores as a measure of how well calibrated 
individuals are when self-monitoring their performance on various cognitive tasks. 
Individuals are scored as accurate or inaccurate based on the objective criterion of 
whether their responses are correct. It is acknowledged that for personality judgements, 
assessing intra-phenomenological accuracy is difficult, because psychologists do not 
have access to the kind of objective criteria that exists in the cognitive arena. 
Nevertheless, psychologists do have self-report measures of personality that have 
repeatedly demonstrated more than adequate psychometric properties across many 
previous research studies (Anastasi & Urbina, 1997). Indeed, it has been argued that the 
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Big Five taxonomy is one of the most parsimonious and efficacious ways of 
conceptualising the architecture of personality (e.g., Goldberg, 1999; Pallier et al., 2002; 
Saucier & Goldberg, 1996; Wiggins, 1996) and thus this taxonomy, as measured by the 
IPIP, has been used as the objective criterion for determining accuracy in Study 2. The 
rationale follows. 
In Study 2, individuals were deemed accurate if they provided consistent 
endorsements across the two parallel forms of the IPIP that were developed for each 
personality dimension (see method section). It is argued that without any objective 
criterion, other than self-report measures within the personality domain, that consistent 
responding across two measures of the same construct should, at the macro level, imply 
some level of accuracy. This assumption may appear contentious because reliability is 
usually considered a property of the test. Nevertheless, the notion that consistent 
responding implies some level of accuracy can be found within the clinical psychology 
literature (e.g., Trauma Symptom Inventory (TSI; Briere, 1995); Millon Clinical 
Multiaxial Inventory-III (MCMI-III; Millon, Davis, & Millon, 1997) ; OMNI-IV 
Personality Inventory (OMNI; Loranger, 2001), Personality Assessment Inventory 
(PAI; Morey, 1991), and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI-2; 
Hathaway & McKinley, 1989). The PAI and the MMPI-2 are the most widely used 
personality assessment inventories in clinical settings and normative data is provided for 
both clinical and non-clinical samples. Both of these inventories are also used outside 
traditional mental health settings in forensic, medical, neuropsychological and 
employment contexts. MMPI-2 interpretation rests on the supposition that the individual 
has, for the most part, endorsed items that are semantically similar in a consistent 
fashion (Nichols, 2001). To this end, the response consistency scale (i.e., Variable 
Response Inconsistency Scale [VRIN]) is examined prior to the interpretation of the 
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standard clinical scales (Nichols & Greene, 1997). VRIN is the variable response 
inconsistency scale which attempts to highlight a random response pattern or an 
inconsistent pattern of responses. This scale consists of 67 pairs of items that were 
chosen because of their statistical associations and semantic correspondence (Nichols, 
2001). Anomalies in VRIN, combined with elevations on True Response Consistency 
Scale (TRIN), and the F-scales, can render an individual‟s protocol invalid. Moreover, 
Nichols, Greene, and Schmolck (1989) cited Greene (1988), who asserted that “…item 
endorsements must be consistent if they are to be accurate” (p. 249). However, response 
consistency does not guarantee accuracy (Nichols et al., 1989). Guaranteeing absolute 
accuracy in intra-phenomenological judgments is a moot point. In a similar way, the 
PAI has the Inconsistency (ICN) scale was also designed to determine if test takers 
endorsed items with similar content in a consistent manner (Morey, 2003).  T-scores of 
73 or higher suggest that respondents answered items in a completely random fashion 
rendering the protocol invalid. Morey suggests that whilst there are a number of 
possible causes for high scores on the ICN scale (e.g., reading problems, uncertainty of 
test instructions, inattention) interpretation of clinical scales is abandoned at this stage 
of the analysis.  As consistent responding has been shown to be the fundamental basis 
upon which clinical interpretation rests, for the purposes of the current research, 
perceived accuracy was assumed if the individual provided consistent responses across 
both IPIP Form A and IPIP Form B, for each of the Big Five personality dimensions. 
Three accuracy protocols were developed for Study 2. The standard error of difference 
scores (Anastasi & Urbina, 1997) was used to determine consistency of responding for 
two of the methods. Full descriptions of how accuracy was determined for all three 
methods and how item-level bias scores were calculated is left to the method section. It 
was expected that the associations among item-level Big Five accuracy scores would 
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also be low for the same reasons as stated in section 4.3 therefore the calculation of 
separate bias scores for each Big Five dimension is justified. 
As the Big Five traits are likely to have high ecological validity, it was expected 
that individuals would be well calibrated. It is also important to investigate whether Big 
Five bias scores are correlated. The reason for this is that, within the cognitive domain, 
bias scores from Gv, Gf, and Gc tasks tend to load onto one factor, suggesting that bias 
scores across various cognitive tasks use the same cognitive processes. What remains 
unanswered is whether bias within the personality domain is driven by the same 
cognitive processes. The factorial structure of Big Five item-level bias scores was 
examined in Study 2, although no specific hypotheses were made at this exploratory 
stage. 
4.5 Gender and Age Differences in Personality Confidence, 
Accuracy, and Bias 
Findings from Study 1 indicated that males were just as confident and accurate 
as females were when making confidence judgments about the Big Five personality 
dimensions. These findings were consistent with the gender similarities hypothesis 
(Hyde, 2005). Gender differences in Big Five confidence and accuracy were re-
examined in Study 2. On the basis of Hyde‟s hypothesis, males and females were not 
expected to differ in terms of Big Five confidence, accuracy, or bias.  
Results from Study 1 showed that age was essentially uncorrelated with either 
Big Five confidence or accuracy, with two qualifications. That is, age was positively 
correlated with both Intellect confidence (r(125) = .19, p < .05) and Intellect accuracy 
(r(125) = -.21, p < .05), however, the effect sizes were small. Correlations between age 
and Big Five accuracy, Big Five confidence, and Big Five bias were examined in Study 
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2. Based on the five-factor theory of personality (McCrae & Costa, 1999), combined 
with the assumption that Big Five judgments are made on a daily basis, and therefore 
have high ecological validity, it was expected that age would neither be associated with 
Big Five confidence, nor be associated with Big Five accuracy, or Big Five bias scores.   
4.6 Factorial Structure of Big Five Confidence and Big Five 
Subscale Scores 
Research has shown that the confidence trait is exists the borderline between 
cognitive abilities and personality (Baker, 2001; Kleitman & Stankov, 2001, 2007; 
Pallier et al., 2002; Stankov, 1998, 1999a, 2000a; Stankov & Crawford, 1996a, 1997; 
Stankov & Lee, 2008). Furthermore, Stankov and Lee (2008, p. 974) asserted “… that 
confidence is indeed a psychological trait that is related to, but distinct from both 
personality and ability traits. Within the structure of all individual differences 
dimensions, confidence should be located between these two domains” (p. 974). In the 
aforementioned studies these assertions were based on low correlations between 
cognitive confidence ratings and Big Five personality traits. The claim that confidence 
is a distinct trait that is related to personality can also be independently investigated by 
factor analysing all the IPIP and IPIP Form B subscales (i.e., adjective ratings and 
confidence scores). It was expected that six factors would emerge from this structural 
analysis. That is, Big Five confidence and the other five factors would correspond to 
each of the Big Five dimensions. 
4.7 Hypotheses  
The hypotheses are summarised below: 
1. It was hypothesised that one confidence factor would emerge from factor analysing 
the item-by-item and block confidence judgments obtained from the Big Five 
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personality dimensions. This hypothesis was developed with reference to abstraction 
theory within the memory domain (e.g., Buss & Craik, 1983; Klein, 2004; Klein & 
Loftus, 1993b; Klein, Loftus, Trafton et al., 1992). 
2. In view of the findings from Study1, and the gender similarities hypothesis (Hyde, 
2005), it was hypothesised that males and females would not differ in terms of Big 
Five confidence at either the block description or item level. 
3. Based on the five-factor theory of personality (McCrae & Costa, 1999) combined 
with the assumption that Big Five judgments are made on a daily basis, and 
therefore have high ecological validity it was hypothesised that age would not be 
associated with Big Five confidence, Big Five accuracy, or Big Five bias judgments 
obtained from either the block description or item level measures. 
4. In view of the findings from Study 1 in which the correlations among the Big Five 
block accuracy scores were low, it was hypothesised that the associations among the 
Big Five block accuracy scores, and the item-level accuracy scores will also be low. 
5. Good calibration was also expected for the Big Five judgments based on 
Gigerenzer‟s (1991) theory which argues that individuals are well calibrated to their 
natural environments. 
6. In view of the findings from Study 1, and the gender similarities hypothesis (Hyde, 
2005), it was hypothesised that males and females would not differ in terms of Big 
Five accuracy judgments obtained at either the block or item level. 
7. Based on previous research, and the claim that confidence is a distinct trait that is 
related to personality, it was hypothesised that six factors would emerge from the 
structural analyses of the Big Five confidence and Big Five subscale scores from the 
IPIP and IPIP Form B. 
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4.8 Participants 
A total of 411 individuals participated in this study. The sample comprised 
males (n = 87) and females (n = 322), ranging in age from 18 to 63 years (M = 28.65 
years, SD = 9.25 years). Two people did not indicate their gender. The mean age of the 
males was 29.74 years (SD = 10.04 years) and the mean age for females was 28.03 (SD 
= 9.01 years).  
The highest educational level varied from completion of grade 9, 10, 11, or 12 (n 
= 86) to completion of tertiary studies (n = 39) and eight participants did not respond to 
this question. Two hundred and forty nine participants were enrolled in undergraduate 
Psychology courses at the University of Southern Queensland and received course 
credit for their participation. Snowball sampling techniques (see method section Study 
1) were used to obtain the other 162 participants. In return for taking the time to 
complete the study, entry in a raffle for cash prizes was offered to these participants. 
4.9 Materials 
All participants completed a computerised battery of measures that included 
demographic information and self-report measures of personality. Demographic 
questions consisted of items regarding, gender, age, and highest level of education.  
The test battery comprised IPIP, IPIP Form B (see below), and the BFBD. IPIP 
Form A was the measure used in the data analyses for the item-level accuracy methods 
and, was formed from participants‟ responses to the IPIP. Prior to developing IPIP Form 
A, the factorial structure of the IPIP was examined (see results) and reliability estimates 
were consulted for each of the IPIP subscales. The factorial structure of IPIP Form A 
was also examined as this scale was used as the criterion for the accuracy scores and the 
factor analysis yielded a clear five factor solution. 
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The Original International Personality Item Pool Five-Factor Personality 
Scale (IPIP) - (Goldberg, 1999). See Study 1. The IPIP was the criterion for accuracy 
for the BFBD described next. 
Big Five Block Descriptions of Personality (BFBD) Based on the IPIP Trait 
Adjectives - (Goldberg, 1999). The same block descriptions used in Study 1 were used 
in Study 2, and the accuracy scores for these block descriptions were derived using the 
same steps outlined in the method section of Study 1. 
Shortened version of the IPIP Scale based on the Trait Adjectives (IPIP 
Form A) - (Goldberg, 1999). A shortened version of the IPIP was used as the criterion 
for accuracy for the item-level judgments. The original IPIP contains 10 items for each 
of the Big Five personality subscales. The IPIP form B (see below) on the other hand, 
does not have 10 items for each subscale for the reasons highlighted in the next section. 
However, the protocols for determining accuracy which are described later necessitate 
the calculation of differences scores for each personality dimension, and this calculation 
required that both the IPIP Form A and the IPIP Form B, have the same number of 
items for each personality subscale. Consequently, items were randomly deleted from 
the Extraversion (2 items), Conscientiousness (1 items), and Emotional Stability 
subscales (1 item) of the original IPIP, resulting in a parallel form of the IPIP subscales. 
Convergent validity co-efficients between IPIP Form A subscales and its respective 
IPIP subscale were .98 or higher. 
Item-by-Item Big Five Self-Rated Personality Descriptions (IPIP Form B) 
based on the Trait Adjectives by Goldberg (1999). The item-by-item judgments used 
the same 46 trait adjectives, instructions, and rating scales, as the BFBD described in 
the last chapter. Thus, 8 trait adjectives assessed the Extraversion dimension, 10 
assessed both the Agreeableness and the Intellect dimensions, and 9 assessed both the 
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Emotional Stability, and the Conscientiousness dimensions. For these judgments, 
however, participants rated each trait adjective (e.g., “I don‟t mind being the centre of 
attention”) separately, and also provided an item-by-item confidence rating. As before, 
participants rated the extent to which each trait adjective generally reflected their 
personality on an 11-point scale with end points of -5 (Not like me) to +5 (Like me). For 
each trait adjective, participants also provided their confidence rating after reading the 
same confidence instructions as described for the BFBD in Study 1. The five item-by-
item personality descriptions are presented in Appendix L. 
Three Accuracy Methods 
In order to continue the parallel with cognitive testing, three accuracy methods 
were developed. This was for the purpose of constructing a necessary situation wherein 
a mean accuracy score was able to be calculated for each Big Five dimension. Prior to 
describing these methods recoding of the parallel forms is discussed. 
As the items across both IPIP Form A and IPIP Form B were scored on different 
rating scales, the first step involved recoding the IPIP Form B scores back to the same 
scale as the IPIP Form A. Thus, IPIP Form B scores of -5 and -4 were recoded as 1; 
scores of -3 and -2 were recoded as 2; scores of -1, 0, and 1 were recoded as 3; scores of 
2 and 3 were recoded as 4; and scores of 4 and 5 were coded as 5. It is acknowledged 
that post hoc transformations to equate the two test forms do not overcome the fact that 
the original response formats were different. The Big Five subscale scores on IPIP Form 
A and IPIP Form B were calculated. On each measure the scores for the Big Five 
dimensions ranged from 8 to 40 for the Extraversion dimension, from 9 to 45 for both 
Emotional stability and Conscientiousness, and from 10 to 50 for both the 
Agreeableness and Intellect dimensions. 
Method 1 
 Cognitive and Personality Confidence 123 
 
For each Big Five dimension the standard error of measurement was calculated 
for raw subscale scores on both IPIP Form A and the parallel scales for IPIP Form B. 
The standard error of difference score was then computed, for each dimension, to 
determine accuracy. 
Anastasi and Urbina (1997) assert that individual scores can be interpreted using 
the standard error of measurement. However, the current study aimed to find a way of 
interpreting whether both subscale scores were answered in a consistent manner. 
Therefore the formula for the standard error of difference scores was used. This score 
provides a measure of “how large a score difference could be obtained by chance” 
(Anastasi & Urbina, 1997, p. 110). At the 95% level of confidence, the standard error of 
the difference between two scores needs to be multiplied by 1.96 whereas at the 99% 
level of confidence, the difference score needs to be multiplied by 2.58. The current 
study used the 95% confidence interval as this is more conservative and results in a 
smaller band of scores around each individual‟s difference score. 
The following formula was taken from Anastasi and Urbina (1997, p. 
111) 
 
in which SEdiff is the standard error of the difference between the two scores, and 
SEM1 and SEM2 are standard errors of measurement of the separate scores. By 
substituting   for SEM1 and  for SEM2 we may rewrite 
the formula directly in terms of reliability coefficients, as follows: 
 
An example for the Agreeableness dimension follows. 
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SEMscoreagree1 = SEM score on the IPIP Form A for Agreeableness, SEMscoreagree2 
= SEM score on the IPIP Form B for Agreeableness. The SEM for any test = 
 where SDt is the standard deviation of the test scores and rtt is the 
reliability co-efficient, both computed on the same group. 
A difference score was calculated by subtracting each individual‟s IPIP Form B 
Agreeableness subscale score from his or her Form A Agreeableness subscale score. If 
the absolute value of the difference between the parallel forms fell within the 95% 
confidence interval then the score was coded as accurate (1); otherwise it was coded 0. 
Accuracy scores for the other four dimensions were determined in the same manner. 
Method 2 
This method involved converting raw subscale scores from IPIP Form A and 
IPIP Form B, to z scores. Difference scores were then computed between the parallel 
forms for each dimension. An arbitrary choice of z = 1 was set for determining accuracy. 
Thus, if the absolute value of the difference between the parallel forms for each 
dimension was z  = 1 then the individual was coded as accurate (1); all else was coded 
0. 
Method 3 
With this method and as a precautionary measure, individual items on IPIP Form 
A and IPIP Form B were transformed to z scores. This was done because item response 
formats and instructions were different for the parallel forms. Next, the Big Five 
subscale scores on the IPIP Form A and IPIP Form B were re-calculated using the z-
transformed items. For every participant a difference score was then computed for each 
Big Five dimension by subtracting the zIPIP Form B subscale score from its 
corresponding subscale score of zIPIP Form A. For each Big Five dimension the 
standard error measurement was calculated for the z transformed subscale scale scores 
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on both IPIP Form A and IPIP Form B. Then to determine accuracy, the standard error 
of difference scores for each dimension was computed in the same manner as in method 
one (see above). If the absolute value of the difference between the parallel forms fell 
within the 95% confidence interval, then the score was coded as accurate (1); otherwise 
it was coded as 0. 
Big Five Bias Scores for each dimension 
The accuracy scores just described were factor analysed to investigate whether a 
five-factor solution emerged, with each factor comprising the three relevant scores for 
each dimension (see results section). For each person a mean accuracy score could then 
be calculated for each dimension, using the accuracy scores obtained from the three 
methods described above. Then for each participant a mean confidence rating score for 
each Big Five dimension was computed. This was done by using the confidence ratings 
taken from IPIP Form B. A bias score could then be calculated for each person for each 
dimension in the same manner as the cognitive bias scores. That is, mean accuracy 
expressed as a percentage was taken away from the mean confidence score. 
4.10 Procedure 
Participants were recruited via the USQ Psychology Experiment Sign Up 
Database (PESUD) and were able to login from any internet connected computer. All 
data were submitted electronically and collected by the Psychology technical team. 
Informed consent was obtained at the beginning of the testing session. Participants read 
the electronic consent form, and typed in a unique identifying number indicating that 
they understood that their data would be used for research purposes (see Appendix M). 
Respondents were informed that they could withdraw from the study at any time 
without penalty, and were assured of confidentiality and anonymity. To eliminate 
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missing data, participants were required to provide an answer to each question to 
progress through the test battery. The battery took approximately 1 hour to complete.  
Due to programming restrictions, the order in which the measures were 
presented, was not randomized. Therefore, the test battery was administered in the 
following order:  
1. IPIP 
2. Item-by-item Agreeableness judgments (IPIP Form B subscale) 
3. Block Agreeableness judgment (BFBD-A) 
4. Item-by-item Conscientiousness judgments (IPIP Form B subscale) 
5. Block Conscientiousness judgment (BFBD-C) 
6. Item-by-item Extraversion judgments (IPIP Form B subscale) 
7. Block Extraversion judgment (BFBD-E) 
8. Item-by-item Emotional Stability judgments (IPIP Form B subscale) 
9. Block Emotional Stability judgment (BFBD-EM) 
10. Item-by-item Intellect judgments (IPIP Form B subscale) 
11. Block Intellect judgment (BFBD-I) 
4.10.1 Scoring 
For the gender variable, 1 = males and 2 = females. For the Big Five accuracy 
variables 0 = inaccurate and 1 = accurate. Big Five bias scores were calculated for the 
item-by-item judgments and were described above. 
4.11 Results 
Prior to statistical analyses, all variables were examined through various 
subprograms from the Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS, Version 16) for 
accuracy of data input, missing data, and fit between their distributions and the 
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assumptions of multivariate analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996).  For several variables 
one or more univariate outliers were detected. Visual inspection of the data from these 
cases revealed that cases 271, 239, 30, 82, 394, and 268 were both univariate and 
multivariate outliers and were therefore deleted from the data set leaving 405 
participants in the study. The other univariate outliers were retained as legitimate 
variation in line with recommendations made by Tabachnick  and Fidell (1996). No 
other problems were detected.  
4.11.1 Factorial Structure of the IPIP 
The factorial structure of the IPIP was examined using Principal Components 
Analysis with Promax rotation and Kaiser normalisation. A solution employing root one 
criterion produced 12 factors. Cattell‟s Scree Plot, however, provided support for 
interpreting a five-factor solution. The pattern matrix, percent of variance accounted for, 
eigenvalues, and factor correlation matrix are presented in Table 4.1.  The five-factor 
solution accounted for 43.40% of the total variance.  As anticipated, for each dimension, 
all the factors comprised loadings from the expected IPIP items.  The five factors were 
labelled IPIP Emotional Stability, IPIP Extraversion, IPIP Agreeableness, IPIP Intellect,  
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Table 4.1 
Pattern Matrix of IPIP Items using Principal Components Analysis with Promax 
Rotation and Kaiser Normalisation (N = 405). 
Variable F1 a F2 F3 F4 F5 h2 
ipip34 0.81 0.07 -0.11 0.05 0.06 .63 
ipip04 0.80 0.04 0.05 -0.06 0.10 .60 
ipip39 0.79 0.03 -0.06 0.04 -0.03 .63 
ipip44 0.78 0.10 -0.07 0.01 0.05 .57 
ipip14 0.76 -0.03 0.18 -0.05 0.10 .58 
ipip29 0.74 -0.02 0.15 -0.11 0.04 .57 
ipip49 0.72 -0.14 -0.06 0.03 -0.02 .61 
ipip24 0.60 0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.10 .38 
ipip09 -0.51 0.13 0.13 0.02 -0.10 .34 
ipip19 -0.51 0.18 -0.07 -0.11 0.15 .38 
ipip18 0.44 0.06 0.10 -0.09 -0.40 .41 
ipip38 0.33 0.16 -0.32 -0.02 -0.20 .30 
ipip21 0.16 0.76 0.11 -0.04 0.13 .58 
ipip01 0.06 0.75 -0.13 -0.04 -0.03 .51 
ipip41 0.09 0.73 -0.13 0.06 -0.02 .51 
ipip31 -0.06 0.71 0.11 -0.04 -0.02 .55 
ipip16 0.14 -0.67 0.19 -0.08 -0.02 .54 
ipip06 -0.11 -0.62 -0.20 -0.05 0.03 .46 
ipip46 0.15 -0.60 -0.02 0.06 0.06 .42 
ipip36 0.11 -0.57 0.22 -0.04 0.08 .39 
ipip11 -0.18 0.54 0.22 -0.03 0.10 .50 
ipip26 0.06 -0.43 -0.24 -0.25 -0.02 .47 
ipip47 0.05 0.35 0.34 0.00 0.10 .30 
ipip42 0.08 -0.04 0.66 -0.03 0.02 .42 
ipip27 0.13 -0.02 0.66 -0.14 -0.03 .40 
ipip22 0.05 -0.07 -0.62 0.01 0.11 .39 
ipip17 0.11 -0.05 0.62 0.04 0.00 .39 
ipip32 0.08 -0.22 -0.61 -0.03 0.07 .49 
ipip07 0.02 0.13 0.60 0.00 -0.01 .40 
ipip37 -0.08 -0.06 0.55 0.01 0.06 .33 
ipip12 0.31 0.18 -0.47 0.06 -0.07 .33 
ipip02 0.06 0.05 -0.40 0.00 0.04 .16 
ipip45 0.17 -0.15 0.29 0.21 -0.07 .18 
ipip50 -0.01 0.11 -0.05 0.70 0.02 .54 
ipip30 0.08 0.05 -0.10 -0.68 0.13 .48 
ipip10 0.19 0.08 0.01 -0.66 0.05 .44 
ipip05 0.03 -0.02 -0.07 0.66 0.05 .41 
ipip25 0.01 0.14 -0.11 0.63 0.15 .48 
ipip15 0.23 0.04 0.06 0.58 -0.04 .39 
ipip40 0.15 0.02 -0.16 0.57 0.00 .31 
ipip20 0.05 0.00 -0.11 -0.55 0.13 .35 
ipip35 -0.19 -0.03 -0.01 0.49 0.08 .30 
ipip23 0.00 0.11 -0.05 -0.20 0.70 .50 
ipip43 0.12 0.07 0.00 -0.04 0.70 .47 
ipip03 -0.01 0.11 -0.11 0.05 0.66 .44 
ipip33 0.17 -0.10 0.06 0.08 0.64 .44 
ipip08 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.14 -0.60 .38 
ipip28 0.13 0.01 0.04 0.08 -0.59 .38 
ipip48 0.04 -0.10 0.06 0.23 0.48 .32 
ipip13 0.08 -0.16 0.14 0.27 0.48 .38 
Eigenvalue 8.12 4.65 3.78 2.64 2.51  
% of Variance 16.24 9.31 7.56 5.28 5.02  
       
Variable F1 F2 F3 F4 F5  
F1 1.00          
F2 -0.30 1.00        
F3 -0.09 0.18 1.00      
F4 -0.09 0.29 0.27 1.00    
F5 -0.21 0.06 0.24 0.12 1.00  
Note.  a Factor Labels, F1 =  IPIP Emotional Stability ; F2 =  IPIP Extraversion;  F3 =  IPIP Agreeableness; 
         F4 =  IPIP Intellect ;  F5 = IPIP Conscientiousness 
 
and IPIP Conscientiousness respectively. The correlations among the factors were 
concordant with previous research (Saucier, 2002; Saucier & Goldberg, 2002). 
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Table 4.2 presents the correlations among the IPIP subscales. These correlations 
were similar to those reported in the literature (Saucier, 2002; Saucier & Goldberg, 
2002). 
Table 4.2 
Correlations Among the IPIP Subscales 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
IINTELL 1.00         
ICON 0.11* 1.00       
IEXTRA 0.30** 0.08 1.00     
IAGREE 0.26** 0.26** 0.26** 1.00   
IEMOT 0.06 0.25** 0.34** 0.14* 1.00 
* p < .05   ** p < .01 
4.11.2 Factorial Structure of the IPIP Form B 
The factorial structure of the IPIP Form B items were also examined using 
Principal Components Analysis with Promax rotation and Kaiser normalisation. A 
solution employing root one criterion produced 7 factors. Cattell‟s Scree Plot, however, 
was indeterminate after five factors thus supporting the interpretation of a five factor 
solution. Table 4.3 presents the pattern matrix, percent of variance accounted for, 
eigenvalues, communalities, and the factor correlation matrix. The five-factor solution 
accounted for 55.04% of the total variance.  For each Big Five dimension, all the factors 
consisted of loadings from the expected IPIP Form B items.  The five factors were 
labelled IPIP Emotional Stability Form B, IPIP Extraversion Form B, IPIP Intellect 
Form B, IPIP Conscientiousness Form B, and IPIP Agreeableness Form B respectively. 
The bottom of Table 4.3 presents the component correlation matrix. As shown, low to 
moderate correlations emerged among the IPIP Form B subscales. It is noted that these 
correlations among the subscales were higher than the correlations among the IPIP 
subscales. 
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Table 4.3 
Pattern Matrix of IPIP Form B Items using Principal Components Analysis with 
Promax Rotation and Kaiser Normalisation (N = 405). 
Variable F1a F2 F3 F4 F5 h2 
PDEM03 0.84 -0.06 -0.07 0.03 0.10 .70 
PDEM04 0.80 -0.12 -0.08 -0.04 0.21 .65 
PDEM05 0.79 -0.08 0.14 0.00 -0.15 .61 
PDEM01 0.76 0.06 0.00 -0.09 0.04 .61 
PDEM07 0.76 0.10 -0.08 -0.03 0.03 .62 
PDEM02 0.75 -0.05 0.09 -0.15 0.06 .57 
PDEM08 0.72 0.08 -0.05 0.12 -0.01 .61 
PDEM09 0.70 0.05 0.11 -0.02 -0.06 .56 
PDEM06 0.68 0.05 0.13 0.14 -0.27 .55 
PDE07 0.02 0.91 -0.07 -0.03 -0.13 .71 
PDE01 -0.04 0.86 -0.02 -0.02 -0.18 .60 
PDE04 -0.05 0.83 0.08 0.03 -0.03 .70 
PDE08 -0.05 0.81 -0.03 -0.08 0.09 .65 
PDE02 0.04 0.79 -0.10 -0.04 0.16 .69 
PDE06 0.04 0.78 0.05 0.00 0.07 .72 
PDE03 -0.01 0.68 0.14 0.12 -0.15 .54 
PDE05 0.19 0.61 -0.06 0.03 0.23 .68 
PDI08 -0.01 -0.06 0.81 -0.11 0.04 .59 
PDI07 0.08 -0.11 0.80 -0.07 -0.05 .57 
PDI05 0.05 -0.08 0.72 0.02 -0.01 .50 
PDI010 -0.19 -0.07 0.71 -0.01 0.16 .48 
PDI03 0.08 -0.03 0.67 0.07 -0.04 .50 
PDI02 0.13 0.04 0.65 -0.02 0.01 .52 
PDI04 0.06 0.07 0.64 0.07 0.02 .54 
PDI09 -0.09 0.13 0.63 -0.07 0.04 .44 
PDI06 0.18 0.07 0.58 0.10 -0.03 .54 
PDI01 -0.02 0.29 0.53 0.00 0.02 .50 
PDC01 -0.14 0.00 -0.03 0.84 0.01 .66 
PDC03 -0.10 0.09 -0.05 0.82 0.04 .68 
PDC04 -0.07 -0.04 -0.04 0.82 0.01 .63 
PDC09 0.05 0.05 -0.13 0.77 0.02 .61 
PDC07 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.76 -0.04 .62 
PDC02 -0.09 -0.07 0.08 0.75 -0.01 .54 
PDC06 0.15 0.08 -0.10 0.65 0.03 .51 
PDC08 -0.01 -0.17 0.26 0.65 0.06 .54 
PDC05 0.18 -0.06 -0.03 0.56 0.03 .37 
PDA08 -0.02 -0.08 -0.04 0.02 0.81 .60 
PDA010 -0.14 -0.05 0.11 -0.08 0.78 .55 
PDA07 0.13 -0.08 -0.11 0.10 0.67 .49 
PDA01 -0.21 0.03 0.11 0.02 0.64 .43 
PDA05 0.24 0.00 -0.07 0.00 0.62 .51 
PDA09 -0.06 0.13 0.12 -0.05 0.56 .40 
PDA06 0.02 -0.07 0.05 0.14 0.50 .33 
PDA04 0.24 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.48 .39 
PDA03 0.11 -0.10 -0.03 0.03 0.42 .19 
PDA02 -0.12 0.21 0.16 0.08 0.40 .34 
Eigenvalue 12.35 4.23 3.38 2.92 2.43  
% of Variance 26.85 9.2 7.35 6.36 5.29  
Factor Correlation 
Matrix 
     
 
 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5  
F1 1.00          
F2 0.43 1.00        
F3 0.34 0.43 1.00      
F4 0.27 0.27 0.29 1.00    
F5 0.33 0.41 0.30 0.37 1.00  
Note.  a Factor Labels, F1 =  IPIP Emotional Stability Form B ; F2 =  IPIP Extraversion Form B;  F3 =  IPIP Intellect Form B;  F4 =  
IPIP Conscientiousness  Form B;  F5 = IPIP Agreeableness Form B. 
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4.11.3 Descriptive Statistics and Factorial Structure of Item-level 
Accuracy Scores  
Three accuracy methods were developed for the purpose of calculating a mean 
accuracy score for each Big Five dimension. The descriptive statistics for these scores 
are presented in Table 4.4, with the most salient feature being that the means for 
methods 2 and 3 are quite similar for each of the dimensions except for the 
Agreeableness dimension. The correlations among these accuracy scores are presented 
in Appendix N. All of the accuracy scores for each Big Five dimension were correlated 
because the three methodologies were similar. It is worth noting for each dimension, the 
highest correlations were between methods 2 and 3.  
Table 4.4 
Descriptive Statistics for Accuracy Scores Derived from Methods 1, 2, and 3 (N=405)  
Variable M SD 
Intellect Accuracy Method 1 68.40 46.55 
Intellect Accuracy Method 2 81.73 38.69 
Intellect Accuracy Method 3 85.68 35.07 
Conscientiousness Accuracy Method 1 78.77 40.95 
Conscientiousness Accuracy Method 2 83.95 36.75 
Conscientiousness Accuracy Method 3 88.15 32.36 
Extraversion Accuracy Method 1 73.09 44.41 
Extraversion Accuracy Method 2 89.63 30.53 
Extraversion Accuracy Method 3 87.90 32.65 
Agreeableness Accuracy Method 1 82.72 37.86 
Agreeableness Accuracy Method 2 72.35 44.78 
Agreeableness Accuracy Method 3 85.19 35.57 
Emotional Stability Accuracy Method 1 72.35 44.78 
Emotional Stability Accuracy Method 2 85.93 34.82 
Emotional Stability Accuracy Method 3 81.73 38.69 
 
Prior to calculating mean accuracy scores for each Big Five dimension, the 
accuracy scores in Table 4.4 were factor analysed which showed five clear factors with 
the three accuracy scores for each dimension loading on its expected factor. The results 
from this structural analysis suggested that accuracy was specific to each Big Five 
domain. So, calculating mean accuracy scores for each dimension was justified. This 
factor analysis is presented in Appendix N. Please note for the remainder of this results 
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section, item-level accuracy scores refer to the mean accuracy scores for each Big Five 
dimension. 
4.11.4 Reliability Analysis 
Internal consistency reliability estimates (i.e., Cronbach‟s coefficient alphas) 
were calculated for all variables where applicable. Table 4.5 presents these alpha 
coefficients, along with descriptive statistics for all dependent variables. All alpha 
coefficients indicated good internal consistency. The alpha coefficients reported for the 
original IPIP subscales accorded with those reported in the research literature where the 
IPIP was administered on a face-to-face basis (e.g., Goldberg, 1999). It is worth noting 
that the table shows that the subscales of IPIP Form B along with Big Five accuracy 
scores all demonstrated more than acceptable levels of internal consistency. Also 
worthy of mention is that the item-by-item Big Five confidence ratings from IPIP Form 
B demonstrated high internal consistency, with alpha coefficients ranging from .91 
to .94.  
4.11.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for all dependent variables are presented in Table 4.5. 
Mean ratings for each of the Big Five dimensions on the original IPIP that was 
administered via the internet, ranged from 30.50 for the Emotional Stability dimension 
to 40.86 for the Agreeableness dimension. These mean ratings closely matched those 
endorsed by Study 1 participants, which used face-to-face test administration. Study 2 
respondents also reported block personality ratings similar to those reported in Study 1.  
Table 4.5 also shows that across all of the Big Five personality dimensions, 
individuals were very confident for both the block and item-by-item personality 
judgments. The fact that the mean confidence rating scores for the Big Five block 
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judgements closely followed those reported by a different group of respondents in Study 
1, is worthy of note here.  
Table 4.5 
Descriptive Statistics for all Dependent Variables (N = 405)  
Dependent Variables M SD # items  
IPIP Original Subscales      
ICON 35.54 5.76 10 .78 
IEMOT 30.50 7.76 10 .90 
IINTELL 36.77 5.31 10 .78 
IEXTRA 32.19 7.00 10 .86 
IAGREE 40.86 4.83 10 .76 
IPIP Form A Subscales     
ICONA 32.18 5.04 9 .75 
IEMOTA 28.08 7.05 9 .89 
IINTELLA 36.77 5.31 10 .78 
IEXTRAA 25.07 5.81 8 .84 
IAGREEA 40.86 4.83 10 .76 
Personality Confidence Item-by-Item Ratings For Each Personality Dimension 
from IPIP Form B Subscales 
    
CONCIC 81.88 11.35 9 .93 
EMOTIC 80.67 12.06 9 .94 
INTELLIC 80.66 11.75 10 .93 
EXTRAIC 80.71 11.99 8 .92 
AGREEIC 82.52 10.62 10 .91 
IPIP Form B Item-by-Item Big Five Adjective Ratings-Recoded 1      
CONCIR 34.36 6.92 9 .90 
EMOTIR 31.13 7.99 9 .91 
INTELLIR 40.12 6.56 10 .88 
EXTRAIR 29.17 7.00 8 .92 
AGREEIR 43.04 4.73 10 .82 
Big Five Block Confidence Ratings (BFBDC)     
CONCB 81.01 13.30 1 - 
EMOTCB 79.36 14.76 1 - 
INTELLCB 80.54 13.87 1 - 
EXTRACB 80.47 14.91 1 - 
AGREECB 82.54 12.61 1 - 
Big Five Block Adjective Ratings (BFBD) 1     
CONCR 3.76 1.07 1 - 
EMOTCR 3.58 1.15 1 - 
INTELLCR 4.00 0.90 1 - 
EXTRACR 3.62 0.85 1 - 
AGREECR 4.40 0.68 1 - 
Big Five Block Accuracy Scores (BFBD Accuracy 20%)     
CONCBA20% 72.84 44.53  - 
EMOTBA20% 70.12 45.83  - 
INTELLBA20% 84.20 36.52  - 
EXTRABA20% 57.78 49.45  - 
AGREEBA20% 91.11 28.49  - 
Big Five Item-Level Accuracy Scores Derived from Methods 1, 2, and 3     
Conscientiousness Accuracy 83.62 31.43 3 .81 
Emotional Stability Accuracy 80.00 33.79 3 .81 
Intellect Accuracy 78.60 31.60 3 .68 
Extraversion Accuracy 83.54 28.78 3 .70 
Agreeableness Accuracy 80.08 34.45 3 .84 
Big Five Bias Scores     
Conscientiousness Bias -1.73 34.98  - 
Emotional Stability Bias 0.67 36.52  - 
Intellect Bias 2.07 34.98  - 
Extraversion Bias -2.83 32.32  - 
Agreeableness Bias 2.44 36.48  - 
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Note. ICON = IPIP Conscientiousness; IEMOT = IPIP Emotional stability; IINTELL = IPIP Intellect; IEXTRA = IPIP Extraversion, IAGREE = IPIP 
Agreeableness; ICONA = IPIP Form A Conscientiousness; IEMOTA = IPIP Form A Emotional stability; INTELLA = IPIP Form A Intellect; IEXTRAA 
= IPIP Form A Extraversion, IAGREEA = IPIP Form A Agreeableness; CONIC= Conscientiousness Item-by-item confidence Form B; EMOTIC= 
Emotional stability Item-by-item confidence Form B; INTELLIC = Intellect Item-by-item confidence Form B; EXTRAIC = Extraversion Item-by-item 
confidence Form B; AGREEIC= Agreeableness Item-by-item confidence Form B; CONCIR= Conscientiousness Item-by-item adjective rating Form 
B; EMOTIIR= Emotional stability Item-by-item adjective rating Form B; INTELLIR = Intellect Item-by-item adjective rating Form B; EXTRAIR = 
Extraversion Item-by-item adjective rating Form B; AGREEIR= Agreeableness Item-by-item adjective rating Form B; CONCB= Conscientiousness 
Block confidence rating; EMOTCB= Emotional stability Block confidence rating; INTELLCB = Intellect  Block confidence rating, EXTRACB = 
Extraversion Block confidence rating; AGREECB= Agreeableness Block confidence rating; CONCR = Conscientiousness Block rating; EMOTCR= 
Emotional stability Block rating; INTELLCR = Intellect Block rating; EXTRACR = Extraversion Block rating; AGREECR= Agreeableness Block 
rating; 1 = These means were calculated after recoding the data from -5 to +5 to 1 to 5 (see method section);  CONSCBA20% = Conscientiousness 
Accuracy ≤ 20 %; EXTRABA20% = Extraversion accuracy ≤ 20 %; AGREEBA20% = Agreeableness Accuracy ≤ 20 %; EMOTBA20% = Emotional 
Stability Accuracy ≤ 20 %; INTBA20% = Intellect Accuracy ≤ 20 %. 
4.12 The Factorial Structure of Confidence 
The first hypothesis stated that one confidence factor would emerge from the 
structural analysis of the item-by-item and block confidence ratings. Exploratory factor 
analytic techniques were used to test this hypothesis. Principal Axis Factoring with 
oblique rotation was undertaken with the following variables: five mean confidence 
rating scores for each Big Five dimension obtained from the item-by-item confidence 
scores; and the five block confidence rating scores. The correlation matrix of these 
psychometric variables is presented in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6 
Correlations among Block and Item-by-Item Confidence Ratings (N = 405) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. AGREECB 1.00          
2. CONCB 0.59 1.00         
3. EXTRACB 0.46 0.63 1.00        
4. EMOTCB 0.51 0.56 0.64 1.00       
5. INTELLCB 0.48 0.54 0.56 0.60 1.00      
6. EMOTIC 0.53 0.60 0.68 0.78 0.62 1.00     
7. CONCIC 0.59 0.73 0.62 0.59 0.55 0.74 1.00    
8. EXTRAIC 0.54 0.66 0.75 0.62 0.62 0.79 0.79 1.00   
9. AGREEIC 0.72 0.58 0.52 0.53 0.55 0.68 0.74 0.70 1.00  
10.INTELLIC 0.51 0.58 0.61 0.66 0.82 0.78 0.70 0.76 0.65 1.00 
Note. CONCB= Conscientiousness block confidence rating; EMOTCB= Emotional stability block confidence rating: INTELLCB = 
Intellect block confidence rating, EXTRACB = Extraversion block confidence rating; AGREECB= Agreeableness block confidence 
rating; CONIC= Conscientiousness Item-by-item confidence IPIP Form B; EMOTIC= Emotional stability Item-by-item confidence 
IPIP Form B; INTELLIC = Intellect Item-by-item confidence IPIP Form B; EXTRAIC = Extraversion Item-by-item confidence IPIP 
Form B; AGREEIC= Agreeableness Item-by-item confidence IPIP Form B. All correlations were significant at the .01  
The data from Table 4.6 were considered factorable as the assumptions as 
advocated by Coakes and Steed were met (1996). A solution employing root one 
criterion produced one factor, which accounted for 67.18% of the total variance. The 
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percent of variance accounted for, eigenvalue, and communalities are presented in Table 
4.7. 
Table 4.7 
Principal Axis Factoring of the Item-by-Item and Block Confidence Rating Scores (N = 
405) 
Variable Communalities Factor –Big Five 
Confidence 
AGREECB .45 .72 
CONCB .57 .79 
EXTRACB .58 .79 
EMOTCB .58 .79 
INTELLCB .55 .77 
EMOTIC .77 .89 
CONCIC .73 .87 
EXTRAIC .78 .89 
INTELLIC .73 .87 
AGREEIC .62 .81 
Eigenvalue - 6.72 
% of variance - 67.18 
 
Table 4.7 shows that the communality values ranged from .51 for AGREECB 
to .79 for EXTRAIC. The factor extracted from the data set was called Big Five 
Confidence as all of the personality confidence scores loaded highly on it. This finding 
suggests that the cognitive processes that underlie personality confidence judgments at 
the block level are the same as those used when individuals make item-by-item 
confidence judgments about their personality. 
4.13 Gender and Age Differences in Personality Confidence 
The next hypothesis proposed that males and females would not differ in terms 
of Big Five confidence. The gender data were subjected to an independent samples t test 
with the results presented in Table 4.8 
3
. Bonferroni adjustment was used to keep 
                                                 
 
3
 The male to female ratio in this study is not ideal, however, it closely resembles other 
calibration research wherein similar gender ratios were reported (e.g., Pallier, 2003).  Also, based on the 
recommendations made by Howell (2002), each effect size calculation used the mean and the standard 
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family-wise error at alpha = .05. None of the t-tests indicated significant gender 
differences and the effect sizes were in the close-to-zero, or small range, as expected. 
These results indicate that males did not differ from females in terms of Big Five 
confidence. This finding essentially replicates the Study 1 results for the block Big Five 
confidence judgments. 
Table 4.8 
Means for Block and Item-by-Item Big Five Confidence Ratings for Males (N = 85) and 
Females (N = 318) in Study 2.
 
 AGREE 
CB 
CON 
CB 
EXTRA 
CB 
EMOT 
CB 
INTELL 
CB 
EXTRA 
IC 
AGREE 
IC 
CONC 
IC 
EMOT 
IC 
INTELL 
IC 
Male 81.53 81.65 79.76 78.82 82.24 80.07 80.92 80.21 79.74 81.27 
Female 82.89 80.85 80.66 79.50 80.09 80.90 82.97 82.34 80.95 80.53 
t tests  -0.83 0.49 -0.48 -0.35 1.22 -0.53 -1.54 -1.41 -0.82 0.52 
Effect 
size 
-0.10 0.06 -0.06 -0.04 0.15 -0.06 -0.19 -0.18 -0.10 0.06 
Note. CONCB= Conscientiousness block confidence rating; EMOTCB= Emotional stability block confidence rating; INTELLCG = 
Intellect block confidence rating, EXTRACB = Extraversion block confidence rating; AGREECB= Agreeableness block confidence 
rating; CONIC= Conscientiousness Item-by-item confidence IPIP Form B; EMOTIC= Emotional stability Item-by-item confidence 
IPIP Form B; INTELLIC = Intellect Item-by-item confidence IPIP Form B; EXTRAIC = Extraversion Item-by-item confidence IPIP 
Form B; AGREEIC= Agreeableness Item-by-item confidence IPIP Form B 
Hypothesis 3 postulated that age would not be associated with Big Five 
confidence at either the block or item level. Pearson‟s Product Moment correlations 
were calculated in order to test this hypothesis, and the only significant correlations 
were between age and item-level Conscientiousness confidence ( r (405) = .10, p  < .05), 
and age and item-level Intellect confidence ( r (405) = .11, p < .05).  These correlations 
suggest that older people were more confident than younger participants when rating 
their confidence for both the Intellect and Conscientiousness dimensions. However, the 
effect sizes were small in both cases.  
                                                                                                                                               
 
deviation for each gender as the denominator.  This practice guarantees that d is approximated 
independently of N, thereby removing potential concerns regarding unequal sample sizes. 
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4.14 Big Five Accuracy and Bias Scores 
The descriptive statistics for the block description accuracy scores were shown 
in Table 4.5. The accuracy scores for the Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, 
Intellect, Extraversion and Agreeableness dimensions were 72.84, 70.12, 84.20, 57.78, 
and 91.11 respectively. The standard deviation of the block accuracy scores showed that 
there were many inaccurate ratings for some traits. It was noteworthy that the 
descriptive statistics presented in Table 4.5 for the block accuracy scores were similar to 
those reported in Study 1 which used face-to-face mode of administration. 
The same validity checks as undertaken in Study 1 (see section 3.11) were 
undertaken for the block descriptions of personality and the results were concordant 
with the checks from Study 1 thus for the sake of brevity were not reported here. 
Hypothesis 4 proposed that the associations among the Big Five block accuracy, 
and among the Big Five item-level accuracy scores would be low. Pearson‟s Product 
Moment correlations were calculated to test both aspects of this hypothesis. The 
correlations amongst the block accuracy scores are presented in Table 4.9, and the 
correlations among the item-level accuracy scores are presented in Table 4.10. The 
correlations between the block accuracy scores, and the item-level accuracy scores were 
low, as expected. These correlations suggest that individuals who were accurate 
(consistent) in their scores on one trait were not necessarily accurate in their scores for 
other traits. 
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Table 4.9 
Correlations among Big Five Block Accuracy Scores (N = 405). 
Variable 
CONSCAC20% EXTRAAC20
% 
AGREEAC20% EMOTAC20% INTAC20% 
CONCBA20% 1.00     
EXTRABA20% 0.15* 1.00    
AGREEBA20% 0.08 0.16* 1.00   
EMOTBA20% 0.15* 0.19* 0.19* 1.00  
INTELLBA20% 0.02 0.13* 0.15* 0.12* 1.00 
Note. CONCBAC20% = Conscientiousness Accuracy ≤ 20 %; EXTRABA20% = Extraversion accuracy ≤ 20 %; AGREEBA20% = 
Agreeableness Accuracy ≤ 20 %; EMOTBA20% = Emotional Stability Accuracy ≤ 20 %; INTBA20% = Intellect Accuracy ≤ 20 %. 
* p < .05. 
Table 4.10 
Correlations among Big Five Item-Level Accuracy Scores (N = 405). 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 
INTAC 1.00         
CONAC 0.18* 1.00       
EXTAC 0.22** 0.23** 1.00     
AGAC 0.12* 0.10* 0.10* 1.00   
EMOTAC 0.16** 0.10* 0.26** 0.17** 1.00 
Note. CONAC= Conscientiousness accuracy item level; EXTAC = Extraversion accuracy item level; AGAC = Agreeableness 
accuracy item level; EMOTAC = Emotional Stability accuracy item level; INTAC = Intellect accuracy item level 
* p < .05  ** p < .01 
Table 4.11 presents the correlations among the block and item-level accuracy 
scores that were also examined. As shown, significant positive correlations emerged for 
all Big Five block accuracy scores and their respective item-level accuracy scores, with 
the Extraversion dimension being the only exception. It is possible that the lack of 
correlation between the two extraversion accuracy measures may not reflect a lack of 
any statistical relationship, but rather could represent unknown confounding variables as 
this study was conducted via the internet in an environment that was not proctored. 
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Table 4.11 
Correlations among Big Five Block and Item-Level Accuracy Scores (N = 405)  
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
INTAC 1.00                   
CONAC 0.18 1.00                 
EXTAC 0.22 0.23 1.00               
AGAC 0.12 0.10 0.10 1.00             
EMOTAC 0.16 0.10 0.26 0.17 1.00           
INTELLBA20% 0.28** 0.03 0.05 0.17 0.08 1.00         
CONCBA20% 0.05 0.31** 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.02 1.00       
EXTRABA20% 0.06 -0.02 -0.08 0.04 0.03 -0.07 -0.07 1.00     
AGREEBA20% 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.39** 0.11 0.15 0.08 -0.02 1.00   
EMOTBA0% 0.08 0.08 0.20 0.14 0.35** 0.12 0.15 -0.01 0.19 1.00 
Note. CONAC= Conscientiousness accuracy item level; EXTAC = Extraversion accuracy item level; AGAC = Agreeableness 
accuracy item level; EMOTAC = Emotional Stability accuracy item level; INTAC = Intellect accuracy item level 
** p < .01 
4.14.1 Item-by-item Big Five Accuracy and Bias 
Item-level accuracy scores were high for each of the Big Five personality 
dimensions. The scores were 83.62, 80.00, 78.60, 83.54, and 80.08 for the 
Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, Intellect, Extraversion and Agreeableness 
dimensions respectively.  
The item-level Big Five bias scores presented in Table 4.5 were -1.73, 0.67, 2.07, 
-2.83, and 2.44 for the Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, Intellect, Extraversion 
and Agreeableness dimensions respectively. The magnitude of these scores suggested 
good calibration for each of the Big Five dimensions, as expected. 
4.14.2 Gender and Age Differences in Accuracy and Bias 
According to hypothesis 6, gender differences were not expected in relation to 
Big Five accuracy at either the block or item levels. To test this hypothesis, independent 
samples t-tests were used and the results are presented in Table 4.12. Bonferroni 
adjustment was used to keep family-wise error at alpha = .05. Consistent with 
expectations, no gender differences appeared across either the block or the item-by-item 
ratings suggesting that males were just as accurate as females when making judgments 
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about the Big Five personality dimensions. This outcome replicated the Study 1 findings 
for the Big Five block accuracy judgments. 
Table 4.12 
Means for Global Block and Item-by-Item Big Five Accuracy Scores for Males (N = 85) 
and Females (N = 318) in Study 2.
 
 AGREE
BA20% 
CONC
BA20% 
EXTRA
BA20% 
EMOT
BA20% 
INTELL
BA20% 
EXTAC AGAC CON 
AC 
EMOT 
AC 
INTAC 
Male 87.06 75.29 74.12 75.29 85.88 80.39 79.21 88.63 77.25 78.43 
Female 92.14 72.33 75.47 68.55 83.65 84.38 80.19 82.18 80.71 78.51 
t tests  -1.28 .55 -.26 1.25 .50 -1.13 -.23 1.94 -.84 -.02 
Effect 
size 
-0.17 0.06 -0.12 0.15 0.06 -0.13 -0.03 0.22 -0.10 -0.00 
Note. CONSCBA20% = Conscientiousness Accuracy ≤ 20 %; EXTRABA20% = Extraversion accuracy ≤ 20 %; AGREEBA20% = 
Agreeableness Accuracy ≤ 20 %; EMOTBA20% = Emotional Stability Accuracy ≤ 20 %; INTBA20% = Intellect Accuracy ≤ 20 %; 
CONAC= Conscientiousness accuracy item level; EXTAC = Extraversion accuracy item level; AGAC = Agreeableness accuracy 
item level; EMOTAC = Emotional Stability accuracy item level; INTAC = Intellect accuracy item level  
Established support for the hypotheses that gender differences do not occur in 
relation to Big Five confidence or accuracy, led to the expectation that gender 
differences in Big Five bias also do not occur. Therefore the non-significant results were 
not reported. 
Age was not expected to be associated with either block or item-level accuracy 
scores. Nor was age expected to be associated with Big Five Bias scores.  Pearson‟s 
Product Moment correlations were calculated to test both aspects of this hypothesis. As 
expected all correlations between age and accuracy, and age and bias were non-
significant with one qualification. There was one significant negative correlation 
between age and the Conscientiousness block accuracy score ( r (405) = -.10, p < .05), 
however, the effect size was small. The correlation suggests that as age increased 
accuracy for the Conscientiousness dimension decreased. 
4.14.3 Factorial Structure of Big Five Bias  
No hypothesis was formed in terms of the factorial structure of the personality 
bias scores. Nevertheless, preliminary examination of the correlations among the bias 
scores ascertained whether or not these scores were factorable. Table 4.13 presents these 
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correlations. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) value was .7, exceeded the recommended 
value of .6; Bartlett‟s test resulted in a value of 218.18, which was statistically 
significant; and the off-diagonal partial correlations of the anti-image matrix revealed 
mainly small values thus supporting the factorability of the correlation matrix 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). In addition, all measures of sampling adequacy exceeded 
the recommended value of .5 proposed by Tabachnick and Fidell (1996).  
Table 4.13 
Correlations among Personality Bias Scores (N = 405).  
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
Intellect Bias  1.00 0.26 0.33 0.19 0.29 
Conscientiousness bias 0.26 1.00 0.34 0.20 0.23 
Extraversion bias 0.33 0.34 1.00 0.21 0.35 
Agreeableness bias 0.19 0.20 0.21 1.00 0.24 
Emotional Stability bias  0.29 0.23 0.35 0.24 1.00 
Note.  All correlations significant at the .01 level. 
Table 4.14 
Summary of Exploratory Structural Analysis Results for Big Five Personality Bias 
Scores, Using Principal Axis Factoring (N = 405) 
Variable h2(b) F1a 
Extraversion bias .27 .52 
Emotional Stability bias .29 .45 
Agreeableness bias .14 .33 
Intellect Bias .27 .41 
Conscientiousness bias .25 .46 
Eigenvalues  2.07 
% of variance  41.32 
Note. h2(b) = Communalities  a  F1 = Big Five bias. 
A solution employing root one criterion produced one factor, which accounted 
for 41.32% of the total variance. Table 4.14 presented the pattern matrix, percent of 
variance accounted for, eigenvalue, and communalities for the one-factor solution. The 
factor was labelled Personality Bias as all Big Five bias scores loaded on it. This one-
factor solution suggests that the cognitive processes that underlie bias for each of the 
Big Five dimensions were the same. 
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4.15 Factorial Structure of Big Five Confidence and Big Five 
Subscale Scores 
The last hypothesis proposed that a six-factor solution would emerge from the 
structural analysis of all subscales from both the IPIP and IPIP Form B. Principal 
Components Analysis with oblique rotation was undertaken to test this hypothesis. The 
correlation matrix of these psychometric variables is presented in Table 4.15. 
The data from Table 4.15 were considered factorable as all assumptions as 
advocated by Coakes and Steed (1996) were met. Root one criterion produced a 5 factor 
solution. However Cattell‟s Scree plot provided support for a six-factor solution, and 
the sixth eigenvalue was .92 which was high enough to warrant the interpretation of a 
six-factor solution (Carroll, 1993) 
Table 4.15 
Correlations among IPIP and IPIP Form B Subscale Scores 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
INTELLIR 1.00                             
CONCIR 0.30** 1.00                           
EXTRAIR 0.46** 0.27** 1.00                         
AGREEIR 0.38** 0.41** 0.43** 1.00                       
EMOTIR 0.40** 0.27** 0.44** 0.38** 1.00                     
INTELLIC 0.54** 0.19** 0.28** 0.31** 0.25** 1.00                   
CONCIC 0.32** 0.28** 0.25** 0.31** 0.16** 0.70** 1.00                 
EXTRAIC 0.32** 0.16** 0.31** 0.28** 0.19** 0.76** 0.79** 1.00               
AGREEIC 0.32** 0.21** 0.28** 0.52** 0.25** 0.65** 0.74** 0.70** 1.00             
EMOTIC 0.29** 0.19** 0.24** 0.27** 0.23** 0.78** 0.74** 0.79** 0.68** 1.00           
IINTELL 0.68** 0.05 0.26** 0.19** 0.08 0.41** 0.24** 0.22** 0.23** 0.21** 1.00         
ICON 0.18** 0.72** 0.11* 0.27** 0.18** 0.16** 0.25** 0.11* 0.23** 0.16** 0.11* 1.00       
IEXTRA 0.36** 0.06 0.78** 0.28** 0.31** 0.22** 0.20** 0.25** 0.24** 0.20** 0.30** 0.08 1.00     
IAGREE 0.19** 0.16** 0.18** 0.58** 0.08 0.23** 0.24** 0.21** 0.43** 0.19** 0.26** 0.26** 0.26** 1.00   
IEMOT 0.29** 0.17** 0.31** 0.27** 0.77** 0.22** 0.18** 0.16** 0.23** 0.20** 0.06 0.25** 0.34** 0.14** 1.00 
* p < .05  ** p < .01 
Table 4.16 presents the pattern matrix, percent of variance accounted for, 
eigenvalues, and factor correlation matrix. The six-factor factor solution accounted for 
85.32% of the total variance.  The first factor was labelled Big Five Confidence and 
comprised loadings from all IPIP Form B confidence subscale scores. The second, third, 
fourth, fifth, and sixth factors were labelled Emotional Stability, Conscientiousness, 
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Intellect, Agreeableness, and Extraversion respectively. As anticipated, for each 
dimension, the last five factors all comprised loadings from the expected IPIP, and IPIP 
Form B subscale scores. There were low to moderate correlations among the factors. 
This six-factor solution was in accordance with expectations, and suggested that Big 
Confidence and Big Five ratings are separate but correlated processes. 
Table 4.16 
Pattern Matrix for all IPIP and IPIP Form B Subscale Scores, Using Principal 
Components Analysis with Oblique Rotation (N = 405) 
Variable h2(b) F1a F2c F3d F4e F5f F6g 
INTELLIR 0.86    .80   
CONCIR 0.89   .94    
EXTRAIR 0.91      -.92 
AGREEIR 0.76     -.70  
EMOTIR 0.90  .92     
INTELLIC 0.84 .79   .32   
CONCIC 0.82 .89      
EXTRAIC 0.86 .94      
AGREEIC 0.81 .74    -.36  
EMOTIC 0.83 .92      
IINTELL 0.88    .94   
ICON 0.82   .90    
IEXTRA 0.88      -.93 
IAGREE 0.86     -.94  
IEMOT 0.86  .94     
Eigenvalues  5.64 2.14 1.62 1.35 1.13 .92 
% of variance  37.62 14.30 10.78 8.98 7.53 6.11 
Factor Correlation Matrix 
 F1 F2   F3 F4 F5 F6  
F1 1.00       
F2 0.23 1.00      
F3 0.21 0.26 1.00     
F4 0.29 0.17 0.13 1.00    
F5 -0.28 -0.17 -0.25 -0.19 1.00   
F6 -0.25 -0.38 -0.14 -0.31 0.25 1.00  
Note.  h2(b) = Communalities  a  F1 = Big Five Confidence, cF2 = Emotional Stability, F3d  = Conscientiousness, F4e = Intellect, F5f = 
Agreeableness, F6g = Extraversion. The cut-off for suppression was .20. 
4.16 Discussion 
The present study investigated personality confidence judgments in more detail 
by obtaining both item-by-item and block personality confidence judgments. This area 
of investigation is important because people make many personality judgments in daily 
life. Previous calibration researchers, however, have not investigated whether 
individuals are biased when making personality judgments about themselves. Internal 
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consistency co-efficients for the item-by-item confidence ratings were high (i.e., >.90), 
attesting to the reliability of the confidence scores. These findings were consistent with 
the cognitive literature reported in Chapter 2, wherein cognitive confidence judgments 
have also demonstrated high internal consistency (e.g., Kleitman, 2003, 2008; Stankov 
& Kleitman, 2008). 
Study 2 explored various ways of determining personality accuracy. Three 
methods were developed. For each dimension the means and standard deviations for 
methods 2 and 3 were reasonably similar. There were significant correlations for each 
Big Five dimension, among all three methods. It is worthy of note, that within each Big 
Five domain, the highest correlations were between methods 2 and 3. Factor analysis of 
all Big Five accuracy scores obtained using three new methodologies, revealed a five-
factor solution, suggesting that accuracy was specific to a domain. Thus calculation of 
mean accuracy scores for each dimension was justified.  These methods were re-
employed in Study 3. For the rest of the discussion, it is important to note that item-
level accuracy scores refer to the mean accuracy scores for each Big Five dimension. 
The reliability estimates of the item-level accuracy scores for each Big Five 
dimension were encouraging. Nevertheless, these scores need to be viewed with caution 
until the replicability of these findings is demonstrated. Study 3 re-examined Big Five 
item-level accuracy scores with a different sample. Also promising, was the factorial 
structure of IPIP Form B was in accordance with expectations. This finding too requires 
replication and will be re-examined in Study 3.  
Results supported the hypothesis that one confidence factor exists with loadings 
from both the block and item-by-item confidence ratings. This outcome suggests that 
the cognitive processes that underlie both block and item-by-item confidence judgments 
are the same. This finding was consistent with the argument presented in the 
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introductory section of this chapter, that all Big Five confidence judgments have trait 
summaries in place because they come from the lexicon of daily life, and therefore 
follow abstraction processes. This finding needs to be replicated before tentative 
conclusions can be made. Study 3 will re-visit this issue. 
The next hypothesis reasoned that males and females would be equally confident 
when making personality judgments about themselves, both the block and the item-by-
item-level. As expected, males and females did not differ in terms of personality 
confidence. The results for the block confidence judgments replicate the findings from 
Study 1. The lack of gender differences for both block and item-level confidence 
judgments, was consistent with Hyde‟s (2005) gender similarities hypothesis, which 
states that males and females are more alike than they are different. The effect sizes 
found in the current study were also in the small and close-to-zero range which is 
consistent with Hyde‟s work. Gender differences in personality confidence judgments 
were-examined in Study 3, so that preliminary conclusions can be drawn from the data 
derived from three studies. 
It was hypothesised that individual differences in age would not be associated 
with Big Five confidence at either the block or the item-by-item level. This hypothesis 
was supported for the item-by-item confidence judgments but not for the block 
confidence scores. That is, for block confidence judgments of both Agreeableness and 
Conscientiousness, age was significantly positively correlated with these dimensions 
with rs of .11 and .10 respectively. The effect sizes however, were small.  
There were low correlations among the Big Five block accuracy scores, as 
expected. The lack of intercorrelations in Study 2 replicates the pattern found in Study 1, 
which used a different sample of participants and a different mode of testing. These 
results suggest that at the block level, personality accuracy needs to be measured for 
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each personality dimension, and that an overall Big Five accuracy score cannot be 
calculated. Nevertheless, to verify these findings further replication is required, and 
Study 3 therefore re-examined the intercorrelations between block level accuracy scores, 
so that conclusions can be drawn from the data derived from three studies. As was the 
case in Study 1, block level bias scores were not calculated. Similarly, correlations 
among the Big Five item-level accuracy scores were also low. It appears that at both the 
item and block levels, individuals who were accurate (consistent) for one trait were not 
necessarily accurate (consistent) across other Big Five traits.  
The hypothesis that individuals would be well-calibrated when making 
personality judgments about the Big Five domains, because these traits are likely to 
have high ecological validity, was supported. The absolute value of the bias scores for 
each Big Five domain was close to five suggesting good calibration. The results for the 
bias scores was consistent with Gigerenzer et al.‟s (1991) Ecological theory, which 
posits that individuals are well-calibrated to their natural environments. Item-level bias 
scores were re-examined in Study 3. 
The hypothesis that males and females would not differ in terms of personality 
accuracy at either the block level or item-by-item level, was supported. The findings for 
the block judgments replicate the results from Study 1. The overall findings were 
consistent with the gender similarities hypothesis as advocated by Hyde (2005). These 
findings, however, need further replication before conclusions can be drawn, and were 
therefore re-examined in Study 3.  
Individual differences in age were not expected to be associated with Big Five 
accuracy at either the block level or the item-by-item level. This hypothesis was 
supported, with the qualification that age was negatively associated with block 
Conscientiousness accuracy (r  = .10). Nevertheless, the effect size was small. 
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The hypothesis that individual differences in age would not be associated with 
item-level bias was supported. The overall findings for age are largely consistent with 
the Five Factor theory of personality (McCrae & Costa, 1999), which posits that 
personality traits develop during childhood and adolescence and then remain stable in 
adulthood. It appears that Big Five accuracy, confidence and bias remains constant too. 
Taken as a whole, the findings for age also fit well with PMM theory (Gigerenzer et al., 
1991) which argues that people are be well calibrated to their natural ecology, therefore 
age differences were not expected. It was therefore argued in Studies 1 and 2 that 
confidence also remains stable in adulthood, and consequently age does not correlate 
with Big Five confidence, accuracy or bias scores. It is also interesting to note that the 
small but significant positive correlation between age and Intellect confidence found in 
Study 1 does not emerge from the data in Study 2. Age differences in personality 
confidence were be examined again in Study 3. 
Although the factorial structure of Big Five bias scores was examined in the 
current study, no hypothesis was formulated. Results showed that one Personality bias 
factor emerges from the structural analysis of the five item-level bias scores. This one-
factor solution suggests that the cognitive processes that underlie bias for each of the 
Big Five dimensions are the same. The factorial structure of item-level Big Five bias 
scores was re-examined in Study3. The one-factor solution for the Big Five item-level 
bias scores is concordant with previous research from the cognitive domain which 
shows that if individuals are miscalibrated in one domain then they are also 
miscalibrated across other domains (Pallier et al., 2002; Stankov, 1998, 1999a). The 
question that remains unanswered is whether personality bias shares variance with 
cognitive bias. Study 3 examined the factorial structure of personality and cognitive bias 
scores. 
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A six-factor solution was expected from the structural analyses of all the IPIP 
and IPIP Form B Big Five subscale scores (i.e., adjective ratings and confidence scores). 
This hypothesis was supported and suggests that Big Confidence and Big Five ratings, 
are separate but correlated processes. This six-factor solution also provides evidence 
that confidence is related to, but is distinct from personality which is in agreement with 
research in the cognitive domain which has demonstrated that the confidence trait is on 
the borderline between cognitive abilities and personality (Baker, 2001; Kleitman & 
Stankov, 2001, 2007; Pallier et al., 2002; Stankov, 1998, 1999a, 2000a; Stankov & 
Crawford, 1996a, 1997; Stankov & Lee, 2008). This result requires replication and was 
re-examined in Study 3. 
One of the shortcomings of this study was that it examined the impact of a 
limited number of individual differences variables (i.e., age and gender) on Big Five 
confidence, accuracy, and bias. It is important that research continues to investigate 
other individual differences variables that may influence confidence, accuracy and bias 
in the Big Five domain. Study 3 extended this investigation by examining the 
relationships between personality confidence and (a) affect, (b) private self-
conscientiousness and (c) need for cognition. The rationale for including these variables 
is left until Study 3.  
Another limitation of this study was that due to technical restrictions, the ordinal 
position of the measures could not be randomised across participants. Consequently, the 
block ratings for each Big Five dimension were made after the item-level ratings for that 
dimension had been made. Practice effects may have influenced the results. In an 
attempt to overcome this limitation, in Study 3, the order of presentation of the IPIP, 
and the other Big Five block and item-level measures, changed.  
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In summary, Study 2 aimed to examine the personality confidence ratings in 
more detail and develop methods by which mean accuracy scores can be calculated for 
each of the Big Five dimensions. In brief, findings suggest that individuals in the 
current sample used the same cognitive processes when making both block and item-
level confidence ratings about their personality.  This conclusion needs to be viewed 
with caution until the factorial structure of block and item-by-item Big Five confidence 
is re-examined in Study 3. Individuals in Study 2 were also well calibrated for each of 
the Big Five dimension. Mean accuracy scores were high and the reliability of these 
scores was encouraging. Also, a number of other findings require replication before 
preliminary conclusions can be drawn and Study 3 re-examined this. Nevertheless, at 
this stage, it appears that neither age nor gender influence personality accuracy, 
confidence, or bias. For the block confidence ratings in particular, data from Studies 1 
and 2 do provide some evidence in favour of this tentative conclusion. The finding that 
Big Five bias scores load onto one factor suggests that the same cognitive processes 
underlie these scores. Study 3 re-examined the factorial structure of Big Five bias scores 
so that conclusions can be drawn from two studies. However, a major question that 
remains unclear is whether Big Five bias is related to cognitive bias. This particular 
issue was examined in Study 3, wherein participants provided confidence ratings at both 
the item-by-item, and block levels, across both the personality and cognitive domains.  
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 Chapter 5 - Study 3 
5.1 Introduction 
Study 3 builds on Studies 1 and 2, and aimed to (a) examine bias (item and 
PTPE) with Gf tasks; (b) investigate whether individual differences in age, gender, 
ability, personality, need for cognition, and negative affect, influence cognitive 
confidence scores; (c) confirm previous findings from Studies 1 and 2 for Big Five 
confidence, accuracy and bias judgments; and (d) examine both the discriminant and 
convergent validity of Big Five confidence scores in relation to self-focussed attention, 
affect, and need for cognition. 
Following this, Study 3 investigated the factorial structure of both personality 
confidence scores and cognitive confidence scores. Additional confidence ratings were 
taken from a measure of self-report abilities and were factor analysed with the Big Five 
and Gf confidence measures. Finally, the factorial structure of both cognitive bias scores 
and Big Five bias scores were examined. 
5.2 Cognitive Calibration and Confidence on Gf Tasks 
5.2.1 Bias in Relation to Gf Tasks 
Conflicting findings have resulted from calibration research that uses reasoning 
tasks to examine bias (i.e., Esoteric Analogies and Letter Series), with some studies 
demonstrating good calibration (Crawford & Stankov, 1996; Kleitman, 2003) and 
others demonstrating overconfidence (Pallier, 2003; Stankov, 2000a). In Study 1, the 
Esoteric Analogies task demonstrated overconfidence and loaded with Gc tasks rather 
than Gf tasks. This Esoteric Analogies task can load onto either Gf or Gc factors, 
depending on the composition of tasks used in the test battery. For Study 3, three 
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reasoning tasks (Esoteric Analogies, Letter Series, and Word Association) were selected. 
Because the findings from pervious research are conflicting, no specific hypotheses 
were formulated for the item-level bias scores. These scores, however, were examined 
and reported, along with their calibration curves and item-specific scatterplots. For the 
post-test performance estimate (PTPE see Chapter 2) bias scores , previous research 
most often demonstrates better calibration with the PTPE bias scores than with item-
level bias scores (Kleitman & Stankov, 2001; Stankov, 2000a; Stankov & Crawford, 
1996a, 1996b, 1997). This same pattern was expected in Study 3. 
Stankov and his collaborators (Pallier et al., 2002; Stankov, 1998, 1999a) factor 
analysed bias scores obtained from various combinations of Gc, Gf, and Gv tasks, and 
found that the bias scores loaded onto one factor. These results indicated that mis-
calibration across a diverse range of abilities and perceptual tasks were driven by the 
same cognitive processes. In view of these findings, a single bias factor was expected to 
emerge from factor analysing the item-level bias scores obtained from the Gf tasks used 
in the current study.  
Study 3 also investigated whether individual differences in age, gender, ability 
and personality influenced cognitive confidence and bias. As the rationale for these 
analyses was presented in Study 1, it is not repeated here. Hypotheses two to five in 
section 5.9 detail the expectations. 
5.2.2 Factorial Structure of Item-Level Cognitive Confidence Ratings 
and Confidence Ratings Obtained in Relation to PTPEs 
Previous researchers have argued that item-level confidence ratings initiate the 
meta-cognitive process of self-monitoring, and have obtained these ratings as 
individuals work through the items of a cognitive task (e.g., Kleitman & Stankov, 2007; 
Stankov, 1999b). However the literature also points to the distinction between the meta-
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cognitive processes of self-monitoring (i.e., item-by-item confidence judgments) and 
self-evaluation (Schraw & Moshman, 1995). The evaluative aspect of meta-cognition is 
measured after the completion of each test, when participants estimate the percentage of 
items they have solved correctly (i.e., post-test performance estimate or PTPE). A bias 
score similar to an item-level bias score can also be obtained using the PTPE score 
(Stankov & Crawford, 1996b). This is achieved by subtracting the actual mean 
percentage of correct responses from the estimated percentage of correct responses. 
Previous researchers, however, have not yet asked participants the question, 
“How confident are you that your percentage estimate is correct?”.  Study 3 explored 
this new territory by obtaining confidence ratings in relation to post-test performance 
estimates. Some researchers may well argue that the PTPE estimate itself is a 
confidence type rating, but Kleitman and Stankov (2001) demonstrated that PTPE 
scores for the tasks used in their study (Geography, Line Length, an Raven‟s 
Progressive Matrices), did not load onto a separate item-level confidence factor. Rather, 
these scores defined factors which also had high loadings from accuracy, speed and 
expectancy measures. An expectancy measure was defined as a pre-test performance 
estimate (i.e., what percentage of items do you expect to answer correctly). As PTPE 
estimates did not load with item-level confidence, they concluded that self-monitoring 
and evaluation were distinct factorially, and that evaluation was not distinct from 
accuracy measures. Consequently, for the purposes of Study 3, the PTPE was simply an 
estimate, used to take the current research further than previous research studies had 
gone, by taking a confidence rating in that estimate. Two assumptions were made; that  
confidence judgments initiate self-monitoring, and that confidence in relation to the 
PTPE represents a construct similar to the evaluative aspect of meta-cognition as 
operationalised by Schraw and Dennison (1994, see section 2.2). The question remains, 
 Cognitive and Personality Confidence 153 
 
are confidence judgments made in relation to post-test performance estimates driven by 
the same cognitive processes as the item-level confidence ratings? Two correlated 
factors were expected to emerge from the structural analyses of item-level and PTPE 
confidence scores because; these measures could theoretically represent the two aspects 
of meta-cognition- self-monitoring and self-evaluation. Because the factorial structure 
of Big Five and cognitive confidence scores were examined (see Section 5.6 for the 
rationale) in Study 3, obtaining an evaluative cognitive confidence measure was 
important. 
5.3 Other Individual Differences in Cognition  
5.3.1 Need for Cognition in Cognition: Gf Tasks 
A paucity of research has examined whether individual differences in need for 
cognition (NFC) influence cognitive confidence and mis-calibration. Wolfe and Grosch 
(1990) found significant positive correlations between NFC and confidence ratings on 
both an information task (r= .25, p < .01) and a person prediction task (r = .25, p < .01). 
Jonsson and Allwood (2003) found that NFC was also significantly positively related to 
confidence ratings for both a word knowledge task (r = .46, p < .01) and a logical 
spatial ability task (r = .47, p < .01). Regarding mis-calibration, however, NFC was not 
correlated with bias scores. More recently, Blais, Thompson, & Baranski, (2005) 
investigated whether cognitive styles (i.e., NFC, Personal Need for Structure, and 
Personal Fear of Invalidity) accounted for individual differences in both cognitive 
confidence and mis-calibration on a general knowledge task, a vocabulary task and a 
perceptual task. Their results indicated that NFC did not significantly influence 
confidence or mis-calibration. None of the studies used Gf tasks, however, so for Gf 
tasks, the role of NFC in cognitive confidence and mis-calibration remains unexplored. 
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The findings that were very relevant to Study 3 are that high NFC individuals scored 
higher on tasks of verbal reasoning (Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & Rodriguez, 1986),  
endorsed themselves as being more effective problem solvers (Heppner, Reeder, & 
Larson, 1983), processed information with greater efficiency, and devoted greater effort 
in decision making tasks, which in turn has led to greater accuracy (Levin, Huneke, & 
Jasper, 2000) than their low NFC counterparts. Therefore, in view of the findings by 
Cacioppo et al. (1986) and Levin, Huneke, and Jasper (2000), it was assumed that 
confidence in the accuracy of self-assessment would also increase. For these reasons 
NFC was expected to be positively associated with Gf confidence. 
5.3.2 Negative Affect in Cognition: Gf Tasks 
Few studies have investigated the impact of negative affect (NA) with regard to 
confidence in the accuracy of self-assessment. Using Levin and Stokes‟s Negative 
Affectivity scale, Wolfe and Grosch (1990), found significant negative correlations 
between negative affect and confidence on both a factual information task (r = -.16, p 
< .05) and a writing discrimination task (r  = -.16, p  < .05). Moreover, these 
correlations remained significant even when the effects of accuracy were partialled out. 
Conversely, for general knowledge questions, Allwood and Bjorhag (1991) did not find 
associations between depressed mood and either confidence or mis-calibration. More 
recently, also for general knowledge questions, Allwood, Granhag, and Jonsson (2002), 
used music and film to create a happy mood for half their participants, and a sad mood 
for the rest, to investigate the impact of mood on cognitive confidence and mis-
calibration. Allwood et al. successfully induced a happy mood but not a sad one, 
therefore the influence of sad mood in relation to cognitive confidence and mis-
calibration went unanswered. However, positive affect (PA) did not influence cognitive 
confidence or bias scores. Because the effect of NA on cognitive confidence remains 
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uncertain, it was examined in Study 3. For the Gf tasks, used in the current study, NA 
was expected to be negatively associated with cognitive confidence scores. However, 
there was no reason to speculate that positive affect (PA) shares variance with cognitive 
confidence and bias measures. Therefore, PA will not be discussed further. 
5.4 Replication Analyses in Relation to Personality 
Study 3 investigated the factorial structure of Big Five confidence judgments 
(both item and block-levels), and also whether individual differences in gender, and age 
influenced Big Five confidence, accuracy and bias. Because the rationale for these 
analyses was presented in Study 2, it was not restated here. Hypotheses 8 to 17 in 
section 5.10 clarify the expectations for Study 3. 
5.5 Validity Checks of Big Five Confidence Judgments 
The discriminant validity of Big Five confidence judgments is discussed below 
in relation to the conceptually distinct constructs of self-focussed attention (PrSc) and 
NA. The convergent validity of Big Five confidence judgments is then explored in 
regard to the potentially related constructs of PA and NFC. 
5.5.1 Self-Focussed Attention in Relation to Personality 
Chapter 4 presented the argument that personality confidence judgments follow 
abstraction processes, and that individuals would not undertake a serial search of 
episodic memory for the Big Five personality dimensions because these traits have high 
ecological validity. The abstraction view-point implies that individuals do not 
constantly focus their attention inwardly when making Big Five personality confidence 
judgments about themselves. It follows then that, confidence in rating one‟s personality 
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traits would not be associated with self-focussed attention, labelled as private self-
consciousness by Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss (1975).  
5.5.2 Negative Affect in Relation to Personality 
Negative affect (NA) is defined as a mood-dispositional dimension that 
encompasses a range negative mood states including apprehension, anger, derision, 
disgust and guilt (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Conceptually, it is reasonable to 
assume that confidence in Big Five judgments is distinct from this negative mood state. 
It was therefore expected that Big Five confidence scores would not be associated with 
NA. 
5.5.3 Positive Affect in Relation to Personality 
Watson et al. (1988) argued that at the factorial level, NA and positive affect 
(PA) represent two orthogonal factors of affective structure. Trait PA was defined as the 
degree to which an individual reflects enthusiasm, high energy and concentration 
(Watson et al., 1988), with high PA reflecting positive characteristics like joy and self-
confidence (Fromson, 2006; Watson et al., 1988). The fact that self-confidence has been 
identified as one aspect of PA, led to speculation about the relationship between trait PA 
and personality confidence judgements. The associations between PA and Big Five 
confidence scores were subsequently investigated, and anticipated to be positive.  
5.5.4 Need for Cognition in Relation to Personality 
Individuals who are high in NFC actively seek and enjoy cognitive activities that 
are challenging (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). 
High NFC individuals have been called chronic cognizers whereas, their low NFC 
counterparts have been labelled as cognitive misers (see Cacioppo et al., 1996, for a 
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review). Of interest is that the construct definition of NFC sounds similar to that of the 
Big Five Intellect dimension. Individuals high on this dimension are characterized by 
terms such as curious, creative, innovative, and inquisitive (Hampson, Goldberg, Vogt, 
& Dubanoski, 2006), and by the readiness to consider new information (Sadowski & 
Cogburn, 1997). The research by Sadowski and Cogburn investigated the relationship 
between NFC and Openness to Experience (Intellect) and found that there was a 
significant positive correlation (r = .50) between these two variables. Thus people who 
are high on NFC may be likely to be more confident for this dimension. Positive 
associations between NFC and Intellect confidence at both the block and item levels 
were therefore expected. 
The prospect that NFC is positively associated with Conscientiousness 
confidence was also feasible. Conscientiousness is measured by adjectives such as 
hardworking, organised and task oriented (Hampson et al., 2006; Sadowski & Cogburn, 
1997) which also sounds similar to the construct definition of the NFC. A short form of 
the NFC scale for use with Australians was selected for the current study (Forsterlee & 
Ho, 1999).  
5.6 Factorial Structure of Personality and Gf Confidence Scores 
In Study 1, Big Five block confidence ratings and item-level cognitive 
confidence ratings obtained across a diverse range of cognitive tasks, defined separate 
factors that were not significantly correlated (r = .05). The factorial structure of item-
level cognitive and Big Five confidence ratings were re-examined in Study 3. Two 
confidence factors were expected to emerge from the structural analyses of confidence 
scores obtained from the Gf and Big Five confidence measures. This expectation was 
developed with reference to Self-Concept theory (Marsh, 2008; Shavelson et al., 1976); 
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PMM theory (Gigerenzer et al., 1991), and the results from Study 1 (see section 3.5 for 
the rationale). 
A question that remains unexplored is whether Big Five confidence shares 
variance with confidence ratings made in relation to PTPEs within the cognitive domain. 
At the theoretical level, item-level confidence judgments within the cognitive domain 
have been argued to initiate self-monitoring whereas a novel aspect of this study was to 
obtain a confidence rating in relation to the PTPE score. In other words, individuals 
considered how confident they were that their post-test estimate was accurate. Section 
5.2.2 explained the PTPE has been operationalised as the evaluative aspect of meta-
cognition; therefore a confidence rating in that estimate is more evaluative again. 
Assuming then, that trait summaries in semantic memory are also evaluative, it is 
possible that a confidence rating in the PTPE shares more variance with Big Five 
confidence. That is, trait summaries are the product of numerous self-evaluations, and 
others‟ evaluations of one‟s personality, that have developed over childhood and 
adolescence, and have remained reasonably stable over the life-span. If these 
assumptions are true, three factors would emerge from the structural analyses of the Big 
Five and Gf confidence scores. That is, a Big Five confidence factor defined by the 
block and item-level Big Five confidence ratings, a Gf item-level self-monitoring 
confidence factor defined by the item-by-item Gf confidence ratings, and a Gf self-
evaluative confidence factor defined by the three confidence ratings made in relation to 
the PTPEs. 
In addition to obtaining confidence scores from objective cognitive tasks, 
confidence ratings were taken from a measure of self-report abilities. This was done in 
order to investigate whether these scores shared variance with either objective or 
personality confidence ratings, or with both. 
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5.7 Self-report Intelligence/Abilities Confidence and Personality 
Confidence Ratings 
The results from Study 1 showed that when cognitive and personality confidence 
scores were factor analysed, there was a lack of correlation (r = .05) between the 
personality confidence and the cognitive confidence factors. One possible explanation 
for this lack of correlation posited was that cognitive confidence judgments were made 
with reference to tests of maximal performance, whereas personality confidence 
judgments were elicited from measures of typical performance. It may be that, if 
participants were given a self-report measure of their general intelligence/abilities that 
also elicited confidence ratings for those abilities, then cognitive self-report confidence 
might share variance with personality confidence. This possibility was investigated in 
the current study. 
To date researchers have not examined whether confidence ratings from a 
measure of self-report general intelligence (abilities), uses the same cognitive processes 
as those employed when making personality confidence judgments. Confidence in 
rating self-beliefs about one‟s general abilities could well share variance with 
personality confidence because participants would be asked to rate how they typically 
are in the abilities domain where confidence ratings would not be tied to objective 
performance. It is surmised that individuals could engage in a similar process to that 
which has been argued in relation to personality confidence judgments. That is, it was 
argued in Chapter 4 that individuals would make their personality confidence ratings 
from a store within semantic memory that contains a delimited number of trait 
generalizations (please refer to abstraction theory in section 4.2). To this end a measure 
of general abilities was chosen and adapted for the purposes of the current study. 
Confidence ratings for items such as “I am intelligent” and “I have a good vocabulary” 
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could feasibly also reside in a store within semantic memory which contains an 
individual‟s self-beliefs about how one typically is ability-wise. It is for this reason that 
it was expected that the cognitive processes underlying confidence judgments about 
self-report abilities, would differ from those used to make confidence judgments about 
cognitive test items. If this is true, then self-report confidence in general abilities can be 
expected to share more variance with personality confidence judgments than with 
objective cognitive confidence scores. It was also expected to load onto the personality 
confidence factor when all of the Big Five (i.e., item and block), cognitive, and self-
report general intelligence confidence scores were factor analysed in Study 3. 
5.8 Factorial Structure of Cognitive and Personality Bias Scores 
The unanswered question is whether Big Five bias shares variance with 
cognitive bias. If one considers PMM theory (Gigerenzer et al., 1991), bias across the 
personality and cognitive domains should not be highly correlated because the cues 
used to respond to cognitive tasks would differ from those used to respond to 
personality items. Moreover, considering self-concept theory (see Chapter 2), and 
assuming that bias in cognitive and personality judgments separate across both the 
abilities and personality (non-ability) domains, it is reasonable to expect that personality 
and cognitive bias scores would define two separate factors. Investigating whether at the 
factorial level, personality bias splits from cognitive bias, has important implications for 
calibration theorists trying to understand self-monitoring, yet this topic has not been 
examined previously. 
5.9  Hypotheses in Relation to Cognition 
The hypotheses for the Gf tasks are summarised as follows: 
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1. It was hypothesised that PTPE bias scores would demonstrate better calibration than 
item level bias scores. This hypothesis was formulated from previous research 
findings (Kleitman & Stankov, 2001; Stankov, 2000a; Stankov & Crawford, 1996a, 
1996b, 1997). 
2. It was hypothesised that age would be positively related to Gf item-level bias scores. 
Calibration studies that demonstrated small but significant positive correlations 
between age and bias scores obtained from Gf, Gc, and Gv tasks (Crawford & 
Stankov, 1996; Pallier, 2003), and from the results obtained in Study 1 which 
showed a positive association between age and Gf bias scores, underpinned this 
hypothesis 
3. It was hypothesised that males would be more confident than females for all three 
Gf tasks used in the current study. The basis for this hypothesis came from previous 
research, which indicated that for cognitive tasks, males have demonstrated 
significantly higher levels of confidence than females (Pallier, 2003; Pulford & 
Colman, 1997; Ross & Fogarty, 2006; Stankov, 1998). 
4. For the Gf tasks, it was hypothesised that low scorers (i.e., in the bottom quartile) 
would be more mis-calibrated than high scorers (i.e., top quartile). The rationale for 
this hypothesis was based on previous research, which demonstrated that those of 
lower ability have some difficulty in accurately appraising their cognitive abilities 
compared with those of higher ability (Dunning et al., 2003; Kruger & Dunning, 
1999; Maki et al., 1994; Moreland et al., 1981; Shaughnessy, 1979) and also on 
findings from Study 1. 
5. Based on the results by Schaefer et al (2004) it was hypothesised that, after 
controlling for the influence of the other four personality dimensions, that: 
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5.1. Openness/Intellect scores would be significantly related to Gf confidence 
scores. 
5.2. Extraversion would be associated with Gf confidence and bias scores. 
5.3. Conscientiousness would be significantly related to confidence scores. 
6. Based on the findings by Wolfe and Grosch (1990) coupled with the research that 
showed that individuals high on NFC were more accurate (Levin et al., 2000), it was 
expected that confidence in the accuracy of self-assessment would also increase. It 
was hypothesised that NFC would be positively associated with Gf confidence 
scores. 
5.10 Replication Hypotheses in Relation to Personality 
The replication hypotheses based on findings from Studies 1 and 2 in relation to 
Big Five confidence, accuracy and bias scores, are summarised as follows: 
7. One confidence factor would emerge from factor analysing the item-by-item and 
block confidence judgments obtained from the Big Five personality dimensions. 
8. Males and females would not differ in terms of Big Five accuracy judgments 
obtained from either the item-level method or the block description method. 
9. Males and females would not differ in terms of Big Five confidence judgments 
obtained from either the item-level method or the block description method. 
10. Males and females would not differ in terms of Big Five bias. 
11. Age would not be associated with Big Five confidence scores obtained from either 
the item-level method or the block description method. 
12. Age would not be associated with Big Five accuracy scores obtained from either the 
item-level method or the block description method. 
13. Age would not be associated with Big Five bias. 
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14. The associations among the Big Five block description accuracy scores and item- 
level accuracy scores would be low. 
15. Good calibration was expected for the Big Five item-level bias scores. 
16. Based on previous research, the results from Study 2, and the claim that confidence 
is a distinct trait that is related to personality, it was hypothesised that six factors 
would emerge from the structural analyses of the Big Five confidence and Big Five 
subscale scores from the IPIP and IPIP Form B. 
5.11 New Hypotheses: Study 3 in Relation to Personality 
In order to achieve the other aims of Study 3 the following hypotheses were 
tested: 
17. As the abstraction view-point implies that individuals do not constantly focus their 
attention inwardly when making Big Five personality confidence judgments about 
themselves it was hypothesised that confidence in rating one‟s personality traits 
would not be associated with PrSc at either the block description level or item level. 
18.  As NA is defined as subjective distress it was hypothesised that trait NA would not 
be associated with Big Five confidence at either the block description level or item-
level. 
19. Because high PA reflects positive characteristics such as joy, enthusiasm, interest, 
and self-confidence (Fromson, 2006; Watson et al., 1988), and self-confidence has 
been identified as one aspect of PA, it was hypothesised that positive associations 
would emerge between PA and Big Five confidence scores. 
20. High NFC individuals are defined as actively seeking and enjoying cognitive 
activities that are challenging (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo et al., 1996), 
characteristics that share striking similarities with the Big Five dimensions of both 
Intellect and Conscientiousness. Previous research has indeed demonstrated that 
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NFC was moderately correlated with both Intellect and Conscientiousness 
(Sadowski & Cogburn, 1997). It can be expected then people who are high on NFC 
will also be more confident for both these dimensions at both the block description 
level and the item-level.  
5.12 New Hypotheses Study 3 in Cognition and Personality 
21. It was hypothesised that three confidence factors would emerge from the structural 
analyses of the confidence scores obtained from factor analysing Big Five (item and 
block), Gf item-level, and Gf evaluative confidence measures. This hypothesis was 
developed with reference to Self-Concept theory (Marsh, 2008; Shavelson et al., 
1976), Gigerenzer‟s (1991) PMM theory, and abstraction theory within the memory 
domain (e.g., Buss & Craik, 1983; Klein, 2004; Klein & Loftus, 1993b; Klein, 
Loftus, Trafton et al., 1992). 
22. Based on abstraction theory within the memory domain (e.g., Buss & Craik, 1983; 
Klein, 2004; Klein & Loftus, 1993b; Klein, Loftus, Trafton et al., 1992), cognitive 
processes that underlie confidence judgments on self-report abilities were expected 
to differ from those used to make confidence judgments about cognitive test items. 
This is because individuals are likely to have summaries about their abilities stored 
in semantic memory. It was hypothesised that, after all of the Big Five (i.e., item 
and block) and Gf confidence scores were factor analysed that the self-report 
intelligence confidence score would load on the personality confidence factor. 
23. Based on Self-Concept theory (Marsh, 2008; Shavelson et al., 1976) and 
Gigerenzer‟s (1991) PMM theory, it was hypothesised that two factors would 
emerge from the structural analyses of the item-level cognitive bias scores and the 
item-level Big Five bias scores. 
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5.13 Method 
5.13.1 Participants 
Two hundred and forty three individuals participated in this study. The sample 
comprised males (n = 61) and females (n = 182), ranging in age from 17 to 62 years 
(M= 29.04 years, SD = 9.80 years). The mean age of the males was 27.70 years (SD = 
8.45 years). The mean age for females was 29.46 (SD = 10.21 years). 
The highest educational level of the sample varied from completion of grade 10, 
11, or 12 (n = 32), to completion of tertiary studies (n = 42). The rest of the sample 
comprised undergraduate students. Two participants did not respond to this question. 
Due to various difficulties involved in recruiting participants, emails were sent to all 
faculty heads at the University of Southern Queensland, asking permission to send out 
global emails to students in their courses via their respective distribution lists. Snowball 
sampling techniques were also employed. Participants enrolled in undergraduate 
Psychology courses at the University of Southern Queensland received course credit for 
their participation. Other participants received the opportunity to enter a raffle for cash 
prizes in return for taking the time to complete the study. 
5.13.2 Materials 
Demographic questions consisted of items regarding gender, age, and highest 
level of education. All participants completed a computerised battery of three cognitive 
tasks and a number of self-report inventories. Each measure is described below. 
Cognitive Tests: For each cognitive test participants provided an answer to 
every trial, as well as a confidence rating indicating how confident they were that the 
answer provided was correct. For the open ended Letter Series and Word Association 
tests, confidence ranged from 0% (Just guessing) to 100% (Absolutely certain). For the 
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multiple choice Esoteric Analogies test, the starting point on the confidence scale was 
100/k, where k = the number of response alternatives. At the end of each cognitive test 
described below, participants were presented with the following instructions: 
At the end of the test, please provide an estimate of the percentage of items you 
think you answered correctly. It is IMPORTANT that you provide this estimate 
IMMEDIATELY after completing the test. After providing your percentage 
estimate, I want you click on how confident you are that your percentage 
estimate is correct using the confidence scale that appears on the screen. 
The confidence scale for the PTPE estimate ranged from 0% (Just guessing) to 
100% (Absolutely certain) using increments of ten percentage points. 
Letter Series Test (LST) - (Stankov, 1997). See study 1 for details. 
Esoteric Analogies Test (EST) - (Stankov, 1997). Details are the same as 
reported in Study 1. 
Word Association test (WAT) - (Stankov, 1997). Participants were presented 
with a two-word stimulus (e.g., “number” and “nobility”) and were asked to provide 
one word that was associated with both stimulus words. In the example of number and 
nobility, a correct answer would be count. Participants responded to 10 trials within a 
time limit of four minutes (see Appendix O). 
IPIP based measures: The test battery comprised IPIP, IPIP-Form B, and the 
BFBD. IPIP Form A (see below) was the measure used in the data analyses for the item-
level accuracy methods and, was formed from participants‟ responses to the IPIP. Prior 
to developing IPIP Form A, the factorial structure of the IPIP was examined (see 
results) and reliability estimates were consulted for each of the IPIP subscales. Because 
the IPIP Form A was used as the criterion against which the accuracy scores were 
measured, its factorial structure was also examined. Due to the constraints imposed by 
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word limits, these results, which were in accordance with expectations, were not 
reported.  
The International Personality Item Pool Five-Factor Personality Scale 
(IPIP) - (Goldberg, 1997). See Study 1 for a detailed description. The IPIP was the 
criterion for accuracy for the BFBD. 
Big Five Block Descriptions of Personality (BFBD) Based on the Trait 
Adjectives - (Goldberg, 1999). Refer to Study 1 for further detail. 
Item-by-Item Big Five Self-Rated Personality Descriptions (IPIP Form B) 
Based on the Trait Adjectives - (Goldberg, 1997). Study 2 provides all relevant 
details. 
Shortened version of the IPIP Scale based on the Trait Adjectives (IPIP 
Form A) - Goldberg (1997). See Study 2 for details. 
Other self-report measures: 
Private Self-Consciousness scale (PrSC) - (Fenigstein et al., 1975). The scale 
consists of eight items measuring individual differences in self-focused attention (e.g., 
“I‟m generally attentive to my inner feelings”). Participants rated themselves on a 5-
point scale from 0 (extremely uncharacteristic) to 4 (extremely characteristic). The 
original scale by Fenigstein et al. comprised 10 items, however, subsequent research 
demonstrated that items 3 and 9 were unreliable, and therefore were not used in the 
current research (e.g., see Burnkrant & Page, 1984). Burnkrant and Page (1984) 
reported acceptable internal consistency for the shortened version (α = .75). Scores can 
range from 0 to 32 with higher scores indicating higher levels of private self-
consciousness. The PrSC scale is presented in Appendix P. 
The Need for Cognition Scale short version (NFC) – (Cacioppo, Petty, & 
Kao, 1984). The 18 item short version measures individual differences in the “tendency 
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to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive endeavours” (Cacioppo et al., 1984, p. 306). 
For example, “I would prefer complex to simple problems”. Participants rated each item 
on a 5-point Likert-type scale that ranged from -2 (Very strong disagreement) to 2 
(Very strong agreement). Scores could potentially range from -36 to + 36 with higher 
scores indicative of a greater level of NFC. Acceptable internal consistency co-efficients 
(α = .81) have been reported in the research literature (e.g., Forsterlee & Ho, 1999) 
when the short form was used with an Australian sample. The need for cognition scale 
is presented in Appendix Q. 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) - (Watson et al., 1988). This 
20 item scale measures individual differences in positive and negative affect. Each 
subscale comprised 10 items (e.g., “inspired”), and respondents rated each item on a 5-
point scale from 1 (Very slightly or not at all) to 5 (Extremely). Varying time-frames 
can be specified for the instructions of the PANAS, in Study 3, respondents rated each 
emotion in terms of how they generally feel. Scores for each subscale can potentially 
range from 10 to 50. The PANAS is a psychometrically reliable and valid measure of 
affect with research reporting internal consistency coefficients of at least 0.85 (e.g., 
Fogarty et al., 1999). The PANAS is presented in Appendix R. 
Self-report Intelligence and Confidence Questionnaire (SICQ): The SICQ is 
a 10 item scale adapted from the Self-report Intelligence Questionnaire (SRIQ) of 
Gignac, Stough, and Loukomitis (2004). All of the items in Gignac et al‟s scale were 
retained. One extra item (“I am good at being able to perceive patterns in a series of 
numbers or letters”) was included because the Letter Series test in the current study 
required participants to perceive the pattern in each string of letters (e.g., A, D, G, J, ?), 
then provide the next letter in the series. In addition, to fulfil one of the aims of the 
current study, which was to investigate the relationship between self-report cognitive 
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confidence (SICQ) and objective cognitive confidence (i.e., confidence ratings obtained 
from the LST, EAT, and WAT tests), the instructions and rating scales of the SRIQ 
were changed, and confidence ratings were added. SICQ is presented in Appendix S. 
5.13.3 Procedure 
Participants were recruited via PESUD (see method section study 2). Again, all 
data were submitted electronically and collected by the Psychology technical team, who 
then forwarded the completed data set for data screening. Informed consent was 
obtained at the beginning of the testing session when participants read the electronic 
consent form and were asked to type in a unique identifying number indicating that they 
understood that their data would be used for research purposes (see Appendix T for 
covering page for Study 3). Respondents were informed that they could withdraw from 
the study at any time without any penalty and were assured of confidentiality and 
anonymity. For the cognitive tasks described above, participants were able to skip items 
they were unsure of within each test by clicking the next button, and returned to missed 
questions if time limits allowed. The rest of the test battery, however, required an 
answer to be provided for each test item before respondents were able to progress to the 
next question. The battery took approximately two hours to complete. 
Due to programming restrictions it was not possible to randomise the order in 
which the measures were presented. Therefore, the test battery was administered in the 
following order:  
1. Letter Series Test –LST  (15 items) 
2. Word Association Test-WAT (10 items) 
3. Esoteric Analogies Test-EAT (24 items) 
4. Block Conscientiousness judgment (BFBD-C) 
5. Item-by-item Intellect judgments (IPIP Form B subscale) 
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6. Block Extraversion judgment (BFBD-E) 
7. Item-by-item Emotional Stability judgments (IPIP Form B subscale) 
8. Block Agreeableness judgment (BFBD-A) 
9. Item-by-item Conscientiousness judgments (IPIP Form B subscale) 
10. Block Intellect judgment (BFBD-I) 
11. Item-by-item Extraversion judgments (IPIP Form B subscale) 
12. Block Emotional Stability judgments (BFBD-EM) 
13. Item-by-item Agreeableness judgments (IPIP Form B subscale) 
14. PANAS (20 items) 
15. Need For Cognition (18 items) 
16. Private Self-consciousness scale (8 items) 
17. SICQ (10 items) 
18. IPIP (50 items) 
The test battery also contained a number of measures designed for the current 
study which assessed participants‟ implicit self-theories about each Big Five dimension, 
their personality as a whole, and their reasoning abilities. These measures were 
developed with reference to implicit theories and empirical research undertaken by 
Dweck and her colleagues (e.g., Benenson & Dweck, 1986; Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 
1995a, 1995b; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Hong, Chiu, Dweck, & Sacks, 1997). These 
measures are not discussed here because the scales did not share variance with either 
confidence or bias scores for personality or cognition, and because word limit 
constraints prevented their inclusion. 
5.13.4 Scoring 
For the gender variable, 1 = males and 2 = females. For the accuracy variables 0 
= inaccurate and 1 = accurate. Big Five accuracy scores at the block level were 
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calculated in the same way as for Study 1. Big Five accuracy scores at the item-level 
were calculated using the three accuracy methods outlined in Study 2. As was the case 
in Study 2, the accuracy scores derived from the three methodologies were factor 
analysed (see results section) before mean accuracy scores were computed for each Big 
Five dimension. Item-level bias scores for the cognitive and personality judgments were 
calculated in the same way as described in Studies 1 and 2. This PTPE bias score for 
each cognitive test required that the actual mean percentage of correct responses be 
subtracted from the estimated percentage of correctly solved items. 
5.14 Results 
5.14.1 Normality and Outliers 
Prior to statistical analyses, all variables were examined through various 
subprograms from the Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS, Version 16) for 
accuracy of data input, missing data, and fit between their distributions and the 
assumptions of multivariate analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). There were some 
problems with missing data for the last five trials of the LST task. These trials were 
removed prior to data analyses and reliability of the measure improved. There were no 
problems in terms of missing data for the self-report variables.  
Univariate and multivariate outlier checks revealed the presence of several 
univariate and multivariate outliers. Multivariate analyses were conducted with and 
without these outliers. As there were no noticeable differences in the outcome of the 
analyses these outliers were retained in accordance with recommendations made by 
Tabachnick and Fidell (1996). 
 Several self-report and objective variables displayed problems with skewness 
and/or kurtosis. Various transformation were applied to normalise the data in 
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accordance with recommendations made by Tabachnick and Fidell (1996). Statistical 
analyses were performed with both the transformed and untransformed data. As the 
transformed data did not alter the outcome of these analyses, the untransformed data 
were retained. 
5.15 Results for Cognitive Tasks 
Means and standard deviations of the Gf dependent variables are presented in 
Table 5.1. As can be seen, item-level bias scores for the cognitive tasks ranged from 
8.86 for the LST task to 23.79 for the WAT task. Participants found the WAT task to be 
the most difficult, correctly solving approximately 28% of items. The WAT task 
displayed lower internal consistency but was still considered acceptable for use in 
experimental research (Gregory, 1996). Reliability for the confidence variables was 
high and similar, to reports by other calibration researchers (e.g., Kleitman, 2003). 
5.15.1 Bias in Relation to Gf Tasks 
No hypotheses re bias scores were made for the LST, EAT, and WAT tasks. 
Nevertheless bias scores, calibration curves, and item-specific scatterplots were 
examined. The bias score for the Letter Series task was 8.86 indicating overconfidence. 
Figure 5.1 presents the calibration curve for this task. Visual inspection of the relative 
frequencies shows that the majority of observations were situated close to the perfect 
calibration line with approximately 23% of the ratings in the underconfidence region. 
The item-specific scatter plot is presented in Figure 5.2 and most of the items were 
close to the perfect calibration line.  
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Table 5.1 
Descriptive Statistics for Cognitive Variables (N=243) 
Dependent Variables M SD # items  
Cognitive Accuracy     
LSTAC 79.80 19.85 10 .86 
WATAC 30.70 21.08 10 .64 
ESTAC 62.86 19.27 24 .71 
Cognitive Confidence     
LSTC 88.66 15.63 10 .87 
WATC 54.48 25.95 10 .87 
ESTC 78.88 14.88 24 .92 
Item-Level Cognitive Bias     
LSTBIAS 8.86 19.62 - - 
WATBIAS 23.79 25.74 - - 
ESTBIAS 16.02 20.25 - - 
Cognitive Post-test Performance Percentage Correct Estimate     
LSTGE 73.76 20.17 1 - 
WATGE 35.12 25.24 1 - 
ESTGE 61.44 20.18 1 - 
Cognitive Post-test Performance Percentage Correct Estimate Confidence Rating     
LSTGC 76.28 21.21 1 - 
WATGC 64.50 30.50 1 - 
ESTGC 69.71 22.42 1 - 
PTPE Bias     
LSTGBIAS 1.97 23.61 1 - 
WATGBIAS 4.30 24.20   
ESTGBIAS -1.42 22.83   
Note.  LST = Letter Series; WAT = Word Association; EAT = Esoteric Analogies. 
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Figure 5.1. Calibration Curve of mean confidence rating and mean accuracy scores for 
the Letter Series Task. 
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Figure 5.2. Scatterplot of mean confidence rating and mean accuracy scores for the 
Letter Series Task. 
The bias score for the Esoteric Analogies task was 16.02 indicating marked 
overconfidence. Figure 5.3 presents the relevant calibration curve. Observation of 
relative frequencies shows that over 50% of the observations were in the overconfidence 
region, meaning that participants gave themselves a rating of 100% confident despite 
their accuracy being around 75%. The item-specific scatter plot is presented in Figure 
5.4 and numerous items were in the overconfidence region. 
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Figure 5.3. Calibration curve for the Esoteric Analogies Task. 
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Figure 5.4. Scatterplot of mean confidence rating and mean accuracy scores for the 
Esoteric Analogies Task. 
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Figure 5.5. Calibration curve for the Word Association task. 
At 23.79, the bias score for the Word Association task indicated marked 
overconfidence. The calibration curve for the Word Association task is presented in 
Figure 5.5 and the relative frequencies show that approximately 67% of the 
observations were in the overconfidence region. The scatterplot of item means for the 
Word Association task is presented in Figure 5.6 and shows that, in this case, several 
items at the lower levels of accuracy were responsible for the overconfidence effect. 
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Figure 5.6. Scatterplot of mean confidence rating and mean accuracy scores for the 
Word Association Task. 
Hypothesis 1 stated that individuals would be better calibrated for the PTPE bias 
scores than for the item-level bias scores. The PTPE bias scores for the Letter Series, 
Esoteric Analogies, and Word Association tasks were 1.97, -1.42, and 4.30 respectively, 
scores that indicated good calibration, as expected.  
5.15.2 Individual Differences for Gf Tasks  
To simplify results for some individual differences analyses using Gf tasks, 
(including those undertaken later on with the Big Five variables), composite variables 
were formed for Gf accuracy, Gf bias, and Gf confidence. All composite variables 
entailed calculating an average score across the three Gf tasks. 
The outcome that age was not correlated with the Gf bias composite score (r 
= .07, p > .05), was contrary to the premise of hypothesis 2, which assumed a positive 
association between age and Gf bias. 
The next hypothesis reasoned that males would be significantly more confident 
than females on Gf tasks. No hypothesis was made in terms of gender differences in 
item-level bias; nevertheless gender differences in item-level bias scores were examined. 
Independent samples t tests were used to test the hypothesis and results appear in Table 
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5.2 
4
. To control for family-wise error, a bonferroni adjustment was made with the alpha 
level being set at 0.01. Another unexpected outcome occurred. Males and females did 
not differ in terms of item level confidence for Gf tasks; nor were there gender 
differences in mis-calibration. Overall these results indicated that males and females did 
not differ in terms of cognitive confidence or mis-calibration. 
Table 5.2 
Means of Confidence and Bias Scores for Males (n = 61) and Females (n = 182) for 
Cognitive Tasks in Study 3. 
 LSTC LST BIAS ESTC EST BIAS WATC WAT BIAS 
Male 87.80 11.05 81.34 17.38 57.65 28.47 
Female 88.94 8.12 78.05 15.56 53.42 22.22 
t tests  -.49 1.01 1.50 .61 1.10 1.66 
Effect size -0.06 0.15 0.23 0.09 0.05 0.24 
Note. LST = Letter Series; WAT = Word Association; EAT = Esoteric Analogies 
 
5.15.2.1 Ability Differences in Relation to Gf Bias Scores 
Considering hypothesis 4, low scorers (i.e., in the bottom quartile) were 
expected to be more mis-calibrated than high scorers (i.e., top quartile) for the three Gf 
tasks used in this study. Based on their accuracy scores for each cognitive task, 
participants were divided into quartiles. This data was subjected to an Independent 
samples t-test with the results presented in Table 5.3. Once again, to control for family-
wise error a bonferroni adjustment was made, with the alpha level set at 0.01. 
The hypothesis received support for all of the Gf tasks indicating that low 
scorers were significantly more mis-calibrated than high scorers were.  
                                                 
 
4
 The male to female ratio in this study is not ideal, however, it closely resembles other 
calibration research wherein similar gender ratios were reported (e.g., Pallier, 2003).  Also, based on the 
recommendations made by Howell (2002), each effect size calculation used the mean and the standard 
deviation for each gender as the denominator.  This practice guarantees that d is approximated 
independently of N, thereby removing potential concerns regarding unequal sample sizes. 
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Table 5.3 
Mean Bias Scores for First and Fourth Quartiles on Cognitive Tasks (N = 243) 
 LSTBIAS ESTBIAS WATBIAS 
Quartile 1 24.49 33.93 34.18 
Quartile 4 1.86 -.53 10.68 
t tests  5.48** 10.48** 6.62** 
Note. lstbias = letter series bias; estbias = esoteric analogies bias; watbias = word association bias   
** p = .00. 
5.15.2.2 Personality in Relation to Gf Confidence and Bias 
Hypotheses 5.1 and 5.3 stated that, after controlling for the influence of the other 
four personality dimensions, there would be significant positive associations between 
Gf confidence and both Intellect and Conscientiousness respectively. Hypothesis 5.2 
dealt with Extraversion, and proposed a positive association between Gf confidence and 
bias. Partial correlations were used to test all three hypotheses (see Table 5.4). Zero 
order correlations are presented in the top portion of this table and partial correlations 
appear below these. The first two expectations were met: Intellect and Gf confidence 
were positively correlated, and when partial correlations were examined, 
Conscientiousness and Gf confidence were also positively associated. 
The use of these partial correlations also revealed an outcome that was 
unexpected; that is, an association between Intellect and Gf bias. Also, anticipated were 
the findings that Extraversion was not correlated with either Gf confidence or Gf bias. 
Overall, for Study 3, there was no difference between conclusions drawn when 
zero-order correlations were used, and those drawn when partial correlations were used, 
with two qualifications. To re-state these, when partial correlations were used to test the 
hypotheses, (a) Intellect was correlated with Gf bias and, (b) the significant zero-order 
correlation between Emotional Stability and Gf confidence became insignificant. 
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Table 5.4   
Correlations among IPIP subscale scores and GF Confidence and Gf Bias and Partial 
Correlations between Big Five Scores and Confidence and Bias (N = 243) 
 IEXTRA IAGREE ICON IEMOT IINTELL a Gfcon Gfbias  
IEXTRA 1.00              
IAGREE 0.17* 1.00            
ICON 0.10 0.10 1.00          
IEMOT 0.24** 0.12 0.36** 1.00        
IINTELL 0.32** 0.21** 0.12 0.23** 1.00      
Gfcon 0.04 0.03 0.21** 0.21** 0.29** 1.00    
Gfbias 0.10 -0.10 0.18** 0.11 0.04 0.59** 1.00  
Partial Correlations 
 IEXTRA1 IAGREE1 ICON1 IEMOT1 IINTELL2    
Gfcon -0.09 -0.04 0.15* 0.11 0.18**    
Gfbias 0.09 -0.14* 0.17* 0.04 0.17**    
Note:  Gfcon= Gf confidence composite variable; Gfbias = Gf bias composite variable; a = controlling for accuracy; 1 = controlling 
for the other four personality dimensions; 2 = controlling for the other four personality variables and accuracy. 
 * p < .05.  ** p < .01. 
5.15.2.3 Need for Cognition in Relation to Gf Tasks 
Hypothesis 6, that NFC would be positively associated with Gf confidence score 
was supported by the data. A significant correlation emerged between NFC and the Gf 
composite confidence variable (r(243) = .28, p < .01) suggesting that as NFC increased, 
so did Gf confidence. 
5.15.2.4 Negative Affect in Relation to Gf Tasks 
No formal hypothesis was formed in relation to the potential association 
between NA and Gf confidence. NA was negatively associated with the Gf composite 
confidence variable (r(243) = -.19, p < 01) suggesting that as NA increased Gf confidence 
decreased. 
5.15.3 Factorial Structure of the IPIP 
The factorial structure of the IPIP was examined using Principal Components 
Analysis with Promax rotation and Kaiser normalisation. A solution employing root one 
criterion produced 12 factors. Cattell‟s Scree Plot, however, provided support for 
interpreting a five factor solution. The pattern matrix, percent of variance accounted for, 
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eigenvalues, and factor correlation matrix are presented in Table 5.5. The five factor 
solution accounted for 50.11% of the total variance.  As anticipated, all the factors 
comprised loadings from the expected IPIP items for each dimension.  The five factors 
were labelled Emotional Stability, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and 
Intellect respectively. Although a couple of complex variables were noted, they did not 
cause concern because the overall structure was consistent with expectations. The 
correlations among the factors were concordant with previous research (Saucier, 2002; 
Saucier & Goldberg, 2002). 
Table 5.5  
Pattern Matrix of IPIP using Principal Components Analysis with Promax rotation and 
Kaiser Normalisation (N = 243) 
Variable F1 a F2 F3 F4 F5 h2 
PIP29 0.83 0.02 0.04 0.07 -0.15 .71 
IPIP44 0.83 0.06 -0.14 0.05 0.04 .67 
IPIP39 0.81 0.04 -0.02 -0.07 0.05 .67 
IPIP04 0.81 -0.02 0.00 0.12 -0.06 .63 
IPIP49 0.76 -0.15 0.04 -0.07 0.02 .68 
IPIP14 0.74 -0.08 0.18 0.15 -0.03 .56 
IPIP34 0.73 0.12 -0.05 -0.07 0.03 .55 
IPIP24 0.66 0.11 0.09 -0.09 -0.08 .48 
IPIP09 -0.60 0.19 0.09 -0.16 0.04 .45 
IPIP19 -0.53 0.15 -0.05 0.21 0.01 .45 
IPIP01 0.06 0.85 -0.09 0.01 -0.03 .68 
IPIP31 0.01 0.81 0.06 -0.03 0.05 .71 
IPIP41 0.12 0.79 -0.13 -0.01 0.08 .63 
IPIP36 0.03 -0.76 0.28 0.04 0.05 .59 
IPIP16 0.12 -0.75 0.12 -0.04 -0.03 .62 
IPIP21 -0.04 0.73 0.19 -0.02 0.06 .65 
IPIP06 -0.13 -0.71 -0.14 -0.10 0.10 .50 
IPIP46 0.04 -0.69 -0.04 -0.03 0.09 .47 
IPIP11 -0.13 0.69 0.25 -0.03 -0.05 .62 
IPIP26 0.05 -0.63 -0.13 -0.02 0.00 .46 
IPIP17 0.05 -0.13 0.79 0.08 0.01 .62 
IPIP42 0.19 -0.02 0.77 0.02 0.07 .63 
IPIP37 0.02 0.04 0.75 0.06 -0.11 .55 
IPIP07 -0.03 0.14 0.68 -0.02 0.09 .56 
IPIP27 0.09 -0.06 0.64 0.02 -0.17 .41 
IPIP32 0.07 -0.15 -0.60 0.11 -0.03 .43 
IPIP22 0.07 -0.06 -0.60 0.03 -0.01 .38 
IPIP47 -0.09 0.31 0.51 -0.04 0.02 .43 
IPIP02 0.14 0.02 -0.50 0.12 0.14 .25 
IPIP12 0.42 0.30 -0.45 0.00 0.09 .40 
IPIP45 0.21 -0.15 0.43 -0.02 0.29 .31 
IPIP33 0.10 -0.11 -0.03 0.76 0.12 .57 
IPIP23 0.08 0.10 -0.04 0.72 -0.09 .50 
IPIP43 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.70 -0.07 .49 
IPIP28 0.13 -0.09 0.05 -0.67 0.18 .53 
IPIP03 0.05 0.07 -0.10 0.65 0.21 .47 
IPIP08 0.10 0.01 0.12 -0.63 0.17 .46 
IPIP38 0.25 0.19 -0.20 -0.52 0.03 .47 
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Variable F1 a F2 F3 F4 F5 h2 
IPIP48 0.17 -0.01 0.13 0.51 0.21 .31 
IPIP18 0.46 -0.01 0.04 -0.47 -0.06 .58 
IPIP13 0.11 0.09 0.18 0.34 0.22 .24 
IPIP50 -0.02 0.14 0.04 -0.01 0.65 .53 
IPIP25 0.02 0.16 -0.03 0.01 0.64 .49 
IPIP10 0.20 0.08 0.21 0.04 -0.63 .43 
IPIP20 0.18 0.23 0.05 0.12 -0.61 .37 
IPIP40 0.13 -0.09 -0.14 0.00 0.60 .32 
IPIP15 0.10 0.06 0.12 -0.03 0.59 .41 
IPIP05 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.09 0.58 .34 
IPIP30 0.13 -0.01 -0.16 0.05 -0.56 .43 
IPIP35 -0.09 0.04 -0.02 0.19 0.50 .35 
       
Eigenvalue 9.13 5.58 4.42 3.17 2.76  
% of Variance 18.25 11.16 8.84 6.34 5.51  
       
Variable F1 F2 F3 F4 F5  
F1 1.00          
F2 -0.20 1.00        
F3 -0.06 0.14 1.00      
F4 -0.30 0.05 0.08 1.00    
F5 -0.19 0.34 0.21 0.07 1.00  
Note.  a Factor Labels, F1 =  IPIP Emotional Stability ; F2 =  IPIP Extraversion;  F3 =  IPIP Agreeableness; 
F4 =  IPIP Conscientiousness;  F5 = IPIP Intellect 
Because the correlations among the IPIP subscales closely resembled those 
reported in the literature (Saucier, 2002; Saucier & Goldberg, 2002), the correlation 
matrix was not presented. 
5.15.4 Factorial Structure of the IPIP Form B 
The factorial structure of the IPIP Form B was also examined using Principal 
Components Analysis with Promax rotation and Kaiser normalisation. A solution 
employing root one criterion produced seven factors. Cattell‟s Scree Plot, however, was 
indeterminate after five factors thus supporting interpretation of a five-factor solution. 
The pattern matrix, percent of variance accounted for, eigenvalues, communalities and 
factor correlation matrix are presented in Table 5.6. The five-factor solution accounted 
for 58.75% of the total variance. As expected, all the factors consisted of loadings from 
the expected IPIP Form B items for each dimension.  The five factors were labelled 
IPIP Agreeableness Form B, IPIP Conscientiousness Form B; IPIP Extraversion Form 
B; IPIP Emotional Stability Form B; IPIP Intellect Form B respectively. As shown in 
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the bottom portion of the table, there were low to moderate correlations among the IPIP 
Form B subscales. 
Table 5.6 
Pattern Matrix of IPIP Form B using Principal Components Analysis with Promax 
rotation and Kaiser Normalisation (N = 243) 
Variable F1a F2 F3 F4 F5 h2 
pda010 0.89 -0.02 -0.01 -0.19 0.00 .72 
pda08 0.86 0.00 0.00 -0.10 -0.05 .67 
pda01 0.83 -0.06 0.01 -0.02 0.09 .70 
pda06 0.77 0.04 -0.06 0.04 0.10 .65 
pda07 0.76 0.24 -0.06 -0.02 -0.17 .62 
pda09 0.74 0.00 0.14 -0.12 0.12 .67 
pda02 0.70 -0.01 0.12 -0.01 0.07 .61 
pda05 0.62 0.05 -0.02 0.30 -0.13 .55 
pda04 0.52 -0.04 0.14 0.25 0.02 .51 
pda03 0.44 0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.01 .20 
pdc04 -0.05 0.87 -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 .65 
pdc09 -0.01 0.86 0.07 -0.04 -0.17 .65 
pdc01 -0.02 0.83 0.06 0.00 0.04 .70 
pdc03 -0.01 0.81 0.04 -0.01 0.00 .66 
pdc02 0.06 0.76 -0.07 -0.11 0.13 .61 
pdc05 0.13 0.74 -0.06 0.11 -0.06 .63 
pdc07 0.07 0.74 0.04 0.04 0.05 .66 
pdc06 0.01 0.72 0.00 0.15 -0.11 .56 
pdc08 0.24 0.45 -0.17 0.00 0.33 .51 
pde07 -0.10 -0.06 0.88 0.07 -0.05 .70 
pde06 0.09 0.03 0.86 -0.02 -0.06 .77 
pde01 -0.20 0.03 0.86 -0.05 0.04 .66 
pde08 0.20 -0.07 0.82 -0.07 -0.05 .73 
pde04 -0.01 -0.04 0.81 -0.06 0.09 .68 
pde05 0.16 0.05 0.77 0.14 -0.12 .76 
pde02 0.23 -0.14 0.74 0.13 -0.07 .72 
pde03 -0.14 0.27 0.53 -0.19 0.28 .53 
pdi01 0.02 0.02 0.43 -0.09 0.38 .46 
pdem01 -0.01 -0.12 -0.03 0.87 0.00 .67 
pdem03 0.04 0.01 -0.08 0.87 -0.01 .73 
pdem04 0.16 -0.13 -0.14 0.85 0.00 .68 
pdem02 0.08 -0.08 -0.15 0.81 0.04 .60 
pdem05 -0.12 0.10 0.01 0.72 0.00 .55 
pdem07 -0.15 0.03 0.18 0.69 0.09 .62 
pdem06 -0.19 0.13 0.10 0.60 0.08 .47 
pdem09 0.02 0.11 0.12 0.57 0.04 .49 
pdem08 -0.12 0.21 0.20 0.56 -0.02 .53 
pdi08 -0.04 -0.19 -0.02 -0.06 0.76 .46 
pdi07 0.05 -0.03 -0.08 0.00 0.75 .52 
pdi05 -0.02 0.11 -0.10 0.04 0.68 .50 
pdi010 -0.01 0.11 -0.05 -0.01 0.67 .49 
pdi06 -0.09 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.64 .55 
pdi03 0.05 0.07 -0.05 0.08 0.63 .48 
pdi09 0.15 -0.19 -0.04 0.14 0.61 .41 
pdi02 -0.06 -0.04 0.17 0.04 0.57 .42 
pdi04 0.07 -0.10 0.15 0.01 0.54 .37 
       
Eigenvalue 13.32 4.39 3.73 3.37 2.23  
% of Variance 28.95 9.53 8.10 7.33 4.84  
       
Factor Correlation 
Matrix 
1 2 3 4 5  
1 1.00          
2 0.30 1.00        
3 0.38 0.27 1.00      
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Variable F1a F2 F3 F4 F5 h2 
4 0.31 0.40 0.37 1.00    
5 0.30 0.43 0.45 0.30 1.00  
Note. a Factor Labels, F1 =  IPIP Agreeableness Form B ; F2 =  IPIP Conscientiousness Form B;  F3 =  IPIP Extraversion Form B; 
F4 =  IPIP Emotional Stability Form B; F5 = IPIP Intellect Form B 
The correlations among the factors for the IPIP Form B were approximately .30 
higher than those reported for IPIP Form A. One possible explanation for this is that the 
IPIP Form B differed from the IPIP from A in that participants were asked to provide 
confidence ratings in relation to each item endorsement. Asking participants to provide 
this confidence rating may have affected the orthogonality of the factors. Non-
orthogonality of the IPIP factors, however, is not new and it has been argued by Saucier, 
(2002) to represent “not the Big Five factors themselves, but rather scale construction 
procedures used by the developers of measures” (p. 28).   
5.15.5 Descriptive Statistics and Factorial Structure of Item-level 
Accuracy Scores  
The three accuracy methods that were developed in Study 2 for the purpose of 
calculating a mean accuracy score for each Big Five dimension were again used in 
Study 3. Table 5.8 presents the descriptive statistics for these scores. The most salient 
feature being that the means for methods 2 and 3 are quite similar for each of the 
dimensions except for the Intellect dimension. The correlations among these accuracy 
scores are presented in Appendix U. Because the three methodologies were similar, all 
of the accuracy scores for each Big Five dimension were correlated. It is worth noting 
for each Big dimension, the highest correlations were between methods 2 and 3 with 
two exceptions. That is for both the Conscientiousness and Emotional Stability 
dimensions, the correlations between methods 1 and 2 were the highest. Overall, the 
correlations between the accuracy scores for each dimension, and the means for each 
dimension were similar to those reported in Study 2.  
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Table 5.7 
Descriptive Statistics for Accuracy Scores Derived from Methods 1, 2, and 3 (N=243)  
Variable M SD 
Intellect Accuracy Method 1 81.48 38.92 
Intellect Accuracy Method 2 80.66 39.58 
Intellect Accuracy Method 3 88.89 31.49 
Conscientiousness Accuracy Method 1 85.60 35.18 
Conscientiousness Accuracy Method 2 88.48 32.00 
Conscientiousness Accuracy Method 3 86.83 33.88 
Extraversion Accuracy Method 1 70.37 45.76 
Extraversion Accuracy Method 2 88.89 31.49 
Extraversion Accuracy Method 3 83.13 37.53 
Agreeableness Accuracy Method 1 81.89 38.59 
Agreeableness Accuracy Method 2 79.01 40.81 
Agreeableness Accuracy Method 3 80.66 39.58 
Emotional Stability Accuracy Method 1 78.60 41.10 
Emotional Stability Accuracy Method 2 84.77 36.00 
Emotional Stability Accuracy Method 3 79.42 40.51 
 
As was done in Study 2, prior to calculating mean accuracy scores for each Big 
Five dimension, the accuracy scores in Table 5.7 were factor analysed. A five-factor 
solution emerged with the three accuracy scores for each dimension loading on its 
expected factor. The results from this structural analysis suggested that accuracy was 
specific to each Big Five domain thereby replicating Study 2 results. Therefore, 
calculating mean accuracy scores for each dimension was again justified. This factor 
analysis is presented in Appendix U. Please note for the remainder of this results section, 
item-level accuracy scores refer to the mean accuracy scores for each Big Five 
dimension. 
5.15.6 Reliability Analysis for Self-Report Measures 
Internal consistency reliability estimates (i.e., Cronbach‟s coefficient alphas) 
were calculated for all self-report variables where applicable. These alpha coefficients 
are presented in Table 5.8 along with descriptive statistics for self-report dependent 
variables. All alpha coefficients indicated good internal consistency. The internal 
consistency coefficients reported for IPIP and IPIP Form B were consistent with those 
reported in Study 2. Noteworthy was that all self-report confidence ratings also 
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displayed high internal consistency. The alpha co-efficient for the modified self-report 
intelligence scale (.79) was higher than that of the original scale SRIQ scale (.73) 
developed by Gignac et al. (2004). 
5.15.7 Descriptive Statistics Self-Report Measures 
Mean ratings for each of the Big Five dimensions on the original IPIP 
administered via the internet ranged from 31.58 for Extraversion to 40.79 for 
Agreeableness. These mean ratings closely resembled those reported by the participants 
in Study 1, in which the test was administered face-to-face, and closely resembled those 
reported in Study 2.  This similarity to the first two studies, continued for the block 
personality ratings, as well for the overall pattern of confidence rating endorsements. 
Their confidence levels also remained high for self-ratings of intelligence. 
Table 5.8 
Descriptive Statistics for Self-Report Dependent Variables (N = 243) 
Dependent Variables M SD # items  
IPIP Original Subscales     
ICON 34.27 6.85 10 .83 
IEMOT 32.13 8.71 10 .91 
IINTELL 36.45 5.58 10 .78 
IEXTRA 31.58 8.79 10 .91 
IAGREE 40.97 5.80 10 .83 
IPIP Form A     
ICONA 31.04 5.97 9 .80 
IEMOTA 29.52 7.93 9 .89 
IINTELLA 36.45 5.58 10 .78 
IEXTRAA 24.40 7.39 8 .91 
IAGREEA 40.97 5.80 10 .83 
Personality Confidence Item-by-Item For Each Personality 
Dimension From IPIP Form B 
    
CONCIC 83.51 12.91 9 .95 
EMOTIC 83.60 12.44 9 .94 
INTELLIC 82.42 12.41 10 .92 
EXTRAIC 82.91 13.98 8 .95 
AGREEIC 86.70 12.50 10 .95 
IPIP Form B-Item-by-Item Big Five Adjective Ratings Recoded1     
CONCIR 31.35 7.59 9 .92 
EMOTIR 29.79 7.65 9 .90 
INTELLIR 38.17 6.18 10 .84 
EXTRAIR 27.83 7.08 8 .92 
AGREEIR 42.03 6.27 10 .90 
Big Five Block Confidence Ratings (BFBDC)     
CONCB 79.88 16.87 1 - 
EMOTCB 82.72 15.51 1 - 
INTELLCB 81.73 14.61 1 - 
EXTRACB 83.50 16.38 1 - 
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AGREECB 86.26 14.18 1 - 
Big Five Block Adjective Ratings (BFBD) 1     
CONCR 3.51 1.17 1 - 
EMOTCR 3.39 1.20 1 - 
INTELLCR 3.70 1.00 1 - 
EXTRACR 3.34 1.21 1 - 
AGREECR 4.20 .90 1 - 
Big Five Block Accuracy Scores (BFBD Accuracy 20%)     
CONCBA20% 74.49 43.68  - 
EMOTBA20% 71.19 45.38  - 
INTELLBA20% 79.01 40.81  - 
EXTRABA20% 76.13 42.72  - 
AGREEBA20% 84.36 36.40  - 
Big Five Item-Level Accuracy Scores Derived from Methods 1,2, & 3     
Conscientiousness Accuracy 86.97 31.19 3 .92 
Emotional Stability Accuracy 80.93 37.57 3 .95 
Intellect Accuracy 83.67 32.12 3 .84 
Extraversion Accuracy 80.80 29.64 3 .65 
Agreeableness Accuracy 80.52 36.93 3 .92 
Big Five Bias Scores     
Conscientiousness Bias -3.46 34.97   
Emotional Stability Bias 2.67 40.60   
Intellect Bias -1.25 35.63   
Extraversion Bias 2.12 32.77   
Agreeableness Bias 6.19 37.76   
Other Self-Report Measures     
PrSC 24.49 7.65 8 .84 
PA 35.69 6.38 10 .86 
NA 20.86 8.38 10 .92 
NFC 9.33 11.33 18 .89 
Intelligence Self-report confidence Ratings 82.05 12.24 10 .92 
Intelligence Self-report  Ratings 15.08 13.42 10 .79 
Note. ICON = IPIP Conscientiousness; IEMOT = IPIP Emotional stability; IINTELL = IPIP Intellect; IEXTRA = IPIP Extraversion, 
IAGREE = IPIP Agreeableness; ICONA = IPIP Form A Conscientiousness; IEMOTA = IPIP Form A Emotional stability; INTELLA = 
IPIP Form A Intellect; IEXTRAA = IPIP Form A Extraversion, IAGREEA = IPIP Form A Agreeableness; CONIC= 
Conscientiousness Item-by-item confidence Form B; EMOTIC= Emotional stability Item-by-item confidence Form B; INTELLIC = 
Intellect Item-by-item confidence Form B; EXTRAIC = Extraversion Item-by-item confidence Form B; AGREEIC= Agreeableness 
Item-by-item confidence Form B; CONCIR= Conscientiousness Item-by-item adjective rating Form B; EMOTIIR= Emotional 
stability Item-by-item adjective rating Form B; INTELLIR = Intellect Item-by-item adjective rating Form B; EXTRAIR = Extraversion 
Item-by-item adjective rating Form B; AGREEIR= Agreeableness Item-by-item adjective rating Form B; CONCB= 
Conscientiousness Block confidence rating; EMOTCB= Emotional stability Block confidence rating; INTELLCB = Intellect  Block 
confidence rating, EXTRACB = Extraversion Block confidence rating; AGREECB= Agreeableness Block confidence rating; 
CONCR = Conscientiousness Block rating; EMOTCR= Emotional stability Block rating; INTELLCR = Intellect Block rating; 
EXTRACR = Extraversion Block rating; AGREECR= Agreeableness Block rating; 1 = These means were calculated after recoding 
the data from -5 to +5 to 1 to 5 (see method section); CONSCBA20% = Conscientiousness Accuracy ≤ 20 %; EXTRABA20% = 
Extraversion accuracy ≤ 20 %; AGREEBA20% = Agreeableness Accuracy ≤ 20 %; EMOTBA20% = Emotional Stability Accuracy 
≤ 20 %; INTBA20% = Intellect Accuracy ≤ 20 %; PrSC = Private Self-Consciousness; PA = Positive Affect; NA = Negative Affect; 
NFC = Need For Cognition.  
5.16 The Factorial Structure of Big Five Confidence 
According to the seventh hypothesis, one confidence factor was expected from 
the structural analysis of the item-by-item and block confidence ratings. Exploratory 
factor analytic techniques investigated this hypothesis, and all Big Five confidence 
scores underwent principal Axis Factoring with oblique rotation. The data from Table 
5.9, which presents the correlation matrix of psychometric variables, were considered 
factorable as all assumptions as advocated by Coakes and Steed (1996) were met. 
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A solution employing root one criterion produced one factor, which accounted 
for 67.48% of the total variance. The percent of variance accounted for, eigenvalue, and 
communalities are presented in Table 5.10. The factor extracted from the data set was 
called Big Five Confidence as all of the personality confidence scores loaded highly on 
it. This finding infers that the same cognitive processes underlie all personality 
confidence judgments, and has therefore successfully replicated the results from Study 2.  
Table 5.9 
Correlations among Block and Item-by-Item Confidence Ratings (N = 243) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
INTELLIC 1                   
EMOTIC 0.74 1.00                 
CONCIC 0.74 0.87 1.00               
EXTRAIC 0.72 0.80 0.84 1.00             
AGREEIC 0.68 0.76 0.80 0.80 1.00           
AGREECB 0.56 0.70 0.70 0.63 0.74 1.00         
EMOTCB 0.57 0.74 0.71 0.74 0.67 0.55 1.00       
INTELLCB 0.62 0.63 0.65 0.67 0.60 0.51 0.56 1.00     
CONCB 0.66 0.62 0.68 0.51 0.55 0.45 0.49 0.41 1.00   
EXTRACB 0.61 0.59 0.56 0.63 0.52 0.39 0.52 0.49 0.47 1.00 
Note. All correlations were significant at the .01 level. 
Table 5.10 
Principal Axis Factoring of Big Five Item-by-Item and Block Confidence Rating Scores 
(N = 243) 
Variable Communalities Factor –Big Five 
Confidence 
AGREECB .53 .73 
CONCB .44 .66 
EXTRACB .43 .65 
EMOTCB .60 .77 
INTELLCB .51 .71 
EMOTIC .84 .92 
CONCIC .87 .93 
EXTRAIC .81 .90 
INTELLIC .67 .82 
AGREEIC .74 .86 
Eigenvalue - 6.75 
% of variance - 67.49 
5.16.1 Gender and Age Differences in Big Five Confidence, Accuracy 
and Bias 
For all gender differences analyses in this section, independent samples t-tests 
were used. Hypothesis eight surmised that males would be just as accurate as females 
when making both block level and item-by-item personality judgments about 
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themselves, and as Table 5.11 
5
 shows, this hypothesis was upheld. Results from Study 
3 have again successfully replicated those from Study 2.  
Table 5.11 
Means for Block and Item-by-Item Big Five Accuracy Scores for Males (n = 61) and 
Females (n = 182) in Study 3.
 
 AGREEB
A20% 
CONCB
A20% 
EXTRAB
A20% 
EMOTB
A20% 
INTELLB
A20% 
EXTRA 
AC 
AGREE 
AC 
CON 
SCACC 
EMOT 
AC 
INT 
AC 
Male 85.25 77.05 83.61 80.33 78.69 80.87 79.24 88.52 89.07 79.24 
Female 84.07 73.63 73.63 68.13 79.12 80.76 80.95 86.45 78.21 85.16 
t tests  .22 .53 1.72 1.97 -.07 0.02 -0.31 0.45 2.29 -1.25 
Effect 
size 
0.03 0.07 0.24 0.28 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.06 0.31 -0.18 
 
Hypotheses nine speculated that males would be just as confident as females when 
making both block and item-by-item personality judgments about themselves. Results 
appear in Table 5.12. Bonferroni adjustment was used to keep family-wise error at alpha 
= .05.  
Table 5.12 
Means for Block and Item-by-Item Big Five Confidence Ratings for Males (N = 61) and 
Females (N =182) in Study 3.
 
 AGREE 
CB 
CON 
CB 
EXTRA 
CB 
EMOT 
CB 
INTELL 
CB 
EXTRA 
IC 
AGREE 
IC 
CONC 
IC 
EMOT 
IC 
INTELL 
IC 
Male 84.59 79.84 82.13 83.77 83.11 82.60 85.81 81.95 83.50 85.04 
Female 86.81 79.89 83.69 82.36 81.26 83.02 87.01 84.03 83.64 81.55 
t tests  -1.06 -.02 -.75 .61 .88 -.20 -.65 -1.09 -.08 1.92 
Effect 
size 
-0.15 -0.003 -0.11 0.09 0.13 -0.03 -0.09 -0.15 -0.01 0.30 
 
As no gender differences arose across either the block or the item-by-item 
ratings, it appears that males were just as confident as females when making judgments 
                                                 
 
5
 The male to female ratio in this study is not ideal, however, it closely resembles other 
calibration research wherein similar gender ratios were reported (e.g., Pallier, 2003).  Also, based on the 
recommendations made by Howell (2002), each effect size calculation used the mean and the standard 
deviation for each gender as the denominator.  This practice guarantees that d is approximated 
independently of N, thereby removing potential concerns regarding unequal sample sizes. 
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about the Big Five personality dimensions. These findings essentially replicate the 
results from Studies 1 and 2. 
Hypothesis 10 addresses gender differences in Big Five bias. The results are 
displayed in Table 5.13. Bonferroni adjustment was used to keep family-wise error at 
alpha = .05. In accordance with hypothesis 11, no gender differences were apparent for 
the Big Five item-level bias scores. This finding, that males and females did not differ 
in terms of Big Five bias, replicates results from Study 2. 
Table 5.13 
Means for Item-by-Item Big Five Bias Scores for Males (N = 61) and Females (N = 
182) in Study 3.
 
 AGREE 
BIAS 
CON 
BIAS 
EXTRA 
BIAS 
EMOT 
BIAS 
INTELL 
BIAS 
Male 6.57 -6.58 1.73 -5.57 5.81 
Female 6.06 -2.42 2.25 5.43 -3.62 
t tests  0.09 -0.80 -0.11 -2.07 1.80 
Effect 
size 
0.01 -0.12 -0.02 -0.29 0.26 
 
The assumptions of hypotheses 11, 12 and 13- that age would not be associated with 
Big Five confidence (either block or item-level), Big Five accuracy (either block or 
item-level), or Big Five item-level bias- were tested by calculating Pearson‟s Product 
Moment correlations. The outcomes largely met expectations. No significant 
correlations were found between age and any of the block or item-by-item personality 
confidence ratings, nor between age and Big Five bias scores. Age was also not 
significantly correlated with either item-level or block accuracy except for one 
significant correlation between age and block accuracy for the Emotional Stability 
dimension (r(243) = .13, p < .05). The effect size however, was small. Overall, the 
aforementioned findings replicate results from Studies 1 and 2.  
Please note: Pearson‟s product moment correlations were computed to test all 
subsequent hypotheses unless otherwise stated. 
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5.16.1.1 Big Five Accuracy and Bias Scores 
The descriptive statistics for the block description accuracy scores were shown 
in Table 5.8 . Scores for the Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, Intellect, 
Extraversion and Agreeableness dimensions were 74.49, 71.19, 79.01, 76.13 and 84.36, 
respectively. The standard deviation of the block accuracy scores showed that there 
were many inaccurate ratings for some traits. It was noteworthy that observation of the 
descriptive statistics presented in Table 5.8 revealed a salient similarity to those 
reported in Studies 1 and 2, but with one qualification worth mentioning. The block 
accuracy score for the Extraversion dimension was much lower in Study 2. 
Hypothesis 14 postulated that the associations among the Big Five block and 
item level accuracy scores would be low. The correlations are presented in Table 5.14 
and Table 5.15. As expected, the correlations between the block and item-level accuracy 
scores were low suggesting that individuals who were consistent (accurate) in their 
scores on one trait were not necessarily accurate in their scores for other traits. 
The block descriptions of personality underwent the same validity checks that 
were used in Study 1 (see section 3.11), and because the results also agreed with those 
from Study 1, they were not reported here. 
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Table 5.14 
Correlations among Big Five Block Accuracy Scores (N = 243). 
Variable CONCBA20% EXTRABA20% AGREEBA20% EMOTBA20% INTELLBA20% 
CONCBA20% 1.00         
EXTRABA20% -0.02 1.00       
AGREEBA20% 0.14* 0.13* 1.00     
EMOTBA20% 0.13* 0.07 0.05 1.00   
INTELLBA20% -0.02 0.21** 0.08 0.10 1.00 
* p < .05. ** p  < .01. 
Table 5.15 
Correlations among Big Five Item-Level Accuracy Scores (N = 243). 
Variables CONAC EMOTAC INTAC EXTAC AGAC 
CONAC 1.00         
EMOTAC 0.14* 1.00       
INTAC 0.31** 0.10 1.00     
EXTAC 0.23** -0.02 0.29** 1.00   
AGAC 0.05 0.13* 0.21** 0.24** 1.00 
CONSCAC= Conscientiousness accuracy item level; EXTRAAC = Extraversion accuracy item level; AGREEAC = Agreeableness 
accuracy item level; EMOTAC = Emotional Stability accuracy item level; INTAC = Intellect accuracy item level . 
* p < .05.  ** p < .01. 
Good calibration was expected for the item-level bias scores according to 
hypothesis 15, with these scores being previously presented in Table 5.8. As anticipated, 
these scores were -3.46, 2.67, -1.25, 2.12, and 6.19 for the Conscientiousness, 
Emotional Stability, Intellect, Extraversion and Agreeableness dimensions respectively. 
It is important to note the similarity between these scores and the item-level bias scores 
from Study 2. 
Considering hypothesis 16, six factors were expected to emerge from the 
structural analysis of all subscales from the IPIP, and IPIP Form B. Principal 
Components Analysis with oblique rotation was undertaken to test this hypothesis, and 
the correlation matrix of these psychometric variables is presented in Table 5.16. 
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Table 5.16 
Correlations among IPIP and IPIP Form B Subscale Scores 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
INTELLIR 1.00                             
CONCIR 0.43** 1.00                           
EXTRAIR 0.52** 0.27** 1.00                         
AGREEIR 0.36** 0.38** 0.44** 1.00                       
EMOTIR 0.38** 0.43** 0.39** 0.34** 1.00                     
INTELLIC 0.36** 0.17** 0.27** 0.34** 0.13* 1.00                   
CONCIC 0.22** 0.29** 0.23** 0.39** 0.13* 0.74** 1.00                 
EXTRAIC 0.21** 0.18** 0.31** 0.35** 0.15* 0.72** 0.84** 1.00               
AGREEIC 0.19** 0.22** 0.27** 0.52** 0.10 0.68** 0.80** 0.80** 1.00             
EMOTIC 0.19** 0.15* 0.20** 0.33** 0.09 0.74** 0.87** 0.80** 0.76** 1.00           
IINTELL 0.66** 0.17** 0.32** 0.19** 0.16* 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.02 1.00         
ICON 0.30** 0.80** 0.21** 0.27** 0.34** 0.12 0.23** 0.14* 0.15* 0.09 0.12 1.00       
IEXTRA 0.36** 0.05 0.82** 0.32** 0.24** 0.17** 0.13* 0.24** 0.18** 0.11 0.32** 0.10 1.00     
IAGREE 0.12 0.09 0.20** 0.59** 0.06 0.20** 0.16* 0.22** 0.35** 0.11 0.21** 0.10 0.17** 1.00   
IEMOT 0.30** 0.34** 0.29** 0.23** 0.77** 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.23** 0.36** 0.24** 0.12 1.00 
* p < .05  ** p < .01 
The data from Table 5.16 were considered factorable as all assumptions as 
advocated by Coakes and Steed (1996) were met.  Root one criterion produced a 5 
factor solution. However Cattell‟s Scree plot provided support for a 6 factor solution 
and the sixth eigenvalue was .90 which was high enough to warrant the interpretation of 
a six factor solution (Carroll, 1993). The pattern matrix, percent of variance accounted 
for, eigenvalues, and factor correlation matrix for the six factor solution are presented in 
Table 5.17. The six-factor solution accounted for 86.94% of the total variance.  The first 
factor was labelled Big Five Confidence and comprised loadings from all IPIP Form B 
confidence subscale scores. The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth factors were 
labelled Emotional Stability, Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, Intellect, and 
Extraversion respectively. As anticipated, for each dimension, the last five factors all 
comprised loadings from the expected IPIP, and IPIP Form B subscale scores.  There 
were low to moderate correlations among the factors. Because of the emergence of this 
anticipated six-factor solution, it can be surmised that Big Five Confidence and Big 
Five ratings are separate, but correlated processes. This structural analysis replicates the 
six-factor solution obtained in Study 2.  
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Table 5.17 
Pattern Matrix for all IPIP and IPIP Form B Subscale Scores, Using Principal 
Components Analysis with Oblique Rotation (N = 243) 
Variable h2(b) F1a F2c F3d F4e F5f F6g 
INTELLIR 0.86     .78  
CONCIR 0.91   -.92    
EXTRAIR 0.92      -.90 
AGREEIR 0.79    .70   
EMOTIR 0.89  .92     
INTELLIC 0.77 .87      
CONCIC 0.90 .93      
EXTRAIC 0.85 .90      
AGREEIC 0.84 .81   .26   
EMOTIC 0.87 .97      
IINTELL 0.88     .94  
ICON 0.87   -.95    
IEXTRA 0.92      -.99 
IAGREE 0.89    .96   
IEMOT 0.89  .97     
Eigenvalues  5.35 2.84 1.66 1.20 1.09 .90 
% of variance  35.67 18.93 11.04 8.01 7.27 6.03 
Factor Correlation Matrix 
 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6  
F1 1.00            
F2 0.11 1.00          
F3 -0.21 -0.40 1.00        
F4 0.27 0.13 -0.16 1.00      
F5 0.09 0.25 -0.20 0.16 1.00    
F6 -0.24 -0.31 0.18 -0.24 -0.34 1.00  
Note. Note. h2(b) = Communalities  a  F1 = Big Five Confidence, cF2 = Emotional Stability, F3d  = Conscientiousness, F4e = 
Agreeableness, F5f = Intellect, F6g = Extraversion. CONIC= Conscientiousness Item-by-item confidence Form B; EMOTIC= 
Emotional stability Item-by-item confidence Form B; INTELLIC = Intellect Item-by-item confidence Form B; EXTRAIC = 
Extraversion Item-by-item confidence Form B; AGREEIC= Agreeableness Item-by-item confidence Form B; CONCIR= 
Conscientiousness Item-by-item adjective rating Form B; EMOTIIR= Emotional stability Item-by-item adjective rating Form B; 
INTELLIR = Intellect Item-by-item adjective rating Form B; EXTRAIR = Extraversion Item-by-item adjective rating Form B; 
AGREEIR= Agreeableness Item-by-item adjective rating Form B; ICON = IPIP Conscientiousness; IEMOT = IPIP Emotional 
stability; IINTELL = IPIP Intellect; IEXTRA = IPIP Extraversion, IAGREE = IPIP Agreeableness. The cut-off for suppression 
was .20. 
5.17 Validity Checks in Personality  
5.17.1 Self-Focussed Attention in Relation to Personality 
Hypothesis 17 formulated that PrSc would not be associated with Big Five 
confidence at either the block or item levels, and the expected outcome was produced. 
All correlations were theoretically zero, so the correlation matrix was not presented in 
tabular form.  
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5.17.2 Negative Affect in Relation to Personality 
NA was not expected to be associated with Big Five confidence at either the 
block or item levels, according to hypothesis 18. The expected outcome was produced 
but with one exception. NA was significantly negatively correlated with Intellect block 
description confidence (r = -.17, p < .01), indicating that as Intellect block confidence 
increases, NA decreases. 
5.17.3 Positive Affect in Relation to Personality 
Table 5.18 reproduces the correlations that were calculated to test hypothesis 19: 
that PA would be positively associated with Big Five confidence scores at both the 
block and item-levels. Perusal of the table revealed significant positive correlations 
between PA and confidence at both the block and item levels for Agreeableness, 
Intellect, and Conscientiousness, as expected. In addition, PA was also correlated with 
item level Extraversion confidence. 
Table 5.18 
Correlations between Positive Affect and Personality Confidence Scores (N = 243) 
Variable PA 
PA      1.00 
Agreeableness block confidence rating 0.27** 
Intellect block confidence rating 0.21** 
Conscientiousness block confidence rating 0.14* 
Extraversion block confidence rating 0.08 
Emotional Stability block confidence rating 0.12 
mean Intellect confidence 0.20** 
mean Emotional Stability confidence 0.13 
mean Conscientiousness confidence 0.24** 
mean Extraversion confidence 0.22** 
mean Agreeableness confidence 0.24** 
* p < .05  **p < .01 
5.17.4 Need for Cognition in Relation to Personality 
Hypotheses 20 proposed that NFC would be positively associated with both 
Intellect confidence, and Conscientiousness confidence at both the block and item levels. 
As expected NFC was positively correlated with both block Intellect confidence (r(243) 
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= .19, p < .01) and item-level Intellect confidence (r(243) = .24, p < .01). The next part of 
the hypothesis was also supported, with NFC being positively associated with both 
block Conscientiousness confidence (r(243) = .19, p < .01) and item-level 
Conscientiousness confidence (r(243) = .16, p < .01). Unexpectedly, NFC was also 
significantly positively related with item-level Extraversion confidence (r(243) = .13, p 
< .01). Taken as a whole, these findings suggested that as NFC increased so did 
confidence for the Intellect, Conscientiousness, and item-level Extraversion dimensions. 
5.18 Factorial Structure of Big Five, Gf, and Self-Report 
Intelligence Confidence Scores  
Hypothesis 21 reasoned that three confidence factors are likely to emerge from 
the structural analyses of the confidence scores obtained of the Big Five (item and 
block), Gf item-level, and Gf evaluative confidence measures. The next hypothesis dealt 
with the self-report intelligence confidence score, which was expected to load on the 
personality confidence factor when all Big Five and Gf confidence scores were factor 
analysed. First, all confidence scores underwent Principal Axis Factoring with oblique 
rotation, and the correlation matrix of these psychometric variables is presented in Table 
5.19. The data were considered factorable as all the assumptions proposed by Coakes 
and Steed (1996) were met. 
 
  
Table 5.19 
Correlations Among all Confidence Variables in Study 3 (N = 243). 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1.LSTGC 1.00                                 
2.WATGC 0.42** 1.00                               
3.ESTGC 0.47** 0.57** 1.00                             
4.CONCB 0.40** 0.29** 0.42** 1.00                           
5.EXTRACB 0.18** 0.15* 0.22** 0.47** 1.00                         
6.AGREECB 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.45** 0.39** 1.00                       
7.INTELLCB 0.25** 0.18** 0.24** 0.41** 0.49** 0.51** 1.00                     
8.EMOTCB 0.16* 0.15* 0.19** 0.49** 0.52** 0.55** 0.56 1.00                   
9.LSTC 0.54** 0.20** 0.23** 0.20** 0.13* 0.02 0.11 0.06 1.00                 
10.ESTC 0.32** 0.24** 0.49** 0.23** 0.21** -0.01 0.16* 0.12 0.33** 1.00               
11.WATC 0.26** 0.24** 0.30** 0.17** 0.06 0.09 0.17** 0.08 0.33** 0.49** 1.00             
12.INTELLIC 0.36** 0.31** 0.43** 0.66** 0.61** 0.56** 0.62** 0.57** 0.19** 0.26** 0.21** 1.00           
13.EMOTIC 0.19** 0.24** 0.26** 0.62** 0.59** 0.70** 0.63** 0.74** 0.08 0.19** 0.13 0.7**4 1.00         
14.CONCIC 0.25** 0.21** 0.27** 0.68** 0.56** 0.70** 0.65** 0.71** 0.12 0.17** 0.16* 0.74** 0.87** 1.00       
15.EXTRAIC 0.27** 0.21** 0.23** 0.51** 0.63** 0.63** 0.67** 0.74** 0.16* 0.15* 0.12 0.72** 0.80** 0.84** 1.00     
16.AGREEIC 0.18** 0.15* 0.21** 0.55** 0.52** 0.74** 0.60** 0.67** 0.10 0.10 0.15* 0.68** 0.76** 0.80** 0.80** 1.00   
17.SICQ 0.31** 0.22** 0.29** 0.54** 0.50** 0.57** 0.66** 0.63** 0.12 0.19** 0.15* 0.72** 0.78** 0.81** 0.80** 0.72** 1.00 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
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A solution employing root one criterion produced the three anticipated 
correlated factors, which accounted for 67.57% of the total variance. The percent of 
variance accounted for, eigenvalues, and communalities are presented in Table 5.20. 
Self-Report Confidence was the first factor extracted from the data set, so named 
because all of the Big Five confidence scores plus the intelligence self-report 
confidence score, all loaded highly on it. This outcome provided support for the 
notion that individuals‟ use the same cognitive processes to make either item-by-item 
confidence judgments or block confidence judgments regarding their personality. 
Study 2 findings were therefore successfully replicated, as anticipated. Furthermore, 
self-report intelligence confidence also appears to employ similar cognitive processes 
to those used when making Big Five confidence judgments, again fulfilling 
expectations. The second factor extracted from the data was labelled Gf Self-
Evaluative Confidence because its major loadings came from all of the Gf PTPE 
confidence scores, as anticipated. The Letter Series PTPE confidence score was 
complex as it demonstrated loadings on both factors 2 and 3. In accordance with 
expectations, the third factor was labelled Gf Self-Monitoring Confidence because its 
loadings came from the item-level Gf confidence variables. Conscientiousness block 
confidence rating was a complex and loaded on factors 1 and 2. The correlation 
matrix showed that the three factors used separate but correlated cognitive processes. 
Overall the factor analysis of the confidence variables shows that Personality 
Confidence, Gf Evaluative Confidence, and Gf Self-Monitoring confidence are 
separate but correlated constructs, as presumed by the relevant hypotheses.  
Accuracy scores were not included in the above factor analysis as these scores 
were not the focus of this analysis because it was expected that confidence in PTPEs 
and cognitive accuracy scores would define two separate factors at the structural level. 
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This expectation was upheld when a two factor solution emerged with a low 
correlation between (r = .29) the factors (see Table U2 in Appendix U). 
Table 5.20 
Principal Axis Factoring with Oblique Rotation all Big Five and all Gf Confidence 
Scores (N = 243) 
Variable Communalities 
 
F1 – Personality 
Confidence 
F2 -Gf Evaluative 
Confidence 
F3- Gf- Self-
Monitoring 
Confidence 
LSTGC 0.49 0.09 0.27 0.50 
WATGC 0.36 0.05 0.55 0.05 
EATGC 0.85 0.01 0.94 -0.04 
CONCB 0.51 0.57 0.26 0.06 
EXTRACB 0.41 0.62 0.04 0.03 
AGREECB 0.58 0.80 -0.18 -0.05 
INTELLCB 0.52 0.71 0.02 0.05 
EMOTCB 0.60 0.79 -0.02 -0.06 
LSTC 0.69 -0.01 -0.17 0.91 
EATC 0.34 0.01 0.36 0.32 
WATC 0.24 0.02 0.19 0.36 
INTELLIC 0.73 0.74 0.23 0.04 
EMOTIC 0.84 0.92 0.05 -0.08 
CONCIC 0.87 0.93 0.01 0.00 
EXTRAIC 0.83 0.92 -0.08 0.07 
AGREEIC 0.75 0.89 -0.08 0.00 
SICQ 0.73 0.83 0.05 0.02 
Eigenvalues  7.94 2.52 1.02 
% of variance  46.71 14.84 6.02 
 
Factor correlation Matrix 
Factor F1 F2 F3 
F1 1.00   
F2 .30 1.00  
F3 .22 .49 1.00 
Note. ACC= Academic self-report confidence. 
5.19 Factorial Structure of Cognitive and Big Five Bias Scores 
The final hypothesis of this dissertation stated that two factors would emerge 
from the structural analyses of the item-level cognitive and item-level Big Five bias 
scores. Please note that the PTPE bias scores were not included because of the 
experimental dependency that exists between these scores and the cognitive item-level 
bias scores. Principal Axis Factoring with oblique rotation was applied to these bias 
scores and the correlations among these scores are presented in Table 5.21. The 
correlation matrix met all of the assumptions for factor analysis as recommended by 
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Coakes and Steed (1996), and a solution employing root one criterion produced the 
two expected factors, which accounted for 45.34% of the total variance. 
Table 5.21 
Correlations among Cognitive and Big Five Bias Scores 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
LSTBIAS 1.00        
WATBIAS 0.25** 1.00       
EATBIAS 0.24** 0.25** 1.00      
Intellect Bias 0.08 0.25** 0.17** 1.00     
Conscientiousness Bias 0.12 0.18** 0.21** 0.27** 1.00    
Extraversion Bias 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.37** 0.31** 1.00   
Agreeableness Bias 0.07 0.20** 0.11 0.26** 0.19** 0.33** 1.00  
Emotional Stability Bias 0.08 0.19** 0.19** 0.28** 0.31** 0.12 0.23** 1.00 
** p < .01. 
Table 5.22 displays the percent of variance accounted for, eigenvalues, and 
communalities. Factor 1 was labelled Personality Bias because all of the Big Five 
Bias scores loaded highly on it. Gf Bias was the label given to factor 2. The factor 
correlation matrix shows that the two factors were moderately correlated. Collectively, 
the results indicate that Gf and Big Five bias are separate but correlated constructs. 
Table 5.22 
Principal Axis Factorings of Cognitive and Big Five Bias Scores (N = 243). 
Variable h2(b) F1a F2 
LSTBIAS 0.19 -0.05 0.45 
WATBIAS 0.28 0.12 0.47 
EATBIAS 0.28 0.02 0.52 
Intellect Bias 0.36 0.56 0.07 
Conscientiousness 
Bias 
0.26 0.43 0.15 
Extraversion Bias 0.40 0.69 -0.17 
Agreeableness 
Bias 
0.23 0.47 0.02 
Emotional Stability 
Bias 
0.20 0.32 0.20 
Eigenvalues  2.41 1.21 
% of variance  30.16 15.18 
Factor Correlation Matrix 
 F1 F2  
F1 1.00   
F2 .43 1.00  
Note. h2(b) = Communalities;  a  F1 = Personality Bias; F2 = Gf Bias. 
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5.20 Discussion 
The aims of this study were to a) examine bias (item and PTPE) with Gf tasks; 
(b) investigate whether individual differences in age, gender, ability, personality, need 
for cognition, and negative affect, influence cognitive confidence scores; (c) confirm 
previous findings from Studies 1 and 2 for Big Five confidence, accuracy and bias 
judgments; and (d) examine both the discriminant and convergent validity of Big Five 
confidence scores in relation to self-focussed attention, affect, and need for cognition. 
Following this, Study 3 investigated the factorial structure of both personality 
confidence scores and cognitive confidence scores. Further confidence ratings were 
taken from a measure of self-report abilities and were factor analysed with the Big 
Five confidence and Gf confidence measures. Finally, the factorial structure of 
cognitive and Big Five bias scores were examined. 
No specific hypotheses were formulated in relation to the Gf item-level bias 
scores, but results indicated that participants were overconfident for all three tasks. 
These results were consistent with previous research in which overconfidence was 
demonstrated (Pallier, 2003; Stankov, 2000a). For the Esoteric Analogies and Word 
Association tasks, the scatterplots of item means clearly showed that the hard-easy 
effect is one explanation for the observed overconfidence (see Figures 5.4 and 5.6). 
This was not the case for the Letter Series task, wherein the scatterplot showed that 
items were close to the perfect calibration line. However, the percentage of missing 
data suggested that participants may have run out of time and the last five items were 
subsequently deleted from the analyses. Some difficulties may have arisen from the 
fact that responses were provided in uncontrolled environments. That is, participants 
completed the battery from any computer that had access to the internet, including 
their home computers. Conducting this study in a controlled environment was 
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unfortunately not viable, because many of the participants were not university 
students. Despite this limitation, it was encouraging that alpha co-efficients for the 
accuracy and confidence scores obtained from the Gf tasks were high, and also 
consistent with previous research, in which the environment for test administration 
was controlled (e.g., Kleitman, 2003). Moreover, collecting cognitive and self-report 
data online was a practical and viable option, with past research indicating that web-
based data typically yield results comparable in reliability and validity to that of 
traditional data collection methods (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004; 
McGraw, Tew, & Williams, 2000).  
The first hypothesis, that PTPE bias scores would demonstrate better 
calibration than item-level bias scores, was upheld by the findings as well as 
concordant with previous research (Kleitman & Stankov, 2001; Stankov, 2000a; 
Stankov & Crawford, 1996a, 1996b, 1997). However, the next hypothesis, that age 
would be positively related to Gf item level bias, was neither supported nor in 
agreement with previous research (Crawford & Stankov, 1996; Pallier, 2003), or with 
the findings from Study1. This inconsistency may represent a Type I error. 
Addressing gender differences in confidence, some previous researchers found 
that, males were more confident than females for various cognitive tasks (Pallier, 
2003; Pulford & Colman, 1997; Ross & Fogarty, 2006; Stankov, 1998). The Study 3 
findings did not agree with the research just mentioned, but dovetailed instead with 
the findings from Study 1, and with Stankov and Lee‟s more recent work (Stankov & 
Lee, 2008) which indicated that males and females were equally confident for the 
TOEFL internet-based test.  
The next hypothesis concentrated on ability levels and assumed that those who 
attain low scores on tasks of cognitive ability are likely to be more mis-calibrated. 
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This hypothesis was supported, and replicated the results from Study 1 which also 
showed that individual differences in ability led to significant differences in mis-
calibration. The findings for the Gf tasks in Studies 1 and 3, parallel the work of 
Kruger and Dunning (1999), who found that low scorers overrated their test 
performance relative to their peers. Overall these findings suggest that those who 
know, do know more about what they know with one very important caveat. Such a 
conclusion is, at this early stage of investigation, is strictly limited to the tasks used in 
Studies 1 and 3. Also worth mentioning is that top quartile participants experienced 
ceiling effects. That is, because scores for both accuracy and confidence were high for 
these participants, and due to the way confidence is measured, it is not possible to 
achieve high bias scores. As Stankov and Kleitman (Stankov & Kleitman, 2008, p. 
557) more recently noted, “…it is probably best to ignore the tweak-your-nose 
interpretation” that high scorers on cognitive tasks have more insight than low scorers 
do, because of the measurement problems highlighted above. 
Work by Schaefer et al. (2004) who advocated the use of partial correlations to 
examine the relations between personality and both cognitive confidence and 
cognitive bias scores, formed the basis of the next tested hypothesis. In accordance 
with expectations, Intellect was positively associated with cognitive confidence and 
accuracy. An unexpected relationship however, was discovered when 
Conscientiousness was positively associated with cognitive confidence and cognitive 
bias. Although this is inconsistent with the findings of Schaefer and colleagues (2004), 
other research using zero-order correlations has demonstrated small but significant 
positive correlations between Conscientiousness, and cognitive confidence and 
cognitive bias scores (Kleitman, 2003).  Taken collectively across Studies 1 and 3, 
simple zero-order correlations provide similar information to that provided by partial 
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correlations, with one qualification. Because Intellect is significantly correlated with 
both accuracy and confidence, it is prudent to partial out the influence of accuracy 
when correlations between Intellect and both cognitive confidence and cognitive bias 
are being examined.  
The next hypotheses stated that NFC would be positively associated with Gf 
confidence and that NA would be negatively associated with Gf confidence. Both 
hypotheses were supported and results were consistent with previous research by 
Wolfe and Grosch (1990) who investigated whether individual differences in NA and 
NFC influenced cognitive confidence. Although the findings for NFC also agreed 
with results obtained by Jonsson and Allwood (2003), they conflicted with findings 
from Blais et al. (2005). Task differences (general knowledge versus reasoning) are a 
probable explanation for this discrepancy given that previous research showed that 
high NFC individuals scored higher on reasoning tasks than did their low NFC 
counterparts (Cacioppo et al., 1986). It follows that confidence in the accuracy of self-
assessment is also likely to increase for the reasoning tasks in Study 3. The negative 
correlations between NA and Gf confidence were inconsistent with Allwood (2002) 
and Allwood (1991) who did not find associations between NA and confidence and 
mis-calibration for general knowledge questions. It may be that the positive 
correlation found between NA and Gf confidence in Study 3 was due to the pervasive 
nature of the NA variable, which has a reputation, in the occupational stress literature 
for creating unwanted associations (e.g., Brief, Burke, George, Robinson, & Webster, 
1988; Burke, Brief, & George, 1993; Elliott, Chartrand, & Harkins, 1994; Fogarty et 
al., 1999). Overall, the results for NFC and NA need to be viewed with caution until 
they are replicated.  
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The next step in Study 3 involved testing whether one confidence factor, with 
loadings from both the Big Five block description and Big Five item-by-item 
confidence ratings, emerged from the structural analysis of the data set. This one-
factor solution did indeed emerge, suggesting that the same cognitive processes 
underlie both block description and item-by-item confidence judgments. This finding 
was consistent with the argument presented in Chapter 4 that all Big Five confidence 
judgments would have trait summaries in place because they are derived from the 
lexicon of daily life, and are therefore likely to follow abstraction processes. The one-
factor solution from Study 3 replicated the one-factor solution from Study 2, which 
used a different sample of participants. In view of these outcomes, it is reasonable to 
speculate that individuals used a cognitive database of trait generalizations or 
summaries which reside within semantic memory, from which they made all Big Five 
confidence judgments about themselves. This assertion was consistent with 
abstraction theory within the memory domain (e.g., Buss & Craik, 1983; Klein, 2004; 
Klein & Loftus, 1993b; Klein, Loftus, Trafton et al., 1992). Logic dictates that 
computational processes are to onerous to be practical for making the many decisions 
presented in daily life. At this stage, these conclusions are limited to Big Five 
confidence judgments, and to investigate the veracity of these findings, results need to 
be replicated using other Big Five measures, different samples, and in other cultures. 
The Big Five traits are not the only personality constructs likely to display high 
ecological validity, and other constructs present a worthwhile basis for future research. 
Are there trait summaries in place, for instance, for other traits like friendliness, 
assertiveness, nurturance, and fairness?  
Further hypotheses stated that individual differences in gender would not 
influence Big Five confidence, accuracy or bias. All of these hypotheses were 
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supported thus replicating findings across three studies for the confidence and 
accuracy variables. With regard to Big Five bias, the absence of gender differences in 
Study 3 paralleled findings from Study 2.  Overall, this lack of gender differences for 
Big Five confidence, Big Five accuracy and Big Five bias scores were consistent with 
Hyde‟s (2005) gender similarities hypothesis which stated that males and females are 
more alike than they are different. Again, conclusions are limited to the Big Five 
domain require replication using different samples. Personality variables that are more 
strongly stereotyped with regard to gender roles (e.g., social boldness, expressiveness, 
gentleness, and diligence) pose an interesting question for future researchers.  
Correlations among block description Big Five accuracy scores were low. The 
result for the block-description accuracy scores replicated findings from Studies 1 and 
2, with all studies evincing low correlations among the block description scores. It 
seems then that calculating an overall personality bias score from block level 
judgments does not make sense. The low correlations among the Big Five item-level 
accuracy scores in the current study, match the low correlations also found in Study 2. 
Moreover factor analyses of the accuracy scores developed from methods 1, 2, and 3 
demonstrated that accuracy was specific to each Big Five domain in both Studies 2 
and 3. Therefore, calculation of separate bias scores for each personality dimension 
was warranted. These result for the accuracy scores need to be viewed with caution as 
there is no perfect criterion by which to determine accuracy within the personality 
domain. Suggestions for future research in relation to personality accuracy are 
presented in the general discussion of this dissertation. 
Several of the hypotheses developed for Study 3, emphasised that age is not 
likely to be associated with Big Five confidence (either block or item-level), accuracy 
(either block or item-level), or item-level bias. As expected, age did not correlate with 
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Big Five confidence, accuracy or bias, but with one qualification. A significant 
correlation arose between age and the block description accuracy score for Emotional 
Stability dimension (r = .13), however, the effect size was small.  
This finding, however, requires replication before speculating why older 
participants were more accurate for this dimension. At this stage, the overall results 
for Study 3 suggest that individual differences in age do not influence confidence, 
accuracy or bias for the Big Five dimensions. This outcome largely mirrors findings 
from Studies 1 and 2, and is consistent with Five-Factor theory of personality 
(McCrae & Costa, 1999) which posits that personality traits develop during childhood 
and adolescence, then remain stable in adulthood. It seems that Big Five accuracy, 
confidence, and bias remain constant too. The overall results for age in the current 
studies also fit well with PMM theory (Gigerenzer et al., 1991) which reasons that 
people are well calibrated to their natural ecology rendering age differences unlikely. 
Because the current study was limited to the Big Five dimensions, it is left to future 
researchers to establish the generalisability of conclusions to other personality 
dimensions, and of course using different samples. 
Results supported the hypothesis that individuals would be well-calibrated for 
the Big Five item-level bias scores. This finding of good calibration for Big Five 
judgments in Study 3 replicates the results from Study 2 where individuals were also 
well-calibrated. These results were consistent with Gigerenzer‟s (1991) theory where 
it was argued that individuals are well calibrated to their natural environments. 
Naturally, this conclusion is also limited to Big Five judgments and awaits future 
research before it can be determined if good calibration generalises to other 
personality domains. Results from Studies 2 and 3 give investigators sufficient reason 
to expect good calibration with other personality judgments that have high ecological 
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validity. However, because of the level of variability in the bias data, the methods 
used to calculate bias in Studies 2 and 3 may need further refinement. Nevertheless, 
these scores represent a viable starting point for other research endeavours, 
particularly as the results obtained from these scores were replicated across two 
studies.  
The next step in the current studies constituted examination of whether a six-
factor solution emerged from the structural analysis of all IPIP, and IPIP Form B 
subscales. The hypothesis that a six-factor solution was likely to emerge was upheld 
by outcomes from both Studies 2 and 3. This result is very interesting as it has not 
been investigated before. Perhaps psychologists have made the assumption that rating 
one‟s personality is the same as confidence in that rating. Data from Studies 2 and 3, 
however, provided evidence contrary to this assumption because these scores defined 
separate (although) correlated factors at the structural level. At this stage, these 
conclusions still need to be viewed cautiously as the IPIP Form B was a newly 
developed measure for the purposes of the current research. Replication with other 
samples and other cultures appears warranted. 
This six-factor solution also provides evidence that confidence is related to, 
but is distinct from personality which is in agreement with research in the cognitive 
domain which has demonstrated that the confidence trait is on the borderline between 
cognitive abilities and personality (Baker, 2001; Kleitman & Stankov, 2001, 2007; 
Pallier et al., 2002; Stankov, 1998, 1999a, 2000a; Stankov & Crawford, 1996a, 1997; 
Stankov & Lee, 2008). 
The reliabilities of all the IPIP Form B subscales developed for use in Studies 
2 and 3, were very high for both the ratings (.82 to .92) and the confidence scores (.91 
to .95). These high internal consistency estimates for the Big Five confidence scores 
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were similar to the high internal consistency scores reported for confidence ratings in 
the cognitive domain (Baker, 2001; Jonsson & Allwood, 2003; Kleitman, 2008; 
Kleitman & Stankov, 2001, 2007; Liberman & Tversky, 1993; Pallier et al., 2002; 
Stankov, 1999a, 1999b, 2000a; Stankov & Lee, 2008). Convergent and discriminant 
validity checks, provide more information about the construct validity of Big Five 
confidence scores. 
To test the validity of Big Five confidence judgments, discriminant validity 
was first examined in relation to the constructs of PrSc and NA. As expected, Big 
Five confidence did not correlate with PrSc and NA scores, with the exception that 
NA was significantly negatively correlated with Intellect block description confidence. 
Given the pervasive nature of NA this correlation may be spurious. Next the 
convergent validity of Big Five confidence judgments was explored in relation to the 
potentially related constructs of PA and NFC. It was expected that PA would be 
associated with Big Five confidence scores, a hypothesis that was partially supported, 
with PA demonstrating positive associations with Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, 
Intellect and Extraversion confidence scores.  The anticipated positive associations 
between NFC and confidence for both Intellect and Conscientiousness were also 
established, along with a significant positive relationship between NFC and item-level 
Extraversion confidence. Overall, these validity checks were in line with expectations 
but need to be viewed with caution until future researchers endeavour to expand upon 
the construct and validity data for the Big Five confidence judgments obtained in the 
current studies. 
Overall, the results for the IPIP Form B confidence scores were encouraging 
but even so, needs to be reproduced using other samples, and by investigating whether 
confidence across other personality dimensions all loads onto one factor in the way it 
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does for the Big Five dimensions in Studies 2 and 3. Extending this confidence 
research into the areas of interests, attitudes and values, may well benefit individual 
differences psychologists in their efforts to understand the structure of the confidence 
trait across other domains.  
Three correlated confidence factors were expected from the structural analyses 
of Big Five (item and block), Gf (item-level and post-test confidence in the PTPE), 
and self-report intelligence confidence scores.  The relevant hypotheses were 
supported. The first factor was labelled Personality Confidence which comprised all 
the confidence scores from the Big Five personality dimensions plus the self-report 
intelligence confidence measure. The second factor was labelled Gf Self-Monitoring 
Confidence, and the third factor was labelled Gf Evaluative Confidence. This three-
factor solution was consistent with a combination of Meta-cognitive theory (Schraw 
& Dennison, 1994), Self-Concept theory (Marsh, 2008; Shavelson et al., 1976), and 
Abstraction theory within the memory domain (e.g., Buss & Craik, 1983; Klein, 2004; 
Klein & Loftus, 1993b; Klein, Loftus, Trafton et al., 1992). From the meta-cognitive 
vantage point, one expects the Gf confidence factors to be similar to the constructs of 
self-monitoring and evaluation respectively.  
As was argued in Chapter 2, in terms of Self-Concept theory, confidence 
judgments are thought to be differentiated across the ability and non-ability domains, 
because both self-concept and self-confidence are cognitive appraisals of the self. The 
emergence of the Personality Confidence factor, with loadings from both the block 
and item-level confidence ratings, was consistent with the argument that Big Five 
confidence judgments have trait summaries that reside within semantic memory. It 
follows that abstraction processes were likely to have been used. On the other hand, 
the three-factor solution did not conform to a strict application of PMM theory 
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(Gigerenzer, 1991) because it surmises that the cues used to answer different types of 
questions will differ across the domains. Therefore the three factors should not be 
associated. As with other aspects of the current exploratory research, such as the 
taking of a confidence rating in the PTPE scores, the three-factor solution must be 
contemplated with caution, until findings are reproduced by future researchers. 
Regarding cognitive bias and Big Five bias, two factors were expected to 
emerge from the structural analyses of these scores. This hypothesis was supported 
and was consistent with Self-Concept theory (Marsh, 2008; Shavelson et al., 1976) 
which posits that ability and non-ability factors split at the factorial level. These two 
factors were moderately correlated, which indicates that Gf and Big Five bias are 
separate but correlated constructs. However definite conclusions must be left until the 
findings have been replicated. At this stage it is not clear why the factors were 
correlated but the magnitude of this correlation is certainly encouraging, and suggests 
that Big Five self-report bias scores share approximately 18.5% of common variance 
with objective bias measures from the cognitive domain.  
The limitations of this study need to be taken into account and addressed by 
researchers. The ordinal position of the measures, for instance, could not be 
randomised across participants due to programming restrictions. Nevertheless, the 
order of presentation of the IPIP based measures were changed from Study 2 and 
overall results were by in large the same (see general discussion).  
Study 3 was also restricted by the small number of cognitive tasks it employed, 
leading to a lack of clarity about whether Big Five item-level confidence and bias 
share variance with other ability measures. This limitation may be overcome by 
including a larger number of cognitive tasks from different ability domains. The 
current research also used only IPIP based instruments to measure the Big Five 
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personality dimensions, and a prudent next step for future researchers might entail 
replication of confidence and bias results, using instruments other than the IPIP. 
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 Chapter 6 General Discussion 
The journey of a thousand miles begins with a first step 
Chinese Sage Lao-tze 
The overall aim of this dissertation was to take the first step in extending the 
calibration paradigm into the domain of personality judgments. Before delving into 
personality appraisals, mis-calibration in the cognitive domain was examined, along 
with whether individual differences in gender, age, personality, and ability influenced 
these scores. These well-established findings from the cognitive domain have been 
discussed in detail in previous research, and in the preceding chapters. They are 
therefore not included here. Instead this chapter is directed toward an overview of the 
new findings in relation to cognition and personality, as well as the implications of 
these findings for future research and psychological practice. Before presenting a 
summary of these findings, however, some issues in relation to Big Five accuracy, 
confidence and bias are briefly discussed. 
As outlined in Chapters 1 and 2, strict parallels with cognitive accuracy were 
not possible because, outside the bounds imposed by reliability and validity estimates, 
as there is no way to determine whether personality assessments are accurate. 
However, it is possible to approach this goal by using the notion of 
consistency/reliability. Consistency does not guarantee accuracy, but a lack of 
consistency implies inaccuracy Parallel forms of the IPIP Big Five measures were 
therefore developed in Studies 1 (BFBD) and 2 (IPIP Form A and IPIP Form B).  The 
psychometric properties of IPIP Form B were more than acceptable. Two points are 
worth highlighting. First, the factorial validity of the adjective ratings from IPIP Form 
B were in accordance with the Five Factor theory of personality (McCrae & Costa, 
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1999), and second, a five-factor solution with significant loadings from the expected 
IPIP Form B items, demonstrated that participants comprehended what they were 
asked to do. Furthermore the scales of the IPIP Form B were internally consistent 
across both Studies 2 and 3.  
It is acknowledged that although differences in scores on parallel forms of less 
than perfectly reliable tests occur for a number of reasons (e.g., fatigue, failure to 
follow test instructions and so forth), one of these reasons, as yet largely unexplored, 
involves an individual‟s knowledge of his or her personality traits, or the lack there of.  
Despite possible concerns regarding the methodologies used in determining 
personality accuracy in the current studies, perusal of Table 6.1 shows that 
meaningful results have emerged for accuracy scores at both the block description and 
item-levels. The data reproduced in Table 6.1 demonstrates that use of the block 
description method and the 20% rule, produced accuracy scores for Conscientiousness 
and Emotional Stability that were strikingly similar across all three studies. For the 
other three personality dimensions, accuracy scores were more varied. Yet for each 
trait, the similarities in block accuracy scores were encouraging. Moreover, it cannot 
be denied, that the continued study of the accuracy of self-insight, has important 
implications for clinical and counselling psychology for example, particularly because 
effective psychotherapy relies heavily on clients‟ insight into their own problems and 
disorders. Failure of this insight is a major stumbling block to the implementation of 
effective interventions. Study 2 continued the investigation into personality accuracy 
for this very reason. 
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Table 6.1 
Accuracy Scores for the BFBD and the IPIP-Form B  
BFBD 20% Accuracy Scores 
Study 
1 
Study 2 Study 3 
Conscientiousness 71.65 72.84 74.49 
Extraversion 77.95 57.78 76.13 
Agreeableness 82.68 91.11 84.36 
Emotional Stability 72.44 70.12 71.19 
Intellect 87.40 84.20 79.01 
IPIP Form B  Mean Accuracy Scores  Study 2 Study 3 
Conscientiousness - 83.62 86.96 
Extraversion - 83.54 80.80 
Agreeableness - 80.08 80.52 
Emotional Stability - 80.00 80.93 
Intellect - 78.60 83.67 
 
The similarity of the IPIP Form-B item-level mean accuracy scores for each 
trait across Studies 2 and 3, is evident in the bottom portion of Table 6.1. The findings 
for the block description and item-level accuracy scores, were largely consistent with 
PMM theory (Gigerenzer et al., 1991), which claims that individuals are well 
calibrated to their natural ecology. It follows then that individuals would be 
reasonably accurate for traits that have high ecological validity. 
Remembering that there is no perfect criterion for determining personality 
accuracy, results should be treated with caution. Despite the attainment of reasonably 
consistent results across three studies for the block description ratings, and across two 
studies for the item-level accuracy scores. Definitive conclusions must wait until 
researchers replicate these findings using differing samples, and using other measures 
of accuracy that have been highlighted in the personality accuracy literature (e.g., 
Albright et al., 1997; Borkenau & Liebler, 1993a, 1993b; Funder & Colvin, 1988; 
Vogt & Colvin, 2003). Perhaps researchers could use agreement measures (e.g., self-
other) and physiological methods, in conjunction with the self-report accuracy 
measures developed in the current studies. This would assist in establishing whether 
accuracy across these different techniques leads to the same conclusions.  
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Concerns about measurement are not merely confined to the study of 
personality accuracy, however. The psychological literature provides evidence, that 
other areas of psychology have spent years grappling with the quest to find 
appropriate assessment methods. The debate is ongoing. Emotional intelligence, 
social intelligence, and multiple intelligences are some of the popular constructs on 
which the current debate about measurement issues, are focussed. 
Prior to the studies conducted in this dissertation, no techniques using 
calibration procedures had been established to assess Big Five confidence or bias. The 
studies in this dissertation represent a tentative exploration with regard to an 
important area of psychological investigation. 
Progressing to the measurement of confidence, the BFBD (see Study 1) and 
the IPIP Form B (see Study 2) were designed to obtain confidence ratings in relation 
to the Big Five personality judgments. In Study 1, 127 participants were tested face-
to-face basis and reported no difficulties in understanding that they were required to 
provide a confidence rating that corresponded with a (hypothetical) rating given by an 
imagined device that accurately knew their personality.  
A limitation of the BFBD, however, was that a mean confidence score could 
not be calculated. The development of IPIP-Form B addressed this limitation by 
obtaining item-level confidence ratings, from which a mean confidence rating score 
was calculated for each Big Five dimension. Confidence scores obtained from both 
these measures are presented in Table 6.2. Confidence in Big Five personality 
judgments was around 80%, irrespective of the trait in question. Because there was no 
available benchmark with which to compare this percentage, the current studies have, 
of necessity, defined that benchmark. It is not surprising that people are decidedly 
confident about their personality self-assessments, given the high ecological validity 
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of the Big Five dimensions. There are however other possibilities that could explain 
why confidence ratings were consistently high across the Big Five traits across all 
studies. For example, participants may have responded without thinking, or they may 
have been trying to create a positive impression. Think aloud protocols are one way 
that could be used in future research to elucidate the reasons why participants were so 
confident. 
Whether this benchmark remains high across the sub-facets of the Big Five 
dimensions, as well as whether it holds true when confidence in personality self-
assessments is measured using personality constructs not examined in this dissertation, 
are both subjects for future empirical investigation. 
Table 6.2 
Confidence Scores for the BFBD and the IPIP-Form B  
BFBD Confidence Scores 
Study 
1 
Study 2 Study 3 
Conscientiousness 80.08 81.88 81.01 
Intellect 78.11 80.66 80.54 
Agreeableness 81.89 82.52 82.54 
Extraversion 80.16 80.70 83.50 
Emotional Stability 78.19 80.67 79.36 
IPIP Form B Mean-Item Level 
Confidence Scores  
Study 2 Study 3 
Conscientiousness - 81.88 83.51 
Intellect - 80.67 82.43 
Agreeableness - 82.52 86.75 
Extraversion - 80.71 82.91 
Emotional Stability - 80.67 83.60 
 
Having established a method of calculating mean personality accuracy and 
mean confidence scores, for each personality dimension, a bias score was then 
computed (see Table 6.3). For each trait across Studies 2 and 3, these bias scores were 
shown to be comparable, although a higher degree of overconfidence emerged for the 
Agreeableness dimension in Study 3. From these results it was evident that people 
were reasonably well-calibrated in relation to their personality judgments. Overall, the 
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bias findings are generally consistent with PMM theory (Gigerenzer et al., 1991), 
which argues that people are well calibrated to their natural environments. 
Table 6.3 
Mean Bias Scores across Studies 2 and 3  
Big Five Mean Item Level Bias Scores Study 2 Study 3  
Conscientiousness -1.74 -3.46  
Intellect 2.07 -1.24  
Agreeableness 2.43 6.19  
Extraversion -2.83 2.11  
Emotional Stability 0.67 2.67  
 
6.1 Factorial Structure of Big Five Confidence 
Results from Studies 2 and 3 demonstrated that a one-factor solution resulted 
when the block and item-by-item confidence ratings were factor analysed. This one-
factor solution suggests that the cognitive processes that underlie both block and item-
by-item confidence judgments are the same. This finding reinforces the argument 
presented in Chapter 4 that all Big Five confidence judgments would have trait 
summaries in place because they come from the lexicon of daily life, and would 
therefore follow abstraction processes.  
At this stage, it appears reasonable to speculate that individuals used a 
cognitive database of trait generalizations, or summaries, that reside within semantic 
memory from which they made Big Five confidence judgments about themselves. 
This assertion was consistent with abstraction theory within the memory domain (e.g., 
Buss & Craik, 1983; Klein, 2004; Klein & Loftus, 1993b; Klein, Loftus, Trafton et al., 
1992). It makes sense that computational processes are to onerous and impractical for 
day-to-day decision making. Although at this stage, conclusions are confined to Big 
Five confidence judgments, to investigate the veracity of these findings, results need 
to be replicated using other Big Five measures, different samples, and in other 
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cultures. It would also be worthwhile for future researchers to investigate these 
findings using other personality constructs that are likely to have high ecological 
validity and therefore, would have trait summaries in place. For example, constructs 
such as friendliness, assertiveness, nurturance and fairness could be useful in this 
regard. 
The one-factor solution for the Big Five confidence scores obtained across 
Studies 1, 2, and 3 also mirrors findings within the cognitive domain. That is, 
independent of the types of tasks employed (e.g., Gf, Gc, Gv), structural analyses of 
cognitive confidence scores have mostly resulted in a one-factor solution (Crawford & 
Stankov, 1996; Kleitman & Stankov, 2001; Pallier et al., 2002; Stankov, 1998, 1999a, 
2000a; Stankov & Crawford, 1996a, 1996b, 1997; Stankov & Dolph, 2000; Stankov 
& Lee, 2008). 
6.2 Gender and Age Differences in Big Five Confidence, 
Accuracy and Bias Scores 
Across all three studies the data has demonstrated that individual differences 
in gender and age do not influence Big Five confidence, accuracy or bias scores. 
Despite findings being consistent with expectations derived from Hyde‟s work (Hyde, 
2005) and the Five-Factor theory of personality (McCrae & Costa, 1999), further 
empirical investigation is required before generalising these conclusions outside the 
Big Five domain.  Such investigation requires employing a variety of samples and 
personality dimensions not evaluated in the current studies. 
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6.3 The Factorial Structure of Cognitive and Big Five 
Confidence 
Studies 1 and 3 assessed the factorial structure of cognitive and Big Five 
confidence scores and both studies produced a two-factor solution. In Study 1 the 
factors were uncorrelated (r = .05) with the opposite being true for Study 3 (r = .30. It 
is possible that the lack of correlation between the Big Five and cognitive confidence 
factors in Study 1 reflects not a lack of any statistical relationship, but rather an 
inability to validly measure personality confidence using a one-item scale for each 
Big Five dimension. To overcome this possibility, the IPIP Form B was developed for 
the purposes of Studies 2 and 3. The reliability of the confidence scores obtained from 
this measure was very high across both studies which were concordant with research 
in the cognitive domain where confidence ratings have also demonstrated high 
internal consistency (e.g., Kleitman, 2008; Kleitman & Stankov, 2001, 2007; Pallier et 
al., 2002; Stankov, 1998, 2000a; Stankov & Crawford, 1996a, 1997; Stankov & 
Kleitman, 2008; Stankov & Lee, 2007). Another potential reason why Big Five and 
cognitive confidences did not load onto the one factor is that these constructs may be 
conceptually different. One option is that Big Five confidence may be related to 
Kleitman‟s (2008) Sureness measure that assesses respondents‟ assuredness that 
various opinion statements will occur in the future albeit that those individuals are 
aware that correct answers may never become available. This possibility requires 
further empirical investigation.  
Nevertheless, the factorial structure of Big Five and cognitive confidence in 
Study 3 provided further evidence that the confidence trait is related to, but is distinct 
from both personality and abilities confidence. Similarly, factor analyses of the IPIP 
and IPIP Form B subscales across Studies 2 and 3 provided convergent evidence that 
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strengthens Stankov‟s contention that confidence is separate from, but related to 
personality.  
The structural independence of personality ratings and confidence in those 
ratings from the IPIP and IPIP Form B across Studies 2 and 3 suggests that rating 
one‟s personality and expressing confidence in those ratings, are separate but 
correlated processes. This finding lays the foundation for future researchers to 
investigate whether this structural independence also occurs for other personality 
dimensions.  
It is still unclear whether confidence across other personality dimensions 
shares variance with Big Five confidence, a worthwhile area of further investigation. 
Asking participants for confidence ratings regarding personality constructs perceived 
as negative remains a challenge, given the valid concerns about self-report data in 
relation to issues such as self-enhancement biases. Future research could examine the 
impact of self-enhancement by including measures of social desirability in their test 
batteries, and by educating participants that people tend toward self-enhancement. In 
other words, people need to understand that while answering psychological tests items 
in such a way as to maintain a positive view of themselves, is a natural human 
tendency, which often operates at the subconscious level to protect individuals from 
anxiety. As a psychologist who has facilitated over 400 group therapy sessions, in an 
acute mental health ward, providing patients with this information has facilitated 
greater meta-cognitive insight which has enhanced the therapy process. If participants 
understand the meta-cognitive processes that could well underlie their reluctance to 
endorse negative traits as being characteristic of themselves, then obtaining 
confidence ratings about these traits could be possible, and is a fruitful area of further 
research investigation. 
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The simple way that confidence ratings were obtained using the IPIP Form B 
opens up the way for future researchers to explore the confidence trait in other 
domains such as interests, attitudes and values. This area of psychological enquiry has 
expanded over the last ten years, particularly with the work of Ackerman and his 
colleagues (e.g., Ackerman, 1996; Ackerman, 1997, 2003; Ackerman & Beier, 2003; 
Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997).  A number of constructs within the field of positive 
psychology offer a useful guide for future research investigation (e.g., zest, 
appreciation of beauty, citizenship team-work, gratitude, optimism, and leadership).  
As expected, confidence ratings obtained from a measure of self-report general 
intelligence (abilities) shared more variance with personality confidence than with Gf 
confidence as it loaded on the personality confidence factor. The fact that the SICQ 
confidence did not share as much variance with Gf self-monitoring confidence as it 
did with Gf evaluative confidence, was probably due to the nature of the items in the 
inventory which were more evaluative in nature. It would be useful for future 
researchers to include a self-report measure of abilities that included several items for 
each ability domain, and a larger battery of cognitive tasks for each ability domain 
(e.g., Gc, Gf, Gv and SAR). The results for the self-report intelligence measure cannot 
be attributed to concerns about internal consistency because the alpha co-efficients 
were more than acceptable. Nonetheless, the SICQ was a newly adapted measure and, 
as with all new measures, reliability and validity needs to be re-examined through 
future research before commenting. 
6.4 Big Five Bias 
The data from two studies indicate that people were well calibrated for Big 
Five judgments. These results were in accordance with expectations and were 
consistent with PMM theory (Gigerenzer et al., 1991), which asserts that individuals 
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are well calibrated to their natural environments. However, because of the exploratory 
nature of the method used to examine bias in Big Five judgments, and also because 
personality accuracy was a component of the bias scores, the current findings need to 
be viewed with caution. The findings of good calibration would need to be replicated 
with other samples and with other cultures before drawing conclusions. Moreover, 
these results are confined to Big Five judgments as operationalised by the IPIP based 
measures. It would be useful for other investigators to examine bias using different 
Big Five self-report questionnaires.   
6.5 Factorial Structure of Cognitive and Big Five Bias Scores  
Study 3 examined the factorial structure of cognitive and Big Five bias scores. 
The structural analyses showed that bias across these domains were separate but 
correlated processes. That is, Personality Bias and Gf bias respectively. The two-
factor solution was consistent with Self-Concept theory (Marsh, 2008; Shavelson et 
al., 1976) where ability and non-ability factors split at the factorial level. It was 
argued in Chapter 2 that this theory provides insight into what could be expected as 
both self-confidence and self-concept are cognitive appraisals of oneself. Results for 
the Gf bias factor were in accordance with findings from the cognitive domain where 
Stankov and his collaborators (Pallier et al., 2002; Stankov, 1998, 1999a) factor 
analysed bias scores obtained from various combinations of Gc, Gf, Gv tasks and 
found that the bias scores loaded onto one factor.  
The moderate correlation (r = .43) between the two bias factors is encouraging, 
as it suggests, that despite the methodological difficulties of measuring Big Five bias, 
the factor scores were reliably correlated. The correlation between these two factors 
indicates that the processes that underlie cognitive (objective) bias are also partially 
involved in Big Five bias. This finding requires replication before speculating too 
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widely as to why this moderate correlation between the Big Five and Gf factors 
emerged. Nevertheless, this result has significant implications for calibration 
researchers, who have been tyring to understand the mis-calibration phenomenon. 
From a conceptual vantage-point one possibility why Big Five and Gf bias did not 
load onto one factor, is that Big Five bias could be an internal consistency bias, which 
is conceptually distinct from Gf bias. This suggestion merits further empirical 
attention. 
6.6 Practical and Other Research Implications 
Throughout this chapter, a number of suggestions have already been made 
regarding continued research into personality confidence, accuracy and bias. Another 
interesting implication of this dissertation is for differential psychologists who are 
striving to understand the structure of the confidence trait. In the current studies, 
simple methods were used to obtain confidence ratings. These procedures could now 
be used to investigate the factorial structure of confidence in much more detail, and 
across other domains such as interests, attitudes and values.  
The current research assumed that all individuals used abstraction processes 
when making confidence judgments for each Big Five trait. However, it is important 
for future researchers to verify this assumption, by asking individuals, via either think 
aloud protocols or qualitative commentaries, to elucidate whether or not they did 
require the use of computational processes to make their Big Five confidence 
judgments. This is important so that future researchers are aware of the underlying 
processing mechanism/s that individuals use when making confidence judgments re 
personality self-assessments.  
 Cognitive and Personality Confidence 224 
 
6.6.1 Clinical and Counselling Psychology 
The split at the factorial level between rating one‟s personality and expressing 
confidence in that rating (see Studies 2 and 3) has important implications in the field 
of clinical psychology. Earlier in this chapter it was argued that this factorial split 
makes sense, because rating one‟s personality and expressing confidence in those 
ratings are likely to be separate but correlated processes, given that the latter involves 
metacognitive processing. For example, Jane rated herself highly on an item 
measuring Conscientiousness. When she provided a confidence judgment in that 
rating, she was in fact monitoring and appraising her thoughts in relation to her 
original rating.  
Within the clinical domain, it would be useful for clinicians to initially 
investigate whether rating one‟s worry or rumination, for example, were factorially 
distinct from confidence in that rating as this could inform clinicians about important 
aspects of therapy. For instance, Susan rates the item “worry will drive me mad” 
highly, and if she provides a high confidence rating (e.g., 80%), then therapy would 
need to address this maladaptive worry. If, however, her confidence in that rating was 
30%, the focus of therapy is more usefully directed toward other worries, about which 
she expressed a higher confidence level.  
It is incumbent on future research endeavours to continue measuring and 
refining methods for determining the accuracy of self-insight, particularly within the 
area of mental health. The prevalence of mental illness in Australia and other western 
countries is high (Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and 
Indigenous Affairs, 2006). That is, approximately one in five adults will experience 
symptoms of mental illness during a 12 month period. One of the main stumbling 
blocks to effective psychotherapy is that many clients fail to have adequate 
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metacognitive insight into their problems and disorders (Dimaggio et al., 2005; 
Dimaggio et al., 2006). By contributing toward a valid attempt to operationalise intra-
phenomenological accuracy within the area of personality, the current studies 
represent an important first step.  
6.7 Other Limitations  
One aim of Study 3 was to investigate the construct validity of personality 
confidence judgments. It was a limitation that this could only be achieved in relation 
to a limited number of psychological variables as participants had already responded 
to a large battery of objective and self-report measures. Self-concept measures 
investigating individuals‟ self-assessment of personality may prove to be a fruitful 
area of further research investigation.  
Randomisation of the tests batteries was not possible for Studies 2 and 3 due 
to programming restrictions. Consequently, the impact of ordinality is unknown and 
future research could address this by randomising the presentation of measures in 
their test batteries.  
Study 3 contained only a small number of cognitive tasks that measured Gf 
abilities, and only the Big Five dimensions. It would be useful for future research to 
include more tasks that measured other cognitive abilities and other personality 
constructs as well as the Big Five traits. Test-retest estimates showing the stability of 
Big Five confidence ratings over time are also needed.  
The mean accuracy scores for each Big Five trait across Studies 2 and 3 were 
calculated from the three accuracy protocols developed in Study 2. It is a limitation 
that the three protocols for each dimension were significantly correlated suggesting 
that random variation could not be captured. Nonetheless, consistent results were 
obtained for each trait across two studies. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to 
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resolve the accuracy debate. Nevertheless, the methods used in this dissertation could 
be viewed as a spring board for future research, which could be directed toward 
refinement of the accuracy measures used in the current studies. 
6.8 Conclusions 
The main aim of this dissertation was to take calibration procedures into the 
domain of personality judgements. Interesting findings have emerged from this foray 
into the Big Five domain. The results from three studies showed that the benchmark 
for peoples‟ confidence in Big Five judgments was around 80%. 
Accuracy for each trait was also reasonably high across the studies when 
consistency measures were used. High accuracy makes sense, because people 
normally have extensive feedback from their natural environments. Of course, there 
would be some people who do not benefit from this feedback because their insight is 
inadequate. Operationalising personality accuracy however, remains somewhat 
elusive because of the absence of any objective criterion against peoples‟ self-
assessments can be judged. This same problem exists in other areas of psychological 
enquiry. There has, and continues to be, intense debate about the inherent problems 
with the development of valid and reliable measures of social, emotional, practical 
and interpersonal intelligences, which are also more complicated in terms of 
determining the accuracy of self-insight. Nonetheless, researchers have both 
persevered, and have continually refined the measures of such constructs. In 
determining the accuracy of self-assessments within the personality domain and using 
objective self-reports as the criterion for accuracy, the same sorts of issues and 
debates will likely arise. Nevertheless, psychologists need to ask themselves the 
following question. Are continued steps on a thousand mile journey worthwhile? Or 
does the psychological profession discontinue efforts towards examining a 
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complicated issue that is valuable, and is of vital importance to individuals, for whom 
the cost of inaccurate self-insight is high.  
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Appendix A 
Sign Up Sheet Study 1 
Self-Confidence in Cognition and Personality 
 
Area of Investigation: Self-confidence in Cognition and Personality 
Credit/Raffle 2% 
Tasks: Respond to 5 cognitive tasks and several  
 personality measures 
People required: 17 years and older 
Name of Experimenter: Sandra Baker  
Contact Number: 0402070056 or 46311613 
Supervisor: Professor Gerry Fogarty 
Ethics Approval #: H02STU198 
Book: Click here to book 
 
More Information: You are invited to participate in an experiment  
 examining self-confidence in both cognition and  
 personality. You will be asked to respond to 
 three reasoning tasks and at the end of each trial you will be 
 asked to provide a confidence rating. You will also be asked  
 to provide confidence ratings for the personality  
 measures. Specific instructions will be provided at the  
 time of testing. Although your participation should  
 give you no cause for concern, you may withdraw 
 at any stage and will not be penalized. Upon  
 completion of testing you will be provided with  
 further information and any questions will be  
 answered. Your identity as a participant in this research will  
 remain confidential with respect to any publication of the  
 results of the study. Any information that can identify you as a  
 participant will be stored in a secured place, with the  
 information available only to the investigator. The results will  
 only be reported in their aggregate form. The USQ Human  
 Research Ethics committee has approved this study and the  
 approval number is listed above. This experiment should take  
 two hours to complete. For participating, you will  
 receive either course credit (2%) or a ticket in the  
 departmental raffle. If you have any questions at any time 
 regarding this research you may contact Sandra Baker on 
 (07) 46311613 or Professor Gerry Fogarty on (07) 46312379 
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Appendix B 
Confidence Ratings for Gf/Gc Quickie Tests 
Confidence Ratings for Gf/Gc Quickie Tests (Stankov, 1997) 
 
1) General Knowledge Test 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
2) Letter Series Test 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
3) Concealed Words Test 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
4) Esoteric Analogies 
25%  50%  75%  100% 
 
5) Cattell‟s Matrices Test 
15% 30% 45% 60% 75% 90% 100% 
 
6) Word Associations Test 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
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Appendix C 
General Knowledge Test 
General Knowledge Test (Stankov, 1997) 
 
Directions:  
 
Say “This is a test of your general knowledge. I will ask you a series of questions and 
I want you to give me the answers as best you can. After each answer I want you to 
say how confident you are that your answer is correct. In this test there are no 
multiple choice answers provided, so a guess would correspond to 0% confidence. If 
you are absolutely certain your answer is correct then you would say 100% confident. 
Please make your choice from the ratings provided on your sheet”. 
 
If a response is incomplete or unclear, ask the participant to explain more fully, but if 
the response is “I Don‟t know” record that as the answer. 
 
You may repeat the question but do not spell out any words or alter the wording. 
 
Write the answers on the person‟s score sheet for later marking. 
 
Questions: 
1. How many weeks are there in a year? 
2. What are BASIC, FORTRAN, and ALGOL? 
3. What nationality was Picasso? 
4. What is the capital of Austria? 
5. At what temperature does water freeze? 
6. Who wrote the Odyssey? 
7. Where is Libya? 
8. In Chemistry, what letter does the letter S stand for? 
9. What was the nationality of Beethoven? 
10. Who was the author of The Origin of the Species? 
11. Name three kinds of blood vessels found in the human body? 
12. Who was Confucius? 
13. Who wrote King Lear? 
14. Who was the President of the United States at the end of the Vietnam War? 
15. What language is spoken in Brazil? 
16. What is today‟s name for the ancient city of Constantinople? 
17. What is the main religion in Malaysia? 
18. Who wrote Crime and Punishment? 
19. Who was the founder of psychoanalysis? 
20. Name one of the main languages spoken in the country formerly known as 
Yugoslavia? 
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Appendix D 
Letter Series Test 
(Stankov, 1997) 
Directions: 
 
Say “ I am going to show you some letters. Your task is to say what should be the 
next letter in the series. Here are two examples”. Show the participant the examples 
but cover the test items with a sheet of paper. 
 
Say “You can see that in the first example the next letter in the series would be „G‟. In 
the second example the next letter would be „A‟ because you must follow a rule that 
after „Z‟ the alphabet starts again at „A‟. Do you understand the rule and what you 
must do?”  
 
If the person says “No” repeat the instructions, otherwise say  “After each answer I 
want you to tell me how confident you are that you are correct. A guess corresponds 
closely to 0% confidence so you should give this as your rating. Absolute certainty 
corresponds to 100% confidence. Please make your choice from the ratings provided 
on the sheet. You will have four minutes to complete this test. Please work as quickly 
and accuratley as you can”. Remove the cover sheet, start timing and record the 
participant‟s responses on their score sheet. 
 
After four minutes say “Please stop now, the time limit for this test is up”. 
 
see  For example: 
Example 1:  A B C D E F ? 
Example 2: U V W X Y Z ? 
 
Trials: 
 
1. J K L M N O P Q ? 
2. C C Z C C Y C C X C C ? 
3. P Q Q R R R S S S S ? 
4. T R A T R B T R C T R ? 
5. B C C D E E F G ? 
6. O P Q O P Q R S T R S T U ? 
7. L O M P N ? 
8. A D G B E H C F ? 
9. A X A Y B X B Y C X C Y ? 
10. A M B C M D E F M G H I J ? 
11. A B C R S T D E F Q R S G H I ? 
12. R C R C S T C T U C ? 
13. Z A X Z Z X Z Y X Z X X Z ? 
14. C E B D A C Z B ? 
15. X F H Z J L B N P ? 
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Appendix E 
Esoteric Analogies Test 
Esoteric Analogies Test (Stankov, 1997) 
 
Directions:  
 
Show the participant the example, but cover the test items with a sheet of paper. 
 
Say  “In this test you will be shown three words in the same manner as the example. 
There is always a relationship between the first two words. In the example, LIGHT 
and DARK are opposites. Your task is to find this relationship and then choose, from 
the alternatives on the right of the sheet, the word which best shares that relationship 
with the third word. In the example you would look for a word that was opposite to 
HAPPY and in this case the best answer would be SAD. 
 
Ask the participant if they understand the procedure, if they answer no repeat the 
instructions. 
 
When the person understands, say “After each answer I want you to tell me how 
confident you are that you are correct. There are four alternative answers, so a guess 
corresponds to 25% confidence, and absolute certainty corresponds to 100% 
confidence. Please make your choice from the ratings provided. You will have only 
four minutes to complete this task, so please work as quickly and accurately as you 
can. There are questions on both sides of the sheet, so please turn over when you have 
finished the first side”. Uncover the test items, start timing and record the person‟s 
score. 
 
After four minutes have elapsed, say “Please stop now, the time limit for this test is 
up”. 
 
Example: LIGHT is to DARK as HAPPY is to 
 GLAD    SAD    GAY    EAGER 
 
Trials: 
 
1. FIRE is to HOT as ICE is to 
    POLE    COLD    CREAM    WHITE 
2. LOVE is to HATE as FRIEND is to 
    LOVER    PAL    OBEY    ENEMY 
3. STATUE is to SHAPE as SONG is to 
    BEAUTY    PIANO    TUNE    NOTE 
4. GROUND is to FOOT as RAIL is to 
    WHEEL    TRAIN    IRON    STATION 
5. FLAME is to HEAT as ROSE is to 
    LEAVES    SCENT    THORN    PETALS 
6. SPACE is to POINT as TIME is to 
    CLOCK    ETERNAL    MOMENT    POTION 
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7. RAIN is to HAIL as DEW is to 
    SNOW    WATER    CLOUD    FROST 
8. MANY is to FEW as OFTEN is to 
    FREQUENT    NEVER    ALWAYS 
9. BETTER is to WORST as SLOWER is to 
    FAST    RAPID    QUICKEST    BEST 
10. SURPRISE is to STRANGE as FEAR is to 
    ANXIOUS    TERRIBLE    WEAK    QUICK 
11. SOON is to NEVER as NEAR is to 
    NOWHERE    FAR    AWAY    SOMEWHERE 
12. WIN is to JOY as LOSE is to     
    FUN    SADNESS    FAIL    DREAM 
13. FOX is to WOLF  as GOAT is to 
    DOG    SHEEP    TIGER    RAT 
14. GANDER is to GOOSE as HOG is to 
    COW    ROOT    SOW    PIG 
15. MAP is to GEOGRAPHY as BLUEPRINT is to 
    HOUSE    ARCHITECTURE    FOUNDATION    GEOLOGY 
16. FORE is to AFT as BOW is to 
    STERN    DECK        BOAT        ARROW 
17. HOMOCIDE is to LAW as OEDEMA is to 
    ACTING    PEDAGOGY    THEOLOGY    MEDICINE 
18. CAT is to FELINE as HORSE is to  
    CANINE    VULPINE    EQUINE    CARNIVORE 
19. THREE is to TRIANGLE as FIVE is to 
    HEXAGON        PENTAGON    CIRCLE    TRAPEZOID 
20. ARMADILLO is to ANIMAL as CHARD is to  
    VEGETABLE    DRINK    FISH    LIZARD 
21. CONSTELLATION is to STAR as ARCHIPELAGO is to 
    PENINSULAR    ISLAND    CONTINENT    COUNTRY 
22. LENORE is to POE as ALICE is to  
    WHITMAN    SHAKESPEARE    CARROL    BYRON 
23. GUSTATORY is to TASTE as OLFACTORY is to 
    TOUCH    SMELL    FEEL    BALANCE 
24. VIRGIL is to AENID as MATTHEW is to 
    PSALMS    MARK    GOSPEL    JESUS 
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Appendix F 
Concealed Words Test  
(Stankov, 1997) 
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Appendix G 
Cattell’s Matrices  
(Stankov, 1997) 
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Appendix H 
The International Personality Item Pool Five-Factor 
Personality Scale  
 (Goldberg, 1997) 
On the following pages, there are phrases describing people's behaviors. 
Please use the rating scale below to describe how accurately each statement 
describes you. Describe yourself as you generally are now, not as you wish 
to be in the future. Describe yourself as you honestly see yourself, in 
relation to other people you know of the same sex as you are, and roughly 
your same age. So that you can describe yourself in an honest manner, your 
responses will be kept in absolute confidence. Please read each statement 
carefully, and then click on the number that corresponds to your rating. 
Response Options 
1: Very Inaccurate  
2: Moderately Inaccurate 
3: Neither Inaccurate nor Accurate 
4: Moderately Accurate 
5: Very Accurate 
1 Am the life of the party 1 2 3 4 5 
2 Feel little concern for others 1 2 3 4 5 
3 Am always prepared 1 2 3 4 5 
4 Get stressed out easily 1 2 3 4 5 
5 Have a rich vocabulary 1 2 3 4 5 
6 Don‟t talk a lot 1 2 3 4 5 
7 Am interested in people 1 2 3 4 5 
8 Leave my belongings around 1 2 3 4 5 
9 Am relaxed most of the time 1 2 3 4 5 
10 Have difficulty understanding abstract ideas 1 2 3 4 5 
11 Feel comfortable around people 1 2 3 4 5 
12 Insult people 1 2 3 4 5 
13 Pay attention to details 1 2 3 4 5 
14 Worry about things 1 2 3 4 5 
15 Have a vivid imagination 1 2 3 4 5 
16 Keep in the background 1 2 3 4 5 
17 Sympathise with others‟ feelings 1 2 3 4 5 
18 Make a mess of things 1 2 3 4 5 
19 Seldom feel blue 1 2 3 4 5 
20 Am not interested in abstract ideas 1 2 3 4 5 
21 Start conversations 1 2 3 4 5 
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22 Am not interested in other people‟s problems 1 2 3 4 5 
23 Get chores done right away 1 2 3 4 5 
24 Am easily disturbed 1 2 3 4 5 
25 Have excellent ideas 1 2 3 4 5 
26 Have little to say 1 2 3 4 5 
27 Have a soft heart 1 2 3 4 5 
28 Often forget to put things back in their proper place 1 2 3 4 5 
29 Get upset easily 1 2 3 4 5 
30 Do not have a good imagination 1 2 3 4 5 
31 Talk to a lot of different people at parties 1 2 3 4 5 
32 Am not really interested in others 1 2 3 4 5 
33 Like order 1 2 3 4 5 
34 Change my mood a lot 1 2 3 4 5 
35 Am quick to understand things 1 2 3 4 5 
36 Don‟t like to draw attention to myself 1 2 3 4 5 
37 Take time out for others 1 2 3 4 5 
38 Shirk my duties 1 2 3 4 5 
39 Have frequent mood swings 1 2 3 4 5 
40 Use difficult words 1 2 3 4 5 
41 Don‟t mind being the centre of attention 1 2 3 4 5 
42 Feel others‟ emotions 1 2 3 4 5 
43 Follow a schedule 1 2 3 4 5 
44 Get irritated easily 1 2 3 4 5 
45 Spend time reflecting on things 1 2 3 4 5 
46 Am quiet around strangers 1 2 3 4 5 
47 Make people feel at ease 1 2 3 4 5 
48 Am exacting in my work 1 2 3 4 5 
49 Often feel blue 1 2 3 4 5 
50 Am full of ideas 1 2 3 4 5 
 
THANKYOU 
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Appendix I 
Big Five Self-Rated Personality Block Descriptions  
Extraversion block personality description  
 
Please read the following personality description carefully. Please rate with reference 
to the 11-point rating scale below the extent to which the OVERALL description 
GENERALLY reflects your personality. 
 
I don‟t mind being the centre of attention; I make friends easily; I take charge;  
I know how to captivate people; I feel at ease with people; I am skilled in  
handling social situations; I am the life of the party; I start conversations. 
 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
You will now be asked to provide a confidence rating. Please read the following 
instructions carefully. 
 
Imagine that there was some device that could accurately tell us about your 
personality. How confident are you that the rating you gave above would  
correspond with the device‟s rating? Please rate your confidence on the scale 
that appears below by circling your level of confidence. 
 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTELY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
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Agreeableness block personality description  
 
Please read the following personality description carefully. Please rate with reference 
to the 11-point rating scale below the extent to which the OVERALL description 
GENERALLY reflects your personality. 
 
I enquire about others‟ well being; I know how to comfort others; I love 
children ; I am on good terms with nearly everyone ; I have a good word for 
everyone; I show my gratitude; I think of others first; I love to help others; I 
am interested in people; I sympathise with others‟ feelings. 
 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
You will now be asked to provide a confidence rating. Please read the following 
instructions carefully. 
 
Imagine that there was some device that could accurately tell us about your 
personality. How confident are you that the rating you gave above would 
correspond with the device‟s rating? Please rate your confidence on the scale 
that appears below by circling your level of confidence. 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTELY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
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Emotional stability block personality description  
 
Please read the following personality description carefully. Please rate with reference 
to the 11-point rating scale below the extent to which the OVERALL description 
GENERALLY reflects your personality. 
 
I am not easily bothered by things; I do not easily take offense; I rarely get 
irritated; I seldom get mad; I rarely panic; I am not easily overwhelmed by 
emotions; I am relaxed most of the time; I seldom feel blue; I don‟t feel 
threatened easily. 
 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
You will now be asked to provide a confidence rating. Please read the following 
instructions carefully. 
 
Imagine that there was some device that could accurately tell us about your 
personality. How confident are you that the rating you gave above would 
correspond with the device‟s rating? Please rate your confidence on the scale 
that appears below by circling your level of confidence. 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTELY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
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Conscientiousness Block personality description 
 
 
Please read the following personality description carefully. Please rate with reference 
to the 11-point rating scale below the extent to which the OVERALL description 
GENERALLY reflects your personality. 
 
I do things according to plan; I continue until everything is perfect; I make plans and 
stick to them; I love order and regularly like to tidy up; I seldom neglect my duties; I 
seldom waste my time; I am always prepared; I pay attention to details; I get chores 
done right away. 
 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
You will now be asked to provide a confidence rating. Please read the following 
instructions carefully. 
 
Imagine that there was some device that could accurately tell us about your 
personality. How confident are you that the rating you gave above would 
correspond with the device‟s rating? Please rate your confidence on the scale 
that appears below by circling your level of confidence. 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTELY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
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Intellect Block Personality Description 
 
Please read the following personality description carefully. Please rate with reference 
to the 11-point rating scale below the extent to which the OVERALL description 
GENERALLY reflects your personality. 
 
I carry the conversation to a higher level; I catch on to things quickly; I can 
handle a lot of information; I love to think up new ways of doing things; I love 
to read challenging material; I am good at many things; I have a rich 
vocabulary; I am interested in abstract ideas; I have a good imagination; I will 
probe deeply into a subject. 
 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
You will now be asked to provide a confidence rating. Please read the following 
instructions carefully. 
 
Imagine that there was some device that could accurately tell us about your 
personality. How confident are you that the rating you gave above would 
correspond with the device‟s rating? Please rate your confidence on the scale 
that appears below by circling your level of confidence. 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTELY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 Cognitive and Personality Confidence 266 
 
Appendix J 
Informed Consent for Study 1 
You are being invited to participate in this study which investigates self-confidence in 
personality and cognitive judgments. It is anticipated that the results of this study will 
provide useful information for other researchers and will also help us understand the 
trait of self-confidence in a more meaningful way. 
 
If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to take some time to 
complete a number of cognitive tasks and personality measures. Completing this test 
battery should require no longer than 1 hour of your time and a 1% credit applies for 
those students whose course allows experimental time to be counted toward their final 
grade. Or you may wish to enter a draw for cash prizes. 
 
Participation in this study is completely voluntary and you will suffer no penalties 
should you choose not to participate. You are also free to withdraw from the study at 
any time. 
 
Your identity as a participant in this research will remain confidential with respect to 
any publication of the results of the study. Any information that can identify you as a 
participant will be stored in a secured place, with the information available only to the 
investigator. 
 
If you have any questions at any time regarding this research you may contact 
Professor Gerry Fogarty on (07) 4631 2379. 
 
I have fully read the above information, and understand the nature and purpose of this 
research. I understand that my participation is completely voluntary and that I may 
withdraw at any time. I understand that the results of this study will be treated with 
confidentiality. The results will be reported only in their aggregate form and I will not 
be identified individually. 
 
Name_________________________________________(please print) 
 
Signature_______________________________________ 
 
Date______________________ 
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Appendix K 
Factor Analysis of IPIP Scales and IPIP Block 
Descriptors-Study 1 
The factorial structure of IPIP subscales and IPIP block descriptors were 
examined using Principal Components Analysis with Oblique rotation. A solution 
employing root one criterion produced 4 factors.  Cattell‟s Scree plot, however, 
provided support for a 5 factor solution. Also, the eigenvalue for the fifth factor 
was .97 providing support for interpreting a five factor solution (see Carroll, 1993). 
The pattern matrix, percent of variance accounted for, eigenvalues, and factor 
correlation matrix are presented in Table K1.  The five factor solution accounted for 
80.71% of the total variance.  The first factor was labelled Extraversion which had 
high loadings from both the IPIP Extraversion subscale and the Extraversion block 
descriptor.  The second factor was labelled Conscientiousness which comprised 
loadings from both the IPIP and block descriptor measures of Conscientiousness. The 
third factor was labelled Emotional Stability which had high loadings from both 
measures. The fourth factor was labelled Agreeableness with high loadings from both 
Agreeableness measures. The last factor was called Intellect with high loadings from 
both measures of this dimension.  
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Table K1 
Principal Components Analysis of IPIP Subscale Scores and Big Five Block 
Descriptors in Study 1 (N = 127). 
Variable h2(b) F1a F2 F3 F4 F5 
CONCR .82  .91    
INTELLCR .80     .89 
AGREECR .68    -.79  
EXTRACR .86 .92     
EMOTCR .86   -.94   
IPIPEXTRA .82 .88     
IPIPAGREE .77    -.88  
IPIPCONSC .81  .89    
IPIPEMOT .84   -.88   
IPIPINTELLECT .82     .90 
Eigenvalues  2.35 2.01 1.52 1.21 .97 
% of variance  23.54 20.10 15.25 12.12 9.69 
Factor 
Correlation 
Matrix 
      
 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5  
F1 1.00      
F2 .05 1.00     
F3 -.16 -.14 1.00    
F4 -.14 -.17 .06 1.00   
F5 .30 -.04 .09 -.06 1.00  
Note. h2(b) = Communalities;  a  F1 = Personality Bias; F2 = Gf Bias. The cut-off for suppression was .20. 
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Appendix L 
IPIP Form B 
IPIP Form B-Agreeableness 
 
Please read the following personality statements carefully. You will be asked to do 
two things with reference to each statement. Firstly, please rate (on the rating scale 
from -5 not like me to +5 like me) the extent to which each statement reflects your 
personality. 
 
After this you will be asked to provide a confidence rating ranging from 0% just 
guessing to 100% absolutely certain. When making your confidence rating: 
Imagine that there was some device that could accurately tell us about your 
personality. How confident are you that the rating you gave would correspond with 
the device‟s rating? Please rate your confidence on the scale that appears below by 
clicking on your level of confidence. 
 
Please read each statement carefully, and then click the number that corresponds to 
each of your ratings 
 
Statement 1.  I enquire about others’ well being 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 
Statement 2.  I know how to comfort others 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
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Statement 3.  I love children 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 
Statement 4.  I am on good terms with nearly everyone 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 
Statement 5.  I have a good word for everyone; 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
Statement 6.  I show my gratitude 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
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Statement 7.  I think of others first 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 
Statement 8.  I love to help others 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 
Statement 9.  I am interested in people 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 
Statement 10.  I sympathise with others‟ feelings 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
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IPIP Form B -Conscientiousness 
Please read the following personality statements carefully. You will be asked to do 
two things with reference to each statement. Firstly, please rate (on the rating scale 
from -5 not like me to +5 like me) the extent to which each statement reflects your 
personality. After this you will be asked to provide a confidence rating ranging from 
0% just guessing to 100% absolutely certain. 
 
When making your confidence rating: Imagine that there was some device that could 
accurately tell us about your  personality. How confident are you that the rating you 
gave would  correspond with the device‟s rating? Please rate your confidence on the 
scale  that appears below by clicking on your level of confidence. 
 
Please read each statement carefully, and then click on the number that corresponds to 
each of your ratings 
 
 
Statement 1.  I do things according to plan 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 
Statement 2.  I continue until everything is perfect 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
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Statement 3.  I make plans and stick to them 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
Statement 4.  I love order and regularly like to tidy up 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 
Statement 5.  I seldom neglect my duties 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
Statement 6.  I seldom waste my time 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
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Statement 7.  I am always prepared 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 
Statement 8.  I pay attention to details 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 
Statement 9.  I get chores done right away. 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
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IPIP Form B -Extraversion 
 
Please read the following personality statements carefully. You will be asked to do 
two things with reference to each statement. Firstly, please rate (on the rating scale 
from -5 not like me to +5 like me) the extent to which each statement reflects your 
personality. After this you will be asked to provide a confidence rating ranging from 
0% just guessing to 100% absolutely certain. 
 
When making your confidence rating: Imagine that there was some device that could 
accurately tell us about your personality. How confident are you that the rating you 
gave would correspond with the device‟s rating? Please rate your confidence on the 
scale that appears below by clicking on your level of confidence. 
 
Please read each statement carefully, and then click on the number that corresponds to 
each of your ratings 
 
Statement 1.  I don‟t mind being the centre of attention  
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 
Statement 2.  I make friends easily  
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
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Statement 3.  I take charge  
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
Statement 4.  I know how to captivate people  
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
Statement 5.  I feel at ease with people  
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 
Statement 6.  I am skilled in handling social situations 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
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Statement 7.  I am the life of the party 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 
Statement 8.  I start conversations 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
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IPIP Form B -Emotional Stability 
Please read the following personality statements carefully. You will be asked to do 
two things with reference to each statement. Firstly, please rate (on the rating scale 
from -5 not like me to +5 like me) the extent to which each statement reflects your 
personality. After this you will be asked to provide a confidence rating ranging from 
0% just guessing to 100% absolutely certain. 
 
When making your confidence rating: Imagine that there was some device that could 
accurately tell us about your  personality. How confident are you that the rating you 
gave would correspond with the device‟s rating? Please rate your confidence on the 
scale that appears below by clicking on your level of confidence. 
 
Please read each statement carefully, and then click on the number that corresponds to 
each of your ratings 
 
 
Statement 1.  I am not easily bothered by things 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 
Statement 2.  I do not easily take offense 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
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Statement 3.  I rarely get irritated 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 
Statement 4.  I seldom get mad 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 
Statement 5.  I rarely panic 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
Statement 6.  I am not easily overwhelmed by emotions 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
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Statement 7.  I am relaxed most of the time 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 
Statement 8.  I seldom feel blue 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 
Statement 9.  I don‟t feel threatened easily. 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
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IPIP Form B –Intellect 
 
Please read the following personality statements carefully. You will be asked to do 
two things with reference to each statement. Firstly, please rate (on the rating scale 
from -5 not like me to +5 like me) the extent to which each statement reflects your 
personality. After this you will be asked to provide a confidence rating ranging from 
0% just guessing to 100% absolutely certain. 
 
When making your confidence rating: Imagine that there was some device that could 
accurately tell us about your  personality. How confident are you that the rating you 
gave would  correspond with the device‟s rating? Please rate your confidence on the 
scale  that appears below by clicking on your level of confidence. 
 
Please read each statement carefully, and then click on the number that corresponds to 
each of your ratings 
 
Statement 1.  I carry the conversation to a higher level 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 
Statement 2.  I catch on to things quickly 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
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Statement 3.  I can handle a lot of information 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 
Statement 4.  I love to think up new ways of doing things 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 
Statement 5.  I love to read challenging material 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
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Statement 6.  I am good at many things 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 
Statement 7.  I have a rich vocabulary 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
Statement 8.  I am interested in abstract ideas 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 
Statement 9.  I have a good imagination 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
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Statement 10.  I will probe deeply into a subject 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
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Appendix M 
Informed Consent for Study 2 
You are being invited to participate in this study which investigates self-confidence in 
personality and cognitive judgments. It is anticipated that the results of this study will 
provide useful information for other researchers and will also help us understand the 
trait of self-confidence in a more meaningful way. 
 
If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to take some time to 
complete a number of self-report personality measures as well as three cognitive tasks. 
Completing this test battery should require no longer than 3 hour of your time and a 
3% credit applies for those students whose course allows experimental time to be 
counted toward their final grade. Or you may wish to enter a draw for cash prizes. 
 
Participation in this study is completely voluntary and you will suffer no penalties 
should you choose not to participate. You are also free to withdraw from the study at 
any time. 
 
Your identity as a participant in this research will remain confidential with respect to 
any publication of the results of the study. Any information that can identify you as a 
participant will be stored in a secured place, with the information available only to the 
investigator. 
 
If you have any questions at any time regarding this research you may contact 
Professor Gerry Fogarty on (07) 4631 2379. 
 
I have fully read the above information, and understand the nature and purpose of this 
research. I understand that my participation is completely voluntary and that I may 
withdraw at any time. I understand that the results of this study will be treated with 
confidentiality. The results will be reported only in their aggregate form and I will not 
be identified individually. 
 
I declare that I am at least 18 years of age and I hereby give my consent to participate 
in this study by inserting the number from the bottom left-hand corner of the survey 
into the Consent ID box below. 
 
123456   
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Appendix N 
Factor Analysis of Big Five Accuracy Scores Study 2 
The factorial structure of the Big Five accuracy scores (i.e., methods 1, 2 and 
3) were examined using Principal Components Analysis with Promax rotation and 
Kaiser Normalization. The correlation matrix of these scores is presented in Table N1.  
A solution employing root one criterion produced six factors. However, 
Cattell‟s Scree plot was indeterminate after five factors which supported a five factor 
solution. The pattern matrix, percent of variance accounted for, eigenvalues, and 
factor correlation matrix for the five-factor solution are presented in Table N2.  The 
five factor solution accounted for 72.07% of the total variance.  The first factor was 
labelled Agreeableness accuracy which comprised loadings from all the 
Agreeableness accuracy scores.  The second, third, fourth and fifth factors were 
labelled Emotional Stability Accuracy, Conscientiousness Accuracy, Extraversion 
Accuracy, and Intellect Accuracy respectively, with each of the factors comprising 
loadings from the appropriate methods for each dimension. The low correlations 
between the factors suggested that accuracy was domain specific and therefore mean 
accuracy scores were calculated. 
  
 
Table N1 
Correlations Among Big Five Accuracy Scores Obtained From Methods 1, 2, and 3 for Study 2 (N = 405) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
IntellectaccM1 1.00                             
ConscientiousnessaccM1 0.11* 1.00                           
ExtraversionaccM1 0.20** 0.17** 1.00                         
AgreeablenessaccM1 0.12* 0.15** 0.11* 1.00                       
EmotionalStabilityaccM1 0.17** 0.12* 0.23** 0.20** 1.00                     
IntellectaccM2 0.27** 0.13* 0.07 0.12* 0.08 1.00                   
ConscientiousnessaccM2 0.02 0.53** 0.10* 0.10* 0.00 0.16** 1.00                 
ExtraversionaccM2 0.08 0.22** 0.34** 0.08 0.15** 0.24** 0.14** 1.00               
AgreeablenessaccM2 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.70 0.14** 0.09 0.05 0.10* 1.00             
EmotionalStabilityaccM2 0.12* 0.07 0.14** 0.08 0.48** 0.08 0.06 0.19** 0.10* 1.00           
IntellectaccM3 0.28** 0.17** 0.09 0.11* 0.08 0.81** 0.15** 0.16** 0.08 0.08 1.00         
ConscientiousnessaccM3 0.08 0.58** 0.09 0.10* 0.10* 0.12* 0.71** 0.10* 0.01 0.07 0.16** 1.00       
ExtraversionaccM3 0.12* 0.27** 0.32** 0.11* 0.16** 0.20** 0.19** 0.82** 0.09 0.24** 0.13** 0.15* 1.00     
AgreeablenessaccM3 0.03 0.07 -0.02 0.54** 0.15** 0.14** 0.12* 0.06 0.67** 0.13** 0.11* 0.04 0.06 1.00   
EmotionalStabilityaccM3 0.12* 0.07 0.12* 0.10* 0.51** 0.09 0.07 0.17** 0.11* 0.86** 0.10* 0.08 0.22** 0.11* 1.00 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
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Table N-2 
Pattern Matrix for Study2 Accuracy Scores Using Principal Components Analysis 
with Promax Rotation and Kaiser Normalisation (N = 405) 
Variable h2(b) F1a F2c F3d F4e F5f 
IntellectaccM1 0.29     .51 
ConscientiousnessaccM1 0.65   .77   
ExtraversionaccM1 0.35    .57  
AgreeablenessaccM1 0.73 .84     
EmotionalStabilityaccM1 0.55  .71    
IntellectaccM2 0.85     .92 
ConscientiousnessaccM2 0.78   .89   
ExtraversionaccM2 0.85    .93  
AgreeablenessaccM2 0.84 .92     
EmotionalStabilityaccM2 0.84  .92    
IntellectaccM3 0.86     .93 
ConscientiousnessaccM3 0.82   .92   
ExtraversionaccM3 0.83    .91  
AgreeablenessaccM3 0.72 .84     
EmotionalStabilityaccM3 0.86  .93    
Eigenvalues  3.53 2.13 2.00 1.67 1.48 
% of variance  23.54 14.20 13.34 11.13 9.87 
Factor Correlation Matrix       
 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5  
F1 1.00      
F2 0.14 1.00     
F3 0.10 0.09 1.00    
F4 0.11 0.23 0.21 1.00   
F5 0.14 0.11 0.19 0.21 1.00  
Note. acc= accuracy; M1 = method 1; M2 = method 2; M3 = method 3 . h2(b) = Communalities  a  F1 =  Agreeableness Accuracy, 
cF2 = Emotional Stability Accuracy, F3d  = Conscientiousness Accuracy, F4e = Extraversion Accuracy, F5f = Intellect Accuracy. 
The cut-off for suppression was .20. 
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Appendix O 
Word Association Test  
(Stankov, 1997) 
 
In this test your task is to think of a word which is associated with two given words. 
Its relationship with the two given words may be different. For the first example the 
two words are: 
 
  NUMBER…………………….NOBILITY 
 
A correct answer for this example would be COUNT because COUNT  is a word 
related to numbers and is a title given to members of nobility. For the second example 
the two words are: 
 
  COST…………………………ATTACK 
 
In this case a correct answer could be CHARGE. The cost of something is how much 
you are charged for it, and to charge is a form of attack. 
 
After each answer I want you to type how confident you are that your answer is 
correct with reference to the confidence scale that is presented below. On the 
confidence scale 0% represents just guessing and 100% represents that you are 
absolutely certain your answer is correct. You can make your confidence rating by 
using the mouse cursor to click on your confidence rating. There are 10 trials in this 
test. You will be given 3 minutes to complete this test, so if you find a question 
difficult then move on to the next item and return to unanswered questions if you have 
time. You can monitor the amount of time that you have taken for the task by 
referring to the clock in the top left hand corner of the computer screen. Additionally, 
a counter will appear in the bottom left hand corner of the computer screen so that you 
can monitor how many trials that you have completed. 
 
At the end of the test, please provide an estimate of the percentage of items you think 
you answered correctly. It is IMPORTANT that you provide this estimate 
IMMEDIATELY after completing the test. After providing your percentage estimate, 
I want you to type how confident you are that your percentage estimate is correct 
using the confidence scale that appears on the screen. 
 
 
FINGER……………..HAMMER 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
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CARD………………...SHIP 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 
CLOTHES……………LAW 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 
MINUTE………………FIRST 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 
RIVER………………..MONEY 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 
ACCOUNT……………DUCK 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 
FISH……………………FILM 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
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MUSIC…………………CLIMB 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 
DRESS………………….EDGE 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 
PIG………………………EYE 
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
END OF TEST 
 
Please estimate the percentage of items you think you answered 
correctly:………………………………. 
 
How confident are you that your percentage estimate is correct? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
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Appendix P 
Private Self-Consciousness Scale  
(Fenigstein et al., 1975) 
Answer the following questions as honestly and accurately as possible on a scale from 
0 (Extremely uncharacteristic) to 5 (Extremely characteristic). 
 
Rating Scale 
 
0  1  2  3  4 
Extremely       Extremely 
Uncharacteristic      Characteristic 
 
 
Item 1 
I‟m generally trying to figure myself out. 
 
Item 2 
I reflect about myself a lot. 
 
Item 3 
I‟m often the subject of my own fantasies. 
 
Item 4 
I‟m generally attentive to my inner feelings. 
 
Item 5 
I‟m consistently examining my motives. 
 
Item 6 
I sometimes have the feeling that I‟m off somewhere watching myself. 
 
Item 7 
I‟m alert to changes in my mood. 
 
Item 8 
I‟m aware of the way my mind works when I work through a problem. 
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Appendix Q 
Need for Cognition (short form) 
(NFC Cacioppo et al., 1984) 
Below are a number of statements. For each statement you are asked to indicate your 
level of agreement using the following rating scale: Please click on the number that 
represents your rating. 
 
Rating Scale 
-2  -1  0  1  2 
Very Strong       Very Strong 
Disagreement       Agreement 
 
Item1 
I would prefer complex to simple problems. 
 
Item 2 
I would like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of 
thinking. 
 
Item 3 
Thinking is not my area of fun. 
 
Item 4 
I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to 
challenge my thinking abilities. 
 
Item 5 
I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely chance I will have to think 
in depth about something. 
 
Item 6 
I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours. 
 
Item 7 
I only think as hard as I have to. 
 
Item 8 
I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones. 
 
Item 9 
I like tasks that require little thought once I‟ve learned them. 
 
Item 10 
The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. 
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Item 11 
I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. 
 
Item 12 
Learning new ways to think doesn‟t excite me very much. 
 
Item 13 
I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve. 
 
Item 14 
The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. 
 
Item 15 
I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is 
somewhat important but does not require much thought. 
 
Item 16 
I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of mental 
effort. 
 
Item 17 
It‟s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don‟t care how it works. 
 
Item 18 
I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally. 
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 Appendix R 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS)  
(Watson et al., 1988) 
Read each item and 
then click the box that 
best indicates to what 
extent you generally 
feel this way, that is, 
how you feel on 
average 
Very 
Slightly or 
not at all 
A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely  
1.  interested      
2.  distressed      
3.  excited      
4.  upset      
5.  strong      
6.  guilty      
7.  scared      
8.  hostile      
9.  enthusiastic      
10. proud      
11. irritable      
12. alert      
13. ashamed      
14. inspired      
15. nervous      
16. determined      
17. attentive      
18. jittery      
19. active      
20. afraid      
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Appendix S 
Self-report Intelligence and Confidence Questionnaire 
(SICQ) 
Please read the following statements about mental abilities carefully. You will be 
asked to do two things with reference to each statement. Firstly, please rate each 
statement using the scale from -5 (not like me) to +5 (like me). 
 
After this you will be asked to provide a confidence rating ranging from 0% (just 
guessing) to 100% (absolutely certain). When making your confidence rating: 
Imagine that there was some device that could accurately tell us about your  
mental abilities. How confident are you that the rating you gave would  
correspond with the device‟s rating?  
 
Please rate your confidence on the scale that appears below by clicking on your level 
of confidence. 
 
Please read each statement carefully, and then click the number that 
corresponds to each of your ratings 
 
 
Item 1. I have a good vocabulary 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 
Item 2  I know a lot of worldly facts 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
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Item 3  I have a good short-term memory 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
Item 4  I am good at arithmetic 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 
Item 5  I have poor visual-spatial skills 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 
Item 6  I have a poor ability at detecting what two concepts have in 
common 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
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Item 7  I have good perceptual skills 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
 
Item 8  I am poor at solving logical problems 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
Item 9  I am intelligent 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
 
Item 10  I am good at being able to perceive patterns in a series of 
numbers or letters 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Not          Like 
like           me 
me 
 
How confident are you that the rating you gave above would correspond with the 
device‟s rating? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
JUST         ABSOLUTLEY 
GUESSING        CERTAIN 
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 Appendix T 
Covering Page and Informed Consent Study 3 
 
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY 
FACULTY OF SCIENCES 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN QUEENSLAND 
Before starting the survey, close down any menu bars or other programs that may be 
reducing your screen size. You should be able to read the information on the screen 
without having to scroll from left to right. 
You are being invited to participate in this study which investigates self-confidence in 
personality and cognitive judgments. It is anticipated that the results of this study will 
provide useful information for other researchers and will also help us understand the 
trait of self-confidence in a more meaningful way. 
 
If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to take some time to 
complete a number of self-report personality measures as well as three cognitive tasks. 
Completing this test battery should require no longer than 2 hours of your time and a 
2% credit applies for those students whose course allows experimental time to be 
counted toward their final grade. Or you may wish to enter a draw for cash prizes. It is 
important that you try to complete the battery in a single session if possible. 
 
Participation in this study is completely voluntary and you will suffer no penalties 
should you choose not to participate. You are also free to withdraw from the study at 
any time. 
 
Your identity as a participant in this research will remain confidential with respect to 
any publication of the results of the study. Any information that can identify you as a 
participant will be stored in a secured place, with the information available only to the 
investigator. 
 
If you have any questions at any time regarding this research you may contact 
Professor Gerard Fogarty on (07) 4631 2379. 
 
I have fully read the above information, and understand the nature and purpose of this 
research. I understand that my participation is completely voluntary and that I may 
withdraw at any time. I understand that the results of this study will be treated with 
confidentiality. The results will be reported only in their aggregate form and I will not 
be identified individually. 
 
If you have any technical concerns or difficulties accessing the Survey please contact 
Sandra Baker, Department of Psychology on 0402070056 or 46311613 or contact 
Ross Bool, University of Southern Queensland, on 07 4631 2388, or email 
bool@usq.edu.au. 
 
I declare that I am at least 18 years of age and I hereby give my consent to participate 
in this study by inserting the number from the bottom left-hand corner of the survey 
into the Consent ID box below. 
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Appendix U 
Additional Factor Analyses for Study 3 
Factor Analysis of Big Five Accuracy Scores Study 3 
The factorial structure of the Big Five accuracy scores (i.e., methods 1, 2 and 
3) were examined using Principal Components Analysis with Promax rotation and  
Kaiser Normalization. The correlation matrix of these scores is presented in Table U1.  
A solution employing root one criterion produced five factors. The pattern 
matrix, percent of variance accounted for, eigenvalues, and factor correlation matrix 
are presented in Table U2.  The five factor solution accounted for 81.13% of the total 
variance.  The first factor was labelled Emotional Stability Accuracy which comprised 
loadings from all the Emotional Stability accuracy scores.  The second, third, fourth 
and fifth factors were labelled Agreeableness Accuracy, Conscientiousness Accuracy, 
Intellect Accuracy, and Extraversion Accuracy respectively, with each of the factors 
comprising loadings from the appropriate methods for each dimension. The low 
correlations between the factors suggested that accuracy was domain specific and 
therefore mean accuracy scores were calculated. 
  
 
Table U1 
Correlations Among Big Five Accuracy Scores Obtained From Methods 1, 2, and 3 for Study 3 (N = 243) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
IntellectaccM1 1.00                             
ConscientiousnessaccM1 0.14 1.00                           
ExtraversionaccM1 0.15 0.04 1.00                         
AgreeablenessaccM1 0.19 0.08 0.09 1.00                       
EmotionalStabilityaccM1 0.19 0.16 -0.01 0.09 1.00                     
IntellectaccM2 0.65 0.13 0.12 0.18 0.13 1.00                   
ConscientiousnessaccM2 0.09 0.70 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.15 1.00                 
ExtraversionaccM2 0.17 0.12 0.23 0.24 -0.06 0.29 0.12 1.00               
AgreeablenessaccM2 0.14 0.08 0.13 0.81 0.17 0.16 0.07 0.20 1.00             
EmotionalStabilityaccM2 0.18 0.18 0.03 0.13 0.81 0.14 0.10 -0.04 0.20 1.00           
IntellectaccM3 0.61 0.12 0.20 0.14 0.13 0.69 0.12 0.21 0.14 0.14 1.00         
ConscientiousnessaccM3 0.13 0.91 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.12 0.74 0.13 0.07 0.14 0.13 1.00       
ExtraversionaccM3 0.12 0.16 0.26 0.24 -0.02 0.22 0.15 0.78 0.23 0.02 0.19 0.18 1.00     
AgreeablenessaccM3 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.77 0.15 0.13 0.08 0.22 0.82 0.20 0.13 0.09 0.25 1.00   
EmotionalStabilityaccM3 0.20 0.17 0.00 0.10 0.98 0.14 0.10 -0.08 0.16 0.83 0.14 0.13 -0.04 0.16 1.00 
Note. * p < .05 ** p < .01 
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Table U-2 
Pattern Matrix for Study 3 Accuracy Scores Using Principal Components Analysis 
with Promax Rotation and Kaiser Normalisation (N = 243) 
Variable h2(b) F1a F2c F3d F4e F5f 
IntellectaccM1 0.75    .86  
ConscientiousnessaccM1 0.89   .94   
ExtraversionaccM1 0.25     .48 
AgreeablenessaccM1 0.86  .93    
EmotionalStabilityaccM1 0.95 .98     
IntellectaccM2 0.79    .88  
ConscientiousnessaccM2 0.76   .88   
ExtraversionaccM2 0.83     .91 
AgreeablenessaccM2 0.89  .94    
EmotionalStabilityaccM2 0.84 .91     
IntellectaccM3 0.77    .87  
ConscientiousnessaccM3 0.92   .96   
ExtraversionaccM3 0.86     .93 
AgreeablenessaccM3 0.86  .92    
EmotionalStabilityaccM3 0.96 .98     
Eigenvalues  3.99 2.57 2.36 1.94 1.30 
% of variance  29.59 17.13 15.76 12.96 8.69 
Factor Correlation Matrix       
 F1 F2   F3 F4 F5  
F1 1.00      
F2 0.17 1.00     
F3 0.15 0.09 1.00    
F4 0.18 0.17 0.15 1.00   
F5 -0.04 0.27 0.17 0.25 1.00  
Note. acc= accuracy; M1 = method 1; M2 = method 2; M3 = method 3 . h2(b) = Communalities  a  F1 =  Emotional Stability 
Accuracy, cF2 = Agreeableness Accuracy, F3d  = Conscientiousness Accuracy, F4e = Intellect Accuracy, F5f = Extraversion 
Accuracy. The cut-off for suppression was .20. 
Factor Analysis of Gf Accuracy Scores and Confidence in PTPEs 
The factorial structure of the Gf accuracy scores and confidence in PTPEs 
were examined using Principal Axis Factoring with Oblique rotation. A solution 
employing root one criterion produced two factors. The pattern matrix, percent of 
variance accounted for, eigenvalues, and factor correlation matrix are presented in 
Table U3.  The two factor solution accounted for 55.82% of the total variance.  As 
anticipated, the two factors comprised loadings from the expected confidence and 
accuracy scores.  The first factor was labelled Gf Evaluative Confidence which had 
high loadings from the confidence in PTPE scores. The second factor was labelled Gf 
accuracy which comprised loading from the Gf accuracy scores. The factors were not 
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correlated highly suggesting that Gf Evaluative Confidence and Gf Accuracy are 
distinct but correlated processes.  
Table U3 
Principal Axis Factoring of Gf Evaluative and Gf Accuracy Scores (N = 243). 
Variable h2(b) F1a F2 
ESTCG .64 .79  
LSTGC .37 .62  
WATGC .48 .69  
WATAC .24  .51 
ESTAC .23  .45 
LSTAC .11  .27 
Eigenvalues  2.12 1.23 
% of variance  35.27 20.55 
Factor Correlation 
Matrix 
   
 F1 F2  
F1 1.00   
F2 .29 1.00  
Note. h2(b) = Communalities;  a  F1 = Personality Bias; F2 = Gf Bias 
